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Control Transaction Governance: Collective 
Action and Asymmetric Information Problems and 
Ex post Policing 
Kenju Watanabe* 
Abstract: Why, when and how should control transactions be policed ex post 
and by a judiciary? This article is the first to 1) articulate the doctrinal prereq-
uisites for effective ex post judicial policing of fiduciaries in control transac-
tions, and 2) theoretically unify two seemingly distinct approaches to police con-
trol transactions: the ex post judicial policing in the United States and the ex 
ante policing by the Takeover Panel in the United Kingdom. Shareholder collec-
tive action and asymmetric information problems, and the extent of gatekeeping 
by fiduciaries together determine the mode of third-party interventions, such as 
those by judiciaries and the Takeover Panel, in control transactions. The Arti-
cle’s analysis yields normative conclusions about how judiciaries in the United 
States, including Delaware’s, should fine-tune gatekeeping by corporate fiduci-
aries in control transactions. It predicts that multijurisdictional shareholder liti-
gation that seeks anticipatory adjudication will produce negative consequences.  
Further, it gives policy makers outside of the United States the theoretical foun-
dation for crafting third-party interventions in both types of control transac-
tions, i.e., third-party acquisitions of control and controller freeze-outs, that are 
optimal for their own jurisdictions. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Why, when, and how should control transactions be policed ex post 
and by a judiciary? Collective action and asymmetric information problems 
and related agency problems often frustrate efficiency enhancing control 
transactions and encourage efficiency destroying control transactions. These 
happen particularly at the companies that have already been plagued with 
the problems. There is no pure internal mechanism to correct these and a 
third party intervention is due. It can be done ex post or ex ante. 
This paper identifies normative prerequisites that a judiciary must meet 
to effectively police ex post fiduciaries in acquisitions of companies1 with 
dispersed shareholders and in freeze-outs of dispersed minority sharehold-
ers, both in cash (together “control transactions”). Collective action prob-
lems (CAPs) and asymmetric information problems (AIPs)—together twin 
problems (TPs)—resulting from shareholder dispersion2 determine the pre-
requisites. The less empowered corporate fiduciaries are to gatekeep control 
transactions for dispersed shareholders, the less the normative strength of 
the prerequisites is. Delaware’s judiciary, while it meets the prerequisites 
better than any other judiciaries and is the best in the United States, should 
examine if its judicial standards give excessive gatekeeping powers to the 
fiduciaries relative to its ability to address TPs relating to shareholder law-
suits against the fiduciaries in control transactions and thus less than opti-
mal. Non-Delaware judiciaries, generally less capable of addressing the 
TPs, should examine if they should follow Delaware’s judicial standards. It 
predicts that multijurisdictional shareholder litigation that seeks anticipatory 
adjudication will produce negative consequences. Jurisdictions outside the 
United States may opt to limit the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping roles and aban-
don the ex post judicial policing if their judiciaries do not satisfy the norma-
tive prerequisites and resort to ex ante policing. 
Part II first shows that the TPs and related agency problems create 
unique governance dilemmas in relation to both types of control transac-
tions. This is especially true when TPs and related agency problems preex-
ist and induce control transactions as a solution. The dilemmas call for a 
special governance regime for control transactions. In the United States, 
federal tender offer and proxy solicitation rules partially address the dilem-
mas. Boards and controllers assume the roles of further addressing the TPs 
 
 1 In this paper, generally “corporation” and “company” are used interchangeably. 
 2 The nature and extent of the TPs depend on the shareholder base, which changes over time. In the 
United States, there has been a reconcentration of share ownership. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance 
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 864, 865 (2013). This reconcentration, however, is in “intermediary institu-
tions,” which are still “rationally reticent” and fail to “act like . . . ‘real’ owners.” Id. at 867, 888. If so, 
the discussion in this paper should remain largely intact. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  10:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:45 (2016) 
50 
50 X 
in respective types of control transactions for dispersed shareholders. By 
default, the task of policing the corporate fiduciaries falls upon judiciaries. 
However, judicial policing takes place after the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping ac-
tions. This creates two related complications. First, the TPs tend to worsen 
and gain momentum before the judicial intervention and make the interven-
tion both more crucial and challenging. Second, the TPs and related agency 
problems assume a different dimension of modalities if the fiduciaries gate-
keep control transactions for dispersed shareholders and make judiciaries’ 
policing of the conduct of the fiduciaries even more crucial and challenging. 
Part III identifies normative prerequisites for effective judicial polic-
ing. Ownership dispersion has “Powerful and Pervasive Effects” on 
“M&A” litigation.3 TPs do not go away and again challenge the judiciaries 
at the initiation and prosecution stage of the lawsuits (Stage I). Control 
transactions involving companies with preexisting TPs are disproportionate-
ly represented among control transactions that require judicial policing. It is 
crucially important to have solutions to the TPs at Stage I.4 In most instanc-
es, judicial relief is rendered following fiduciary actions. The TPs also chal-
lenge the judiciaries at the stage of implementing the ex post relief (Stage 
II): restorative remedies are often superior to damage remedies, but the TPs 
make restorative remedies impractical.5 Possible solutions are explored to 
satisfy the normative prerequisites. 
Part IV examines the solutions the Delaware judiciary uses. Delaware 
has a robust discovery system to solve AIPs and an opt-out class action sys-
tem with fee calculation and shifting mechanisms to solve CAPs, each relat-
ing to Stage I. The availability of anticipatory adjudication combined with 
the judiciary’s speed, expertise, and flexibility allows it to take advantage of 
a window of time between decisions by fiduciaries on control transactions 
and shareholder actions on the transactions. Thus, the Delaware judiciary 
satisfies the Stage II prerequisites. Moreover, in the context of anticipatory 
adjudication—Delaware’s oft-criticized “indeterminacy”—is less of a prob-
lem and can even be beneficial. First, generally decisions are rendered ex 
post fiduciaries’ decisions but ex ante irreparable damages, and the fiduciar-
ies are not subject to financial liabilities. Second, “indeterminacy” prevents 
opportunistic activities. Part IV then reveals that discovery and class action 
are generally available in the United States to solve TPs at Stage I. Non-
Delaware judiciaries can render anticipatory relief. Unlike Delaware’s judi-
ciary, however, the non-Delaware judiciaries typically lack the flexibility 
 
 3 John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effects of Ownership on M&A (Harv. Law Sch. 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 669, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544500. 
 4 Hereinafter, the prerequisites necessary to solve the TPs at Stage I the “Stage I prerequisites.” 
 5 Hereinafter, the prerequisites necessary to solve the TPs at Stage II the “Stage II prerequisites,” and 
together with the Stage I prerequisites, the “prerequisites.” 
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and expertise necessary to meet the Stage II prerequisites. 
Part V examines whether judicial systems in non-U.S. jurisdictions 
have strategies, tools, and attributes to meet the prerequisites. Japan will be 
used to illustrate possible difficulties for non-U.S. jurisdictions to meet the 
prerequisites. Discovery and opt-out class actions are uniquely American 
institutions. Thus, many non-U.S. judiciaries lack key tools to meet the 
Stage I prerequisites. These non-U.S. judiciaries at a minimum need to ex-
plore whether they have alternative tools to satisfy the Stage I prerequisites. 
They should not let judiciaries assume, by default or not, the policing role 
unless they are shown to be capable of playing that role. Non-U.S. judiciar-
ies may engage in anticipatory adjudication. However, no other major judi-
ciary appears to have the speed, expertise, and flexibility of the Delaware 
judiciary. 
The penultimate Part VI observes the relationship between the intensi-
ty of gatekeeping by fiduciaries and the required capability of judiciaries to 
police the fiduciaries. The less empowered corporate fiduciaries are to gate-
keep control transactions for dispersed shareholders, the less crucial and 
demanding judiciaries’ policing roles become, and the less the normative 
strength of the prerequisites becomes. This should mean that, under the 
modified regime, the disadvantages of non-Delaware judiciaries in the 
United States should become smaller. Non-Delaware jurisdictions in the 
United States should consider cutting back the fiduciaries’ gatekeeping role 
to level the playing field and to reduce the risk of errors in anticipatory ad-
judications. While it is the best, the Delaware judiciary is not perfect and is 
unable to completely eliminate the TPs relating to the lawsuits and the 
agency problems of the corporate fiduciaries. The more capable it is, the 
more gatekeeping power it should be able to give to the fiduciaries and vice 
versa. It seems beneficial to examine whether the judicial standards the 
Delaware judiciary uses to police the fiduciaries are optimal. International-
ly, the removal of the gatekeeping role makes ex ante policing possible, and 
expert nonjudicial organs could become credible substitutes. 
Finally, Part VII, based on the findings in the preceding parts, suggests 
possible approaches for judicial and nonjudicial interventions in control 
transactions. 
 II. TWIN PROBLEMS, DILEMMAS, EX POST JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION, AND ATTENDANT COMPLICATIONS 
The sole or single owner standard theory has been implicitly or explic-
itly accepted to establish rules to enhance efficient acquisitions and discour-
age inefficient acquisitions.6 “The single-owner standard holds that an effi-
 
 6 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL 
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cient sale is one that a willing buyer and seller would make were both par-
ties free from coercion.”7 The sole owner does not suffer from CAPs and 
suffers far less from AIPs or is well informed.8 Thus, under the sole owner 
standard, CAPs and AIPs (together twin problems or TPs), in relation to 
cash acquisitions of control, exist as “problems”: they tend to induce ineffi-
cient acquisitions, and thus it is desirable to eliminate or lessen them. Simi-
larly, the TPs of minority shareholders, if the minority shareholders are giv-
en a strong say—such as a veto in freeze-outs—may unduly frustrate 
efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs and induce inefficient freeze-outs.9 How 
do TPs adversely affect control transactions, and how should we address 
those problems? 
 A. Governance Dilemmas 
 1. Acquisition of Companies with Wholly Dispersed Shareholders 
Once a discussion for a potential control transaction is initiated, the 
TPs tend to intensify. The control transactions raise complex business, fi-
nancial, and legal issues that will exacerbate the TPs. The composition of 
 
STUD. 165, 166–67 (1988).  
 7 Id. at 166. The theory’s first academic proponent was presumably Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., Luci-
an Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 1693, 1743–44 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice]; Lucian Arye Beb-
chuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 197, 221–28 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Cor-
porate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 981–88 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case Against 
Board Veto]. Under the market standard theory, “any offer above the target’s prebid market price should 
succeed.” Schwartz, supra note 6, at 165. For the details of the market standard theory, see, for example, 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to 
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and 
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 8 Dispersed selling shareholders tend to be less informed than buyers. The academic proponents of 
the sole owner standard appear to have focused more on the CAPs and far less on the AIPs. This, how-
ever, does not mean that AIPs are irrelevant to the efficiency. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted 
Choice, supra note 7, at 1772 (“[A] mistaken estimate [of the independent target’s value] might of 
course lead to an inefficient outcome.”). A sole owner as well as dispersed shareholders might suffer 
from AIPs. Typically, however, the sole owner’s AIPs are infinitely far less than those of dispersed 
shareholders. Moreover, the sole owner’s AIPs can be fixed quite easily and quickly when, for example, 
the owner delves into the records of the company and has one-on-one discussions with the management. 
This is not the case for the dispersed shareholders. But for their possible actual or potential conflict of 
interest, the company’s management is best equipped to address the AIPs. However, in their view it is 
difficult to eliminate the downside effects of the conflicts. See, e.g., id. at 1772–73; Bebchuk, The Case 
Against Board Veto, supra note 7, at 999–1004; John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the 
Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?−The Peculiar Divergences of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regula-
tion, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1741 n.53 (2007).  
 9 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 785, 804 n.73 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling]. 
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the shareholders becomes fluid as well, which may worsen the TPs, in par-
ticular the CAPs. Naturally, actual and potential third-party participants in 
the control transactions are tempted to exploit the TPs. The problems persist 
through shareholder decisions, if any, on such potential control transactions. 
Corporate directors work for shareholders’ collective interests and are 
capable of solving the TPs. 10  However, corporate directors suffer from 
agency problems.11 At the precise moment when they could be most helpful 
to shareholders in relation to control transactions, directors—particularly 
nonindependent directors—have strong personal interests in the outcome of 
such discussions that are not aligned with those of the shareholders, and 
they may be tempted to act selfishly at the expense of the shareholders’ 
welfare.12 The TPs have already made it difficult for shareholders to moni-
tor the directors, which could further exacerbate the director agency prob-
lems. Thus, the more the shareholders need help from the directors, the less 
helpful the directors might possibly become.13 Unless a solution is found to 
neutralize these related problems, they could stifle or skew the market for 
corporate control and diminish efficiency-enhancing functions of control 
transactions.14 A targeted scheme might be helpful to solve the dilemma.15 
 
 10  Directors may have other constituents to look after. 
 11  As to the term “agency problems,” see John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, 
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 2, § 2.1 
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies] (“[A]n agency problem—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the welfare 
of one party, termed the ‘principal’, depends upon actions taken by another party, termed the ‘agent.’”). 
See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309–10 (1976). 
 12  See, e.g., Fernando Gomez & Maria Isabel Saez, The Enforcement of Management Passivity Duty 
in Take-over Law: Class Action or Government Action?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN EUROPE 261, 267 (Jügen G. Backhaus et al. eds., 2012). 
 13  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 84 VAND. 
L. REV. 83, 104–08 (2004); Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.2.1 
(describing interactions between CAPs and agency problems); ALESSO M. PACCES, RETHINKING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTROL POWERS §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.2.2 (2012) 
(stating that AIPs make it possible for corporate agents to cheat and difficult for shareholders to monitor 
the agents).  
 14  Once the directors assume gatekeeping functions, these problems may intensify. See infra Part 
II.D.2. 
 15  See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search 
for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 559 (2002) [hereinafter Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Takeover Law] (“[H]ostile takeover bids are a relatively recent arrival, which the corporate statutes 
leave unaddressed.”). The lack of any independent institution that can credibly intervene may lead to 
laws that heavily restrict the control transactions. See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1930 (1996) [hereinafter Black & 
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model] (“A prohibitive code simply bars many kinds of corporate behavior 
that are open to abuse, such as self-dealing transactions and cash-out mergers.”). 
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 2. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers 
Under certain circumstances, controllers may find it efficient to com-
pletely own the companies.16 Company laws, however, may allow the mi-
nority shareholders a say, including a veto power, in connection with the 
freeze-outs17 necessary to effect 100% ownership. In such cases, the TPs of 
the minority shareholders may prevent the controllers from having effective 
negotiations with the minority shareholders. The controllers, of course, may 
try to exploit the TPs. Thus, unless a solution is put in place, the TPs of the 
minority shareholders may let efficiency-decreasing freeze-outs move for-
ward or prevent efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs from going forward. 18 
Again, a targeted scheme might be helpful to solve the dilemma.19 
 B. Governance Dilemmas Intensified 
Preexisting CAPs and AIPs may induce control transactions. This is 
because the control transactions could remove the TPs and improve the val-
 
 16  For various reasons to allow freeze-outs, see, for example, John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an 
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
1251, 1327–29 (1999) [hereinafter Coates, Minority Discounts]; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 113, 134 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large 
Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (1996); Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: The-
ory and Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs]. 
Cf. Fernan Restrepo, Do Freezeouts Affect the Performance of the Controlling Shareholder? An Empiri-
cal Analysis 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford, Working Paper No. 184, 2014) (“[W]hether 
or not freezeouts are efficiency generating transactions is a question that cannot be responded at the lev-
el of theory.”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418846; Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restate-
ment of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE. L.J. 1354, 1365–70 (1978) (proposing a flat prohibition of pure 
freeze-outs due to the minimal benefits relative to the great risks they engender). For unique incentives 
controllers may have in the United Kingdom and Japan, see infra Part V.B.1.b.i. 
 17  The term is used to denote controller freeze-outs generally. The term “freeze-out” is used differ-
ently in the European Union. For the meaning of freeze-outs in the EU, see Directive 2004/25, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC) 
art. 15 [hereinafter EU Takeover Directive]; Companies Act, 2006, c. 3, § 979 (U.K.).  
 18  Of course a free rider problem may also prevent efficiency-enhancing freeze-outs. See, e.g., Luci-
an Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 983 (1994) 
(hereinafter Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales). However, when the minority shareholders are not 
dispersed and do not have TPs, the importance of the free rider issue may be small, since, not having 
TPs, the minority shareholders are able and incentivized to make contributions commensurate with their 
aggregate ownership percentage relative to the controller’s ownership percentage. 
 19  See supra note 15. Typically, minority shareholders do not have powers to oust controllers. See, 
e.g., Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 8, § 8.3.2 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) [here-
inafter Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions] (stating that there is not much company law can do if the 
controllers are unwilling to relinquish their position). As to Delaware, see Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (“Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a 
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority.”).  
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ues of the issuing companies. Thus, attempted control transactions involve a 
disproportionately large number of companies with shareholders or minori-
ty shareholders with preexisting TPs. However, TPs themselves, combined 
with other factors, may hamper the control transactions that are otherwise 
efficiency enhancing. It is important to find an effective solution. 
 1. Acquisition of Companies with Wholly Dispersed Shareholders 
Assume that there is a public company with dispersed shareholders 
suffering from acute TPs. Assume further that the relevant corporation law 
gives the shareholders a say with respect to certain business decisions. Due 
to their TPs, the shareholders might have blocked efficiency-enhancing 
transactions. The TPs might also have hampered shareholders’ ability to 
elect qualified persons as directors. The TPs might have frustrated the 
shareholders’ ability to monitor agents and might have allowed them to “act 
opportunistically, skimping on the quality of [their] performance, or even 
diverting to [themselves] what was promised to the principal.”20 There will 
be those who believe that they are able to remove or significantly reduce the 
TPs and agency problems by becoming sole owners. If so, they might value 
the company more highly than the company’s market capitalization and 
want to explore the purchase of the company at a price higher than the pre-
vailing market price but lower than the value they would be able to achieve 
after the ownership change.21 Such attempts are potentially efficiency en-
hancing.22  In these situations, however, the TPs and the related agency 
problems23 may magnify in the deal phases and hamper the transactions that 
would remove the inefficiency attributable to the preexisting problems. 
 2. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers 
Controllers are tempted to exploit minority shareholders. To protect 
minority shareholders, some jurisdictions may enact less enabling laws em-
bedding procedural safeguards in shareholder approval requirements, such 
 
 20  Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1 (footnote omitted). 
 21  See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 
(1965); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 112–17; Armour et 
al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.2.1.  
 22  See, e.g., Eli Ofek, Efficiency Gains in Unsuccessful Management Buyouts, 49 J. FIN. 637 (1994); 
Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 264. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (indicat-
ing that takeovers are responsive only to certain kinds of governance problems and appropriate only for 
very large problems), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/ 
257565/doc/slspublic/Controlling-Shareholders.pdf. Of course, the buy side may suffer from its own 
agency costs.  
 23  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 162. 
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as a supermajority voting requirement, a majority of the minority voting re-
quirement, a prohibition of super voting shares, and a mandatory sharehold-
er equality principle.24 In particular, related party transactions may be sub-
ject to strict procedural requirements. Due to their TPs, however, the 
minority shareholders with the minority protections might unnecessarily ve-
to25 the controllers’ proposals or otherwise restrict the controllers’ ability to 
manage the companies efficiently. For example, the minorities might block 
related party transactions that should benefit both.26 In addition, they might 
unduly restrict private benefits to the controllers commensurate with the 
benefits of the governance and other benefits they provide or the costs the 
controllers incur.27 Freeze-outs can remove minority shareholders’ TPs and 
related “passive agency problems”28 and achieve economic efficiency.29 In 
these situations, however, the TPs in the deal phases may be corresponding-
ly greater. If the minority shareholders are also given a say in the freeze-out 
process, there could be a significant risk for the minority shareholders’ pas-
sive agency problems to magnify and block or otherwise skew efficiency-
enhancing freeze-outs. 
 
 24  See generally, Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and 
Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 4, §§ 4.1.2–4.1.4 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter En-
riques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders]; Black & Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1958–60. As to rules in Delaware, see, for example, Gilson & Gor-
don, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9, at 789–93. For a brief description of rules in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Canada, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Control-
ling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 426–37 (2003). These protec-
tive measures may not be only for companies with dispersed minority shareholders. However, dispersed 
minority shareholders have a stronger need for the protective measures.  
 25  This power is strong if a supermajority or a majority of the minority voting requirement is in place 
with respect to certain corporate transactions. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 24, at 402 (discussing possi-
ble adverse effects of a majority of the minority requirement). 
 26  See, e.g., id. at 400. 
 27  As to the validity of some level of controllers’ private benefits, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & 
Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitments 3 (Columbia Law and Econ. Research 
Paper No. 436, Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Research Paper No. 438, Yale Law and Econ. Research 
Paper No. 461, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 216, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2182781; Gilson, supra note 22, at 1652 (describing 
controllers’ costs of monitoring, liquidity, and nondiversification). If the controllers are undercompen-
sated for their governance role, minority shareholders are at least partially “free riding.” For the ranges 
of private benefits in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, and France, see, for 
example, Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders, supra note 24, § 
4.3.2.1.  
 28  See, e.g., Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1. 
 29  Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 358–359; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 113 (giving examples of possible efficiency gains that may be achieved 
through controllers’ minority freeze-outs). See also Coates, Minority Discounts, supra note 16, at 1327–
29. 
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 C. U.S. Model to Solve Governance Dilemmas 
Globally, at present, there are two principal approaches to solve the 
control transaction dilemmas. Under the Takeover Code in the United 
Kingdom,30 the Takeover Panel assumes the role of a third-party institution 
to solve or lessen the dilemmas and polices control transactions ex ante.31 
The most salient features of the Takeover Code are a no-frustrating action 
rule and a mandatory bid rule (U.K. MBR).32 “[T]he ‘no frustration’ rule . . . 
operates so as to put the shareholders in the driving seat as far as decision-
making on the offer is concerned.”33 However, the U.K. MBR simultane-
ously requires holders of 30% or more of the shares of a company to launch 
a general offer for the remaining shares at the best price paid for shares dur-
ing the preceding twelve months. The U.K. MBR minimizes shareholder 
CAPs (collective action problems) and coercive effects that would other-
wise result by assuring treatment of the shareholders left after the bidder’s 
establishment of control (i.e., 30% ownership) over the target no less favor-
able than the treatment of any of the shareholders of the target when the 
bidder is in the process of accumulating the control position.34 Under the 
Takeover Code regime, a scheme of arrangement to effect a control transac-
tion requires approval by a majority in number of shareholders representing 
in the aggregate 75% in the value of the shares of each class of shareholders 
present and voting as well as ex ante court sanction.35 The approach taken 
by the Takeover Code is one that is less concerned with TPs of dispersed 
shareholders and more concerned with agency problems of corporate fidu-
ciaries or less confident in the ability to address the agency problems ex 
 
 30  THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE (11th ed. 2013), 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf [hereinafter THE TAKEOVER 
CODE].  
 31  See Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.2. 
 32  THE TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 30, r. 9, at F1, r. 21.1, at I16. See discussion supra Part 
V.B.1.b.i. (referring to the U.K. MBR in discussing Japanese tender offer rules). 
 33  Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.3.1. Note that the code does not pro-
hibit prebid frustrating actions. This “exemption” apparently does not create any serious issue in the 
United Kingdom. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1736. 
 34  See, e.g., Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.5.3, -4; PAUL L. DAVIES & 
SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW ¶ 28–46 (9th ed. 
2012). This does not mean that the U.K. MBR addresses all structural coercion. See infra note 48. To the 
extent that off-market purchases without a tender offer are restricted, unsolicited bidders are less likely 
to establish large toehold stakes quickly. Thus, companies have more time to adopt defense measures. 
For various strategies for crafting tender offer regulations, see Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, 
supra note 19, § 8.2.5.3. 
 35  Companies Act, 2006, c. 3, § 899 (U.K.). See also THE TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 30, app. 7.1. 
For protection of minority shareholders in a scheme of arrangement, see, for example, Jennifer Payne, 
Minority Shareholder Protection in Takeovers: A UK Perspective, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 145, 152–
58 (2011). 
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post.36 The EU Takeover Directive used the approach of the Takeover Code 
as a prototype model. However, significant exceptions to such approach 
were created in the EU Takeover Directive. For example, it permits EU 
member countries to opt out of the no-frustration rule.37 Variations of the 
approach under the Takeover Code have also been proposed.38 
The other approach to address the control transaction dilemmas is one 
that prevails in the United States. In the United States, two principal gov-
ernance regimes regulate control transactions: state corporation law and 
federal securities law.39  Unlike the approach under the Takeover Code, 
combined, they represent an approach that is concerned more with the TPs 
of dispersed shareholders and less with the agency problems of gatekeeping 
corporate boards or controllers, as the case may be, or that has more confi-
dence in the ability to police the agents ex post. 
Corporation laws in the United States generally follow an enabling 
model,40 and a cash merger, including one in which a controller freezes out 
minority shareholders, can be effected through a simple majority vote.41 
Boards of directors propose mergers to shareholders.42 Direct purchases of 
shares are possible without any involvement of the board of the issuer com-
pany. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has tender offer rules43 and 
proxy rules.44 These rules focus primarily on the information and time nec-
essary or helpful for shareholders to decide whether to tender or how to 
vote their shares. Going private rules45 focus on disclosure. The tender offer 
rules focus on protections against “Saturday night special” bids or “blitz-
krieg tactics”46 and prescribe certain substantive rules as well.47 Thus, these 
 
 36  For a comparison of the U.S. approach and the U.K. approach with a focus on situations in which 
there are no controllers, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1733–45 (with respect to corporate man-
agers as agents); Davies & Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.1. 
 37  EU Takeover Directive, supra note 17, art. 12, para. 1. See also Luca Enriques et al., The Case for 
an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union), 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 85 
(2014) (proposing a model that allows an entity-level choice for EU countries). 
 38  See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7, at 1796–1801. 
 39  Hereinafter the model that prevails in the United States will be referred to as the U.S. model. 
 40  An enabling model is contrasted with a prohibitive model. See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1930. 
 41  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2014). 
 42  See, e.g., § 251(b). In the case of short-form mergers, no shareholder approval of subsidiary cor-
porations is required. § 253. 
 43  These provisions were added by the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), n(d)–(f) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14-d1 to 14d-103 (2014). 
 44  15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (2014). 
 45  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2008). 
 46  See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1734, 1755. 
 47  For example, the best price rule is in place. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2006). If shares exceed-
ing the maximum limit are tendered in response to a partial bid, the bidder is subject to a proration re-
quirement. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (2011). 
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rules address the TPs described in Parts II.A. and II.B. above or issues the 
TPs present. The rules, however, do not address the TPs comprehensively. 
For example, unlike the U.K. MBR of the Takeover Code, the rules do not 
focus on CAPs stemming from structural coercion of two-tier tender offers 
or cascading tender offers.48 Further, unlike the U.K. rules, the Securities 
Exchange Act rules—including the act’s going private rules—do not tighten 
the corporate law rules regarding freeze-outs. 
The roles to fill the gap and further reduce or remove issues arising out 
of the TPs fall on the directors or the controllers as fiduciaries.49 Unlike the 
Takeover Code, the tender offer rules do not have a no-frustrating action 
rule. Corporation laws do not contain an outright prohibition of the boards’ 
use of a defense measure. While it is not completely settled if “substantive 
coercion” should be recognized as a cognizable threat,50 Delaware generally 
let directors gatekeep control transactions on behalf of shareholders. 51 
 
 48  For structural coercion, see, for example, Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7; 
Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard, supra note 7; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 BUS. 
LAW. 259, 259 (1989). There may be residual CAPs that the U.K. MBR does not address. See, e.g., 
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 7, at 1737–38. Depending on the procedural require-
ments for freeze-outs, varying degrees of structural coercion also exist in the context of freeze-outs. For 
discussions concerning Delaware corporations, see, for example, In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders 
Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also A. C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Sharehold-
ers: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83, 101–03 (2004); Gilson & Gor-
don, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9; Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2 
(2005). 
 49  As to the relationships of the two regimes, see, for example, Armour & Skeel, supra note 8 (de-
scribing the history of the emergence of this dual control); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic 
Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2005) [hereinafter Ka-
han & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism] (arguing that “the relation between federal law and Delaware law is 
symbiotic, rather than competitive”).  
 50  See, e.g., Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Guhan 
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 1113 YALE. L.J. 621 (2003) [hereinafter 
Subramanian, Bargaining]; Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law, supra note 15, at 561–63; 
Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 10 n.24.  For the concept of 
“substantive coercion,” see infra note 73. Further, there is a renewed debate as to the extent of federal 
preemption of poison pills. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional 
Review of the Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (2014); Marty Lipton et al., A Response to Beb-
chuk and Jackson’s Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, HARV. L. SCH. F.  ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/13/a-
response-to-bebchuk-and-jacksons-toward-a-constitutional-review-of-the-poison-pill/; Lucian A. Beb-
chuk & Robert A. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill: A Reply to Wachtell 
Lipton, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 17, 2014), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/17/toward-a-constitutional-review-of-the-poison-pill-a-
reply-to-wachtell-lipton/#more-61373. 
 51  One may call this decision-making approach a joint decision-making strategy. See, e.g., Davies & 
Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 19, § 8.2.3.1. However, we should note that shareholders have a 
chance to join the joint decision making with respect only to potential transactions that are presented to 
them.  
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Boards are also generally recognized as gatekeepers of control transactions 
in other states.52 Similarly, if they own a sufficient number of shares, con-
trollers—at their initiation—are empowered to unilaterally freeze out mi-
nority shareholders.53 They may choose to craft ad hoc Gatekeeping and 
other governance measures that address the TPs and related agency prob-
lems.54 Judiciaries confronting shareholder lawsuits55 police the Gatekeep-
ers ex post relative to their decisions using as a nexus “fiduciary duty,” a 
state law concept.56 This is how the governance dilemmas presented in con-
trol transactions are addressed in the United States.57 
In the United States, the Delaware judiciary has played a dominant 
role and has been known for its relative superiority in resolving shareholder 
lawsuits against Gatekeepers. “65.6 percent of all Fortune 500 companies 
are incorporated in Delaware, up from 58 percent in 2000. . . . And almost 
89 percent of U.S. based Initial Public Offerings in 2014 chose Delaware as 
their corporate home . . . .” 58 And Delaware law governs when shareholders 
 
 52  As to defense measures in states other than Delaware, see generally Michal Barzuza, The State of 
State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2009). 
 53  Hereinafter these roles of the boards and controllers will be Gatekeeping, and directors and con-
trollers playing such roles will be Gatekeepers. Any capitalized derivatives words shall be construed 
accordingly. Stephen M. Bainbridge used the terms in the same manner. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006). Note, howev-
er, that “[t]he term has been widely used to refer to the outside professionals who serve the board or in-
vestors.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
 54  See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503, 525 (Del. Ch. 2013) (making the same point), 
aff’d by Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). See also Davies & Hopt, Control 
Transactions, supra note 19, §§ 8.1.2.4, 8.2.3.1.  
 55  Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1604–07; Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. 
White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1798 (2004). Confidential arbitration before the Chancery Court has been held 
unconstitutional. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 U.S. 1551 (2014). For a comparison of the level of private enforcement in the United States with 
that in the United Kingdom, see John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: A Compar-
ative Empirical Analysis of the UK and the US, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687 (2009). 
 56  To borrow a phrase from an article by Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Su-
preme Court, the state law side of the U.S. model “rests on a two-fold trust in the judiciary, and in the 
board of directors.” Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002). There are state antitakeover statues that have the effect of reducing 
structural coercion. Delaware’s antitakeover statute is of a different type. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
203(c) (2014).  
 57  See supra Parts II.A., II.B. This approach can be said to allocate “the real authority to a court.” 
Enriques et al., The Case for Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 4. As this paper will show, 
however, such a court may prove to be a paper tiger. 
 58  DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), 
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2014%20Annual%20Report.pdf. Most of such corporations, 
however, are headquartered outside Delaware. The percentage seems to favorably compare with those 
reported in the New York Times in 1969. See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 891 (1969) (stating, based on the New York Times, Jan. 12, 
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of a Delaware corporation can sue directors or controlling shareholders al-
leging their violations of fiduciary duties, including those relating to control 
transactions.59 This does not mean that the Delaware judiciary has a mo-
nopoly over such disputes.60 In fact, plaintiffs often choose to litigate in 
federal or non-Delaware state courts.61 However, this should not indicate 
that the quality or effectiveness of the judicial proceedings in that state is in 
decline,62 and the Delaware judiciary is still dominating cases involving 
corporate control transactions involving public Delaware companies.63 
 
1969, that “one third of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and almost half of the 
nation’s one hundred largest industrial concerns” are Delaware corporations). 
 59  See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The 
Reach of State Corporate Law beyond State Borders: Reflections upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1149, 1159–60 (2009) (describing the internal affairs doctrine). 
 60  John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1351–53 (2012) [hereinafter 
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act]; Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, 
and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155–56 (2011) [hereinafter 
Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits] (stating that since the vast majority of publicly held Delaware corpora-
tions’ headquarters are in states other than Delaware, they “generally have sufficient contracts for per-
sonal jurisdiction before at least two courts, allowing plaintiffs to bring suits out of Delaware”). Dela-
ware’s judiciary has jurisdiction over directors of Delaware corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 
3114(a) (2014). 
 61  See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 
609–10 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?]. For statistical information, 
see OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 3 
(2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/897c61ef-bfde-46e6-a2b8-
5f94906c6ee2/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review.pdf. 
 62  For possible reasons for the decline in the recent past, see, for example, Armour et al., Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1380. See also Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra 
note 61, at 651 (an empirical study suggesting relationships between Delaware’s tough stance on fees 
and its diminished deference to the first to file advantage, on the one hand, and the filing of lawsuits 
with courts outside Delaware, on the other). The suggested reasons seem to suggest that “plaintiffs’ 
counsel seeks to avoid Delaware’s recent turn towards more aggressive policing of agency costs in ac-
quisition related shareholder litigation, as well as to improve their relative position in the competition for 
fees.” Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 139. In fact, the shift away from Delaware might 
have been attributable in part to the relative inexperience of non-Delaware courts to apply Delaware law. 
See, e.g., id. at 155 (suggesting the creation of possible settlement value if a judge in a non-Delaware 
court is unfamiliar with Delaware law and fails to dismiss weak claims). 
 63  Under a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision, forum selection bylaws designating a court in 
Delaware as the exclusive forum for litigation relating to internal affairs can be valid. Boilermakers Lo-
cal 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). In a subsequent decision, the court 
also held that a forum selection bylaw designating courts in the state in which the headquarters of the 
Delaware corporation reside is valid both facially and as applied. City of Providence v. First Citizens 
Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014) (permitting a bylaw change that designated the state in 
which the corporation’s headquarters is). These bylaw changes, on balance, are more likely to increase 
the dominance of the Delaware judiciary. In 2015, Delaware amended its corporation law to expressly 
permit Delaware corporations to have a forum selection clause in the certificate of incorporation or by-
laws designating Delaware as the exclusive state in which all internal corporate claims may be brought 
and to expressly prohibit them from having provisions in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws pro-
hibiting such claims from being brought in Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015). This legisla-
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When the Securities Exchange Act and Delaware governance law are 
combined, they are in large measure consistent with the sole owner stand-
ard.64 In Delaware, for example, in In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine Jr. stated: 
Delaware law has seen directors as well-positioned to understand 
the value of the target company, to compensate for the disaggre-
gated nature of stockholders by acting as a negotiating and auc-
tioning proxy for them, and as a bulwark against structural coer-
cion. Relatedly, dispersed stockholders have been viewed as 
poorly positioned to protect and, yes, sometimes, even to think 
for themselves.65 
Are there challenges to implementing the sole owner standard in judi-
cial proceedings? 
Control transactions typically are effected in one step—a cash merger 
or its equivalent—or in two steps—a direct share purchase through a tender 
offer from shareholders followed by a cash merger or its equivalent cash-
out transaction. Regardless of the forms, however, they typically have the 
following key dates under the U.S. model: (1) the date on which the process 
for a possible control transaction is initiated (the initiation date), (2) the date 
on which Gatekeepers decide to or decide not to let the shareholders make a 
collective decision on the transaction (the Gatekeeper decision date), (3) the 
date on which shareholders make a collective decision based on the Gate-
keepers’ decision on the Gatekeeper decision date (the shareholder decision 
date), and (4) the date on which the control transaction is completed after 
the shareholders’ favorable collective decision on the shareholder decision 
date (the completion date). As to (3) above, if the relevant transaction is in 
the form of a one-step acquisition, the shareholders’ collective decision is 
made at a shareholders meeting. If it is in the form of a two-step acquisi-
tion, the shareholders’ collective decision to approve the transaction may 
have to be made in two stages. The first stage decision is made by tendering 
a number of shares enough to meet the minimum tender condition of the 
relevant tender offer. If the bidder fails to accumulate enough shares to enti-
tle him or her to effect the second step without having shareholder approval, 
the second stage decision must be made at a shareholders meeting to ap-
 
tion appears to overrule the City of Providence decision. In 2014, there was a marked increase in the 
percentage of “M&A litigation” filed in Delaware compared to several preceding years. KOUMRIAN, 
supra note 61, at 3.  “This is likely are result of wide spread adoption of forum provisions in corporate 
bylaws . . . .”  Id. 
 64  See Schwartz, supra note 6. However, commentators have differed significantly as to the utility 
and risks associated with the use of target directors. For examples of contrasting positions, see Martin 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 103 (1979); Bebchuk, The Case 
Against Board Veto, supra note 7. See also supra note 50.  
 65  808 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2003). See also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 503, 525 
(making the same point). 
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prove the second step cash squeeze out. Regardless of the need to have such 
a shareholders meeting, the acquisition of shares is made in two stages. The 
five successive phases the key dates create will be referred to as Preinitia-
tion Phase, the Gatekeeping Phase, the Shareholder Deliberation Phase, the 
Execution Phase, and the Postcompletion Phase. 66  As described below, 





A hallmark of the U.S. approach is to let Gatekeepers make initial de-
cisions. This is consistent with the ripeness requirement applicable general-
ly to judiciaries in the United States.67 Thus, judiciaries intervene in any 
dispute between the shareholders and the Gatekeepers only on or after the 
Gatekeeper decision date. 
 D. Ex Post Judicial Policing: Amplified Needs and Difficulties 
 1. Preexisting Problems Amplified and Ex post Judicial Policing 
Becoming Both More Crucial and More Challenging 
As stated,68 among non-freeze-out control transactions, those involving 
companies with preexisting TPs and related director agency problems are 
 
 66  See infra Chart I. 
 67  See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing 15 JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 101.76[1][a], ¶ 101.76[2] (3d ed. 2006) (denying a request for 
declaratory judgment confirming the validity of a bylaw change proposed to shareholders stating that the 
dispute was unripe)).  
 68  See supra Part II.B.1. 
1. Before C 
2. Before D 
3. After    D 
Transaction Flow and Timing of a Court Decision 
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disproportionately represented. As also stated,69 among freeze-outs, those 
involving companies with minority shareholders with preexisting TPs are 
disproportionately represented. The preexisting TPs and agency problems 
tend to persist and intensify during the Gatekeeping Phase and the Share-
holder Deliberation Phase. The buyers are also tempted to exploit the prob-
lems. This is likely to mean that among the companies requiring effective 
ex post judicial policing, the companies with the preexisting TPs will be 
more disproportionately represented. The ex post judicial policing must be 
able to effectively address the TPs at Stage I.70 
 2. Gatekeeping Activities Make Policing More Challenging 
Once directors or controllers assume Gatekeeping roles, the TPs and 
related agency problems take on vastly different modalities. This affects the 
attributes the judiciaries need to police them effectively. 
 3. Acquisition of Companies with Dispersed Shareholders: 
Directors Acting as Gatekeepers 
Once directors are given a Gatekeeping role, they can and sometimes 
must adopt defense measures, and the TPs and related agency problems 
during deal phases could take on vastly different modalities.71 First, share-
holder AIPs could dramatically worsen during the Gatekeeping Phase and 
the Shareholder Deliberation Phase. Deal-related communication with exist-
ing bidders or proposed or potential bidders will be primarily with the target 
boards. Negotiations will be delicate and nuanced and often will have ele-
ments of a mind game. Many deal points will need to be negotiated. In ad-
dition, directors are unable to disclose everything they know. For example, 
they may have to posture from time to time and to maintain their negotiat-
ing leverage, should not show all of their cards during the Shareholder De-
liberation Phase. They may have to comply with contractual confidentiality 
obligations. It is advisable not to disclose information to preserve attorney-
client privilege or to maintain its propriety value.72 Moreover, it may be dif-
ficult to communicate certain types of information accurately to the share-
holders.73 Deal negotiations may move quickly. Thus, during these phases 
 
 69  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 70  Note that if any preexisting agency problem involves a breach of fiduciary duty, it could also sug-
gest the judiciary’s inability to police the agency problem associated with the control transaction. 
 71  Cf. supra Parts II.A.1., II.B.1. 
 72  See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in 
Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 58 n.19 (1985) (“[M]anagement 
may have access to valuable information that cannot be made publicly available without destroying its 
value.”). 
 73  For example, when they resist unsolicited overtures, boards may argue the existence of a substan-
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the information asymmetry between the Gatekeepers and the shareholders 
will become greater than when the boards are not acting as Gatekeepers. 
Second, shareholder CAPs may worsen due to rapid and less predicta-
ble developments, increased fluidity of the shareholder bases, asymmetric 
information, and possible exploitations of the problems by third parties, 
such as actual and potential bidders. Third, potential agency costs relating 
to boards’ Gatekeeping function become higher. During the Gatekeeping 
Phase and the Shareholder Deliberation Phase, there is “the omnipresent 
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests.”74 Board 
members perform complex tasks, their discretions are wide, and they often 
act behind the scenes. This increases the potential agency costs.75 Note that 
the conduct the potential conflicts engender include those that might exac-
erbate the TPs. For example, the directors may be tempted to be less up-
front about what they are doing than when they do not act as Gatekeepers. 
They may choose to time various events to make coordination among 
shareholders difficult. Control transactions may be induced by the target 
boards’ agency problems.76 In these situations, unless the targets’ directors 
are completely oblivious to their possible predicaments, they tend to be 
even more conscious of their job security. If so, the agents have even more 
acute conflicts of interest77 and may attempt to block the proposed transac-
tions or curry favor with the bidders, in each case more so than when they 
do not act as Gatekeepers. Fourth, third parties—including existing, pro-
posed, and potential bidders—may be more strongly tempted to exploit the 
 
tive coercion, which assumes “an informational disparity between target managers and shareholders.” 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is 
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 260 (1989). Substantive coercion is 
“the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve manage-
ment’s representations of intrinsic value.” Id. at 267. See also Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover 
Law, supra note 15, at 523. Noted commentators, however, have argued that the substantive coercion 
argument does not have an empirical foundation in the modern marketplace in the United States. See, 
e.g., Subramanian, Bargaining, supra note 50, at 633–35.  
 74  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). For final period problems, 
see, for example, Black & Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law, supra note 15, at 559 (stating that the 
decisions the directors have to make are “decisions that place . . . directors in a final period problem, 
where agency costs are likely to be high,” and that “[c]ontrol contests and board decisions to reject all 
bidders raise final period problems similar to those that arise in mergers and sales of all or substantially 
all assets, and could plausibly call for similar regulatory treatment”); Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto, supra note 7, at 991 (referring to this as “ex post agency costs”). 
 75  See, e.g., Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, supra note 11, § 2.1. (“The great-
er the complexity of the tasks undertaken by the agent, and the greater the discretion the agent must be 
given, the larger these ‘agency costs’ are likely to be.”). 
 76  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 77  See Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 284–85. In addition to “conflicted motives,” the agents may 
also suffer from “cognitive biases”; “[u]nderperforming managers can be reluctant to acknowledge mis-
take, rather explaining bad strategy as market misvaluation.” Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased 
Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 10. 
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conflicts of interest than when they do not act as Gatekeepers.78 Finally, 
these four modalities combine to magnify the risk that the Gatekeepers will 
engage in “pretextual justifications.”79 
 4. Acquisition of Minority Shares by Controllers: Controllers 
Acting as Gatekeepers 
In the United States, freeze-outs can be effected in one step or in two 
steps.80  If the controllers choose to effect a freeze-out through one-step 
transactions, as long as they already own the requisite percentage of shares 
that assures a favorable voting result, voting decisions by minority share-
holders do not affect the outcome.81 In a tender offer by the controllers, mi-
nority shareholders can choose not to tender their shares. If, however, the 
controllers already own the requisite percentage of shares that assures a fa-
vorable voting result, the minority shareholders’ decisions as to the tender 
offers do not affect the outcome. Thus, these are self-dealing transactions in 
which the controllers have the most acute conflicts of interest but are not 
subject to an outright prohibition. In the self-dealing context, minority 
shareholders are generally in riskier positions than the shareholders in con-
trol transactions in which board members act as Gatekeepers. All the com-
plications described in Part II.D.2.a. exist in their extreme forms. Robust 
judicial policing is necessary to protect minority shareholders. 
 III. EX POST JUDICIAL POLICING OF GATEKEEPERS: TWIN 
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
As shown, under the U.S. model, judiciaries capable of effectively po-
licing Gatekeepers are crucially important. Are shareholder lawsuits to po-
lice Gatekeepers unique? If so, what prerequisites do judicial systems need 
to meet to effectively police the Gatekeepers? 
 
 78  See, e.g., Subramanian, Bargaining, supra note 50, at 664–65. 
 79  See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The Topps board’s 
negotiating posture and factual misrepresentations are more redolent of pretext, than of a sincere desire 
to comply with their Revlon duties.”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (stating that in situations where heightened scrutiny applies, “the court seeks . . . to . . . smoke out 
mere pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions”). If the directors are permitted to con-
sider the interests of constituents other than the shareholders, they should be able to come up with any 
number of pretexts that are on the surface not facetious. 
 80  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2014); Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 20. 
 81  However, minority shareholders might vote against the freeze-outs to exercise appraisal rights. 
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2014). 
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 A. Twin Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of Lawsuits 
 1. Twin Problems 
For a judiciary to perform the policing function described above,82 
someone has to file and prosecute a lawsuit against the Gatekeepers. How-
ever, TPs also plague the initiation and prosecution of shareholder lawsuits. 
As stated,83 among the companies requiring effective ex post judicial polic-
ing, those having preexisting problems tend to be disproportionately repre-
sented. The preexisting TPs could be further carried over to the initiation 
and prosecution of the lawsuits to police the Gatekeepers. Effective mecha-
nisms must exist to solve the TPs. 
 (a) Collective Action Problems 
Shareholders may have direct claims84 against the Gatekeepers. How-
ever, they face CAPs. A lawsuit is costly, time consuming, and often un-
predictable as to both the process and the outcome. Shareholder lawsuits 
against Gatekeepers alleging the breach of fiduciary duties are inordinately 
technical and complex and often are fast moving. Frequently, they have to 
be filed quickly to preserve the status quo and require quick tactical deci-
sions.85 It is typically against strongly motivated, well-financed, and well-
coordinated defendants.86 Free riders may emerge. If one conducts a cost-
benefit analysis, typically it does not make sense for a small shareholder to 
file a lawsuit individually and to invest sufficient time and other resources 
in the lawsuit.87 A fluid shareholder base exacerbates the CAPs.88 There-
 
 82  See supra text accompanying notes 54–57. 
 83  See supra Part II.B.  
 84  Shareholders may be able to derivatively sue corporate fiduciaries to enforce the claims of corpo-
rations against the corporate fiduciaries. However, in the context of M&As generally, there are often 
situations in which the shareholders suffer but the companies do not suffer from the Gatekeepers’ mis-
conducts. Thus, in general derivative suits are less important than direct suits. For example, in Delaware 
derivative suits against fiduciaries involving public company acquisitions represent a minor portion 
when compared to class actions. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of 
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167–69 (2004) 
[hereinafter Thompson & Thomas, The New Look]. In addition, there may be restrictive rules relating to 
filing of derivative suits. As to the hurdles of Delaware’s appraisal rights, see Gilson & Gordon, Con-
trolling Controlling, supra note 9, at 798–99; Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 30–31. 
 85  See infra Part III.C.2.  
 86  “[I]t is not necessarily true . . . that parties with greater financial resources are unable to improve 
their position before a judge by hiring a more skilled or articulate legal advocate.” John Armour et al., 
The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical 
Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 230 (2011) [hereinafter Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile 
Takeover Regimes] (citation omitted).  
 87  There may be shareholders who have large and unique stakes. For example, unsolicited suitors, 
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fore, unless the judicial system has features or tools to neutralize the CAPs, 
the expected shareholder-initiated judicial policing will not materialize. 
 (b) Asymmetric Information Problems 
Shareholders also face acute AIPs when they decide whether they 
should file lawsuits and when they prosecute such lawsuits. The most sensi-
tive and delicate facts crucial to the court’s determination on the merits of 
the shareholders’ fiduciary duty claims against Gatekeepers are in the hands 
(or minds) of the fiduciaries or those on the fiduciaries’ side. Shareholders 
are not necessarily privy to the intricacies of the Gatekeepers’ decision-
making processes during the Gatekeeping Phase.89 Of course, extensive dis-
closures may be made to the public. Such information, however, is typically 
insufficient to evaluate whether the Gatekeepers have complied with their 
duties. Moreover, it is difficult for shareholders to know if the disclosure is 
adequate90 unless they have access to undisclosed information.91 In addi-
tion, agents may try to finesse their public disclosure to avoid giving any 
hint of impropriety.92 In short, shareholder lawsuits are “‘outsider-looking-
in’ litigation”93 and are plagued by acute AIPs.94 
 
while their shareholding interests are small, have a big stake in the outcome of their challenge against 
board members. They may want to prosecute their own lawsuits, particularly if they can seek anticipa-
tory relief. For such examples in Delaware, see infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 88  See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and 
Class Action Settlements, 59 U. FLA. L. REV. 71, 74–77 (2007); Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra 
note 60, at 153; PACCES, supra note 13, § 5.5.2.1; Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1791.  
 89  Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracts and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the 
Evolution of Novel Contract Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 207 (2013) (“[T]he emphasis is on process 
rather than detailed rules.”). “[T]he focus is on process rather than on substantive facts.” Id. at 208 
 90  For example, when the applicability of a substantive judicial standard depends on a shareholder 
decision made on an informed basis, plaintiff shareholders may have to know facts that have not been 
disclosed to them. See, e.g., In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450–51 (Del. Ch. 
2002) (14D-9’s failure to disclose material information). Absent a means to find such facts that have not 
been publicly disclosed, such a substantive judicial standard does not work. 
 91  See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 1565, 1574 (2000) (stating that “[p]roving misdisclosure often requires information that is buried 
in the company’s records”).  
 92  See id. at 1588–89, 1601–02. 
 93  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors and Scope, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 529, 610 (2001). Major proxy advisory firms have class action services. See, e.g., Maxim-
ize Recoveries and Meet Fiduciary Responsibilities with Securities Class Action Services, INST’L 
S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., http://www.issgovernance.com/scas; Right Claim, GLASS, LEWIS & CO., LLC, 
http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/right-claim. However, their roles in shareholder class actions relat-
ing to control transactions appear to have been limited. 
 94  For impacts of information asymmetry between parties on dispute resolution, see, for example, 
Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33 
(2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND. J. 
ECON. 404 (1984). 
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Since the Gatekeepers’ tasks are complex and their discretion is wide, 
their agency costs can become heavy.95 Accordingly, the tasks of the judici-
ary to police the agency problems become complex and intricate. The judi-
ciary will not be able to render decisions with confidence unless it has full 
factual information. This means in particular that shareholders in the pro-
cess of litigation need to have a strong means to obtain relevant infor-
mation, including information in the hands (or minds) of defendants. 
 2. Solutions 
 (a) Solutions to Collective Action Problems 
Opt-out class actions with an appropriate cost arrangement could 
greatly reduce CAPs at the initiation and prosecution phase of shareholder 
lawsuits.96 John Coffee stated that an opt-out class action “is usually justi-
fied as necessary to solve collective action problems that render small 
claimants rationally apathetic.”97 
While not much attention has been paid to this, restorative and antici-
patory relief also helps reduce CAPs with respect to the initiation and pros-
ecution of lawsuits. As will be discussed,98 however, in most shareholder 
lawsuits against Gatekeepers restorative relief is not desirable. 
Typically, anticipatory relief has direct or indirect effects or impacts 
that are helpful to all the shareholders and reduce CAPs. For example, if an 
injunction is issued, other shareholders can receive the immediate benefits 
of and essentially free ride on the decision. This is true if the particular ju-
risdiction does not have the concept of issue preclusion (collateral estop-
pel).99 If a declaratory judgment is issued in a jurisdiction where issue pre-
clusion is recognized, other shareholders can rely on its precedential 
value.100 Even if issue preclusion is not recognized, in most shareholder 
suits in the context of control transactions “there are questions of law or fact 
 
 95  See supra text accompanying note 75. 
 96  See, e.g., Black, supra note 91, at 1574, 1601–02 (advocating the use of a class action or similar 
system to support a strong securities market). Class action is a type of aggregate litigation. For various 
types of aggregate litigation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Se-
riously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298–304 (2010).  
 97  See Coffee, supra note 96, at 298. 
 98  See infra Part III.B. 
 99  For the anticipatory effect of issue preclusion, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 700 (1994) [hereinafter Landes & 
Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication].  
 100  As to the preclusive effects of such determinations, see, for example, Samuel R. Bray, Preventive 
Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1291–96 (2010). The preclusive effects are generally broad since 
shareholder suits tend to have common legal or factual issues.  
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common to the [shareholders].”101 Thus, unless the defendant thinks the 
case was erroneously decided and the judgment is timely, the defendant 
may refrain from taking actions that would cause damages or may take ac-
tions to reverse the course of earlier actions to prevent such damage, which 
benefits other shareholders.102 
Depending on the allocation or calculation of the costs of class actions, 
potential plaintiffs could be reluctant to file lawsuits, or they may not have 
lawyers who are willing to represent them. A contingent fee arrangement is 
helpful but not enough.103 First, the plaintiffs want to make sure that if they 
lose they do not have to pay fees for the defendants’ lawyers.104 Second, if 
they win they need to come up with the money to pay the contingent fees to 
their own lawyers under the American Rule.105 
There is yet another issue. As expected, in opt-out class actions most 
typically the lawyers representing the classes drive the process. Nominal 
plaintiffs possess neither the requisite expertise nor strong incentives or re-
sources to effectively monitor and control their lawyers in such suits. Fur-
ther, depending on the financial arrangement, the stakes of plaintiffs’ law-
yers in the lawsuits may be far greater than those of the named shareholders 
and are not completely aligned with those of the shareholders in the class.106 
Thus, another agency problem will emerge, but the TPs hamper the ability 
of the shareholders in the class to monitor the agents. Further, in class ac-
tions seeking anticipatory relief, plaintiffs’ lawyers have to make quick de-
cisions on a wider range of issues than in class actions seeking monetary 
payments only. This could increase the attorney agency costs. Generally, a 
generalist court less knowledgeable than plaintiff lawyers is not able to ef-
fectively control the attorney agency costs. A specialist court can help alle-
viate the attorney agency costs in class actions against the Gatekeepers. 
 
 101  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 102  This is not to suggest that all the shareholders have the same goals. In some situations, they may 
want to pursue different remedies. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989). 
 103  Cf. Black, supra note 91, at 1574 (“Contingent fee arrangements are a useful supplement to the 
class action procedure, but in my judgment not essential.”). 
 104  Under the English Rule, losers pay winners’ attorney fees. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 96, at 292 
n.8. For the history of the English Rule, see also John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–71 (1993). 
 105  As to the American Rule, see Vargo, supra note 104, at 1571. For the history of the American 
Rule, see id. at 1575–78. 
 106  As to the agency costs of various players in shareholder lawsuits, see Randall S. Thomas & Rob-
ert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdic-
tional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1768–73 (2012). For agency problems in and alternatives to 
opt-out class action lawsuits in general, see Coffee, supra note 96. 
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 (b) Solutions to Asymmetric Information Problems 
In an adversarial system, one approach to alleviate shareholder AIPs is 
to allow the shareholder plaintiffs to demand relevant information from the 
defendants and third parties. A negative inference can be used to incentivize 
a party that has asymmetrically more information to produce evidence.107 
Thus, shifting the burden of proof108 to the Gatekeepers—the parties that 
have asymmetrically more information—is also likely to reduce the AIPs. 
The burden shifting could be especially effective when self-dealings are in-
volved.109 It should have a dramatic effect in jurisdictions where the thresh-
old for the burden of proof is high.110 In the context of corporate control 
lawsuits against Gatekeepers, burden shifting is not necessarily unfair: typi-
cally in anticipation of shareholder lawsuits they are often in a position to 
create and maintain records to prepare, defend, and exonerate themselves 
against meritless lawsuits. 
The need for the means to uncover facts in the possession of Gate-
keepers or third parties of course exists with respect to facts that plaintiffs 
have to prove. The same need, however, also exists with respect to facts that 
the defendants have to prove: the plaintiffs might have to undermine the 
credibility of the proof the defendants have offered. 
 B. Twin Problems re Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a 
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction 
 1. Twin Problems 
On the Gatekeeper decision date, Gatekeepers may decide to let share-
 
 107  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated: Burden of Proof, Uncertain-
ty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 632 (1994) (Res ipsa 
loquitur “arose to offset systematic biases that were introduced into litigation as a function of access to 
evidence,” and it “persists in these post-discovery days because of its added incentive to the full produc-
tion of information, which is at the heart of modern litigation theory”). See also id. at 636 (stating that in 
a prediscovery time in the United States, res ipsa loquitur was a tool for the court to uncover facts oth-
erwise unavailable); see also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 6 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1054–55 (1991) (describing bur-
den shifting in relation to duty of loyalty cases due to AIPs). 
 108  In this article, unless otherwise specifically noted, “burden of proof” means the burden of persua-
sion or risk of nonpersuasion and does not include the duty of producing evidence or the production 
burden. For explanations of the concept, see Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 
51 (1961); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 
1502–07 (1999). 
 109  Black, supra note 91, at 1588–89. The use of circumstantial evidence should also be permissible. 
Id.  
 110  See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 243, 248 (2004) (“Any high standard of proof makes burdens of proof critical to outcome.”). 
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holders consider a proposed control transaction and make a collective deci-
sion on it.111 Gatekeepers’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, however, may 
adversely affect the integrity of the shareholders’ collective decision. For 
example, conflicts of interest might have caused the Gatekeepers to make 
recommendations to shareholders that they should not have made. The 
Gatekeepers may have failed to make a fair disclosure to the shareholders. 
In two-step freeze-outs controllers’ tender offers in the first steps might 
have been coercive. 
Typically, however, the TPs will make it costly and time-consuming to 
undo the shareholder collective decision, repeat the Shareholder Delibera-
tion Phase, and restore integrity to the shareholders’ collective decision.112 
This should become clear if one notes that the Shareholder Deliberation 
Phase is unnecessary in the absence of dispersed shareholders. One will al-
so note that the reversal should be much simpler if shareholders are not dis-
persed. 
Once control transactions are completed and the Postcompletion Phase 
commences, it is generally even more impractical, disruptive, costly, and 
time-consuming to restore the status quo ante. There will be related transac-
tions and other important changes simultaneously with or soon after the 
completion date.113 These will make the reversal difficult even when the 
ownership is not dispersed and no TPs exist. The TPs, however, make the 
reversal particularly difficult.114 In the case of tender offers, promptly after 
the tender offer periods, shares and money change hands. In the case of 
one-step mergers, pursuant to the merger agreements, the transactions are 
effected and shares change hands in due course. The TPs make the task of 
reversing the transfer of shares no small task.115 
 
 111  See supra Part II.C. 
 112  In fact, due to the TPs, collective decisions tend to be formed over a period leading up to the day 
of reckoning. Thus, any court decision to fix such decision-making processes is somewhat “restorative” 
even if the court decision is made before the shareholder decision date. In view of this restorative nature, 
as the shareholder decision date comes close, the court may become increasingly reluctant to disrupt the 
timing of that date. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1367 (describing a 
plaintiff’s lawyer’s complaint that “it was hard to get a preliminary injunction hearing in merger cases 
until shortly before the shareholder vote, when there was almost no chance the judge would delay the 
vote”). 
 113  When financial buyers are involved, simultaneously with the closings, for example, the shares 
and/or assets of the targets may be pledged to secure the loans the proceeds of which are used to pay the 
purchase prices. 
 114  Cf. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (indicating a possibility of 
rescission of the sales of shares pursuant to a tender offer), overruled in part on other grounds by Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 115  Typically, courts do not get into the details of the enormity and complexity of the undoing of 
completed transactions. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (stating in 
relation to a controller freeze-out merger approved by a majority of the minority shareholder vote based 
on deficient disclosure that “[s]ince it is apparent that this long completed [freeze-out merger] transac-
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No less importantly, at least as to non-freeze-out control transac-
tions,116  the control transaction opportunities might entirely disappear if 
courts are to undo the distorted shareholder decisions or transactions ap-
proved by such decisions. If so, restorative remedies may create situations 
worse for the shareholders than when such remedies are not ordered. 
 2. Solutions 
We need to explore whether there are adequate alternative remedies. 
Major alternatives worthy of examination are damage and anticipatory rem-
edies. 
 C. Inadequacy and Inefficiency of Ex Post Damage Relief 
 1. Inadequacy and Inefficiency 
 (a) Adequacy of Ex Post Damage Relief 
 (i) Directors as Gatekeepers 
Damage remedies are often inadequate or inappropriate for breach of 
fiduciary duties by directors committed in connection with control transac-
tions. “[I]n corporate law [standards of conduct and standards of review] 
often diverge. The reasons are rooted in policy interests. First, directors 
must make decisions in an environment of imperfect information. Sec-
ond, . . . any risk of liability would likely dwarf the incentives for assuming 
the role.”117 Therefore a relaxed standard is typically used to judge whether 
 
tion is too involved to undo, and in view of the Chancellor’s discretion, the award, if any, should be in 
the form of monetary damages based upon entire fairness standards, i.e., fair dealing and fair price”); 
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (stating that rescission of the sales of 
shares pursuant to a tender offer is not feasible due to a subsequent merger of the target into another 
company and other changes), overruled in part on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701 (Del. 1983); Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987) (assuming 
implicitly that a shareholders’ collective decision on a self-tender offer suffering from inadequate dis-
closure and coerciveness cannot “easily be undone”); Elster v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 128 A.2d 801, 805 
(Del. Ch. 1957) (“In cases involving the sale of corporate assets or their merger with those of another 
corporation, slight delay may in itself lead to the denying of a motion for injunctive relief where such an 
order would involve a complex undoing of an accomplished corporate act.”); In re Siliconix Inc., 
S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *66 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (stating that a completed ex-
change offer is difficult to unwind). For the difficulties in undoing M&A deals involving public targets 
when there is a contractual breach, see John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evi-
dence from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 311–12 (2012). 
 116  As to freeze-outs, no other bidders will surface unless controllers decide to sell their positions.  
 117  William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Dela-
ware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1296 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function Over Form] 
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directors made a legally cognizable error in business judgments.118 To fur-
ther reduce the risk of liability, statutory exemptions may be created. For 
example, it may be wise to exculpate directors from claims for damages 
arising out of a violation of their fiduciary duties unless such a violation 
constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty or an act or inaction taken in bad 
faith.119  
In addition, damage awards are not adequate to compensate the victims 
if the directors are unable to satisfy the monetary obligations. Directors may 
be wealthy but not wealthy enough to pay such damages out of their pock-
ets. Directors’ and officers’ insurance has exclusions,120 may be too expen-
sive, or may not cover the full liability. The insurers may become insol-
vent.121 The companies may not indemnify directors against the payment of 
such damages.122 Therefore, there are situations in which the feasibility and 
adequacy of nonmonetary relief should be explored.123 
 
(footnote omitted). See also Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of 
Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH ch. 3, § 3.6.1 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed. 2009) (text accompanying notes 128–32). 
 118  Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 117, at 1296. 
 119  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014). As to Japan, see, for example, Kaisha-hō 
[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 427 (Japan) (allowing corporations to have preset limits on 
the amounts of damages payable by nonexecutive directors for breach of fiduciary duties not amounting 
to gross negligence through provisions in articles of incorporation). 
 120  The exclusions may include liabilities arising out of “deliberately fraudulent misconduct” and 
“transactions resulting in an individual receiving any personal benefit or advantage to which he is not 
legally entitled.” See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evi-
dence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007); Ber-
nard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indem-
nification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to The Russian Securities 
Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 77–79 (2008) [hereinafter Black et al., Legal Liability of Direc-
tors and Company Officials Part 2]; Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1055, 1085–88 (2006).  
 121  Id. at 1088. 
 122  Id. at 1093–94. For surveys of directors’ liability, including indemnification, see generally 
DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY: A WORLDWIDE REVIEW (Alexander Loos ed., 2d ed. 2010); Bernard Black et 
al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds for Liability (Re-
port to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 614 (2007) [hereinafter Black et al., 
Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1]; Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and 
Company Officials Part 2, supra note 120.  
 123  If anticipatory adjudication is available and rendered against director decisions, those decisions 
may be subject to reputational sanctions. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors 
in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholders Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1465, 1488–90 (2007); Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 117, at 451 n.10 (“Directors are 
reputationally sensitive and likely will try to avoid making decisions that could be enjoined by a 
court.”). The reputational sanction, however, will be weak if the public is not properly sensitized. See 
Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 285–87. 
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 (ii) Controllers as Gatekeepers 
Controllers may owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.124 Con-
trollers’ failures to discharge their fiduciary duties in relation to freeze-outs 
typically means that the shareholders would have been better off if it had 
not been for such failures. Unlike directors, however, controllers are more 
likely to have resources to pay damages from their failures to observe their 
fiduciary duties in the transactions. 
 (b) Efficiency of Ex Post Damage Relief 
 (i) Directors as Gatekeepers 
The efficient breach hypothesis—the claim that “loss-based measures” 
are superior “because they enable the parties to avoid performance that is 
more costly than the benefit created”125 or “court-ordered expectation dam-
ages (a liability rule) lead parties to maintain or abandon prior agreements 
efficiently”126—has long been an influential principle.127 There has been a 
contractual understanding of fiduciary duties:128 “[t]he duty of loyalty re-
places detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by 
prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if bar-
gaining were cheap and all promises fully enforced. The usual economic as-
sessments of contractual terms and remedies then apply.”129 There can be 
instances in which fiduciary duties may be efficiently breached.130 
Importantly, however, a simple calculation shows that unless self-
 
 124  In Delaware controllers owe duties to minority shareholders. See infra note 166 and accompany-
ing text. For Japan, under the prevailing view, the answer is no. See infra note 417 and accompanying 
text.  
 125  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 
441 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty].  
 126  Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the 
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 384–85 (2005). 
 127  For a short history and development of the hypothesis, see id. at 384 n.11. See also Alan 
Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting 
for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990). There has been a recent lively debate as to the validi-
ty of the theory. For a short list of critics of the efficient breach hypothesis, see Daniel Markovits & 
Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1929, 1940 n.5 (2011). 
 128  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 441–44. 
 129  Id. at 427. See also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 107, at 1048–49; John C. Coffee, Jr., Privati-
zation and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 28 
(1999). 
 130  However, damage remedies appropriate for the breaches are not necessarily expectation damages 
and can be damages short of full restitution damages. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 442–44.  
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dealing is involved,131 the efficient breach theory in most instances does not 
justify directors’ breaches of their duty of loyalty. In these situations any 
surpluses created or losses avoided by the breach are not likely to be suffi-
cient to compensate the shareholders for the losses the breach would 
cause.132 
For example, suppose the directors of a company decide to sell the 
company they serve to one bidder over another bidder. The terms the two 
bidders proposed are identical except that the second bidder indicates a 
willingness to offer a price substantially more than the price the first bidder 
offers. The directors choose the first bidder, since the first bidder has indi-
cated a willingness to keep the incumbent directors after the acquisition. 
Ordinarily, possible losses to the shareholders substantially exceed any gain 
the directors realize from the job security the first bidder offers the direc-
tors. For the same reason, if directors of a target company deploy or main-
tain a poison pill to protect their jobs, the economic value of the job security 
is likely to be substantially outweighed by the shareholders’ loss of the op-
portunity to be bought out by the bidder.133 
When directors acting as Gatekeepers are in breach of their fiduciary 
duties, the negotiations with bidders have been skewed. This could lead to 
less optimal transactions than when the directors discharge their duties in 
negotiating the deal. This rationale is also applicable to a breach of the duty 
to disclose. 
In the first example above, depending on the circumstance,134 if the 
court orders an injunction, it may encourage the directors to renegotiate 
with the bidder in compliance with their fiduciary duties. In the second ex-
ample above, in most instances if the court issues an injunction to redeem 
the poison pill, the directors may be encouraged to negotiate with the hos-
tile bidder and possibly others in a manner consistent with their duties. In 
many instances timely issued and appropriately crafted remedies resulting 
from anticipatory adjudications135 should be more efficient than expectation 
 
 131  For an example of the definition of self-dealing, see Luca Enriques, The Law on Company Direc-
tors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, 2 INT’L & COMP. L.J. 298, 299 (2000). Management buy-
outs (MBOs) are self-dealing transactions. It is easy to conceive situations where Kaldor-Hicks efficien-
cy exists; the buyers’ gains will exceed the losses of the target shareholders. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER 
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 42 (6th ed. 2012). 
 132  No Kaldor-Hicks efficiency exists.  
 133  This should follow from the following proposition: “[T]he amounts that you need to pay manag-
ers to do the right thing are generally small compared to the benefits that doing the right thing creates for 
shareholders.” Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 901 (2002).  
 134  Of course, by the time of the decision the second bidder might have lost interest in the target, and 
there may be no other prospective bidders. In a case like this, it may be disadvantageous to the share-
holders if the court issues an injunction.  
 135  The terminology is borrowed from Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99. 
While Landes and Posner did not define the term, the concept includes declaratory judgment, temporary 
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damages even if the directors are fully capable of paying the damages.136 
In addition, even in self-dealing transactions, such as management 
buyouts (MBOs), where there could be net surpluses from a breach, there 
are circumstances beyond the reach of the theory.137 For example, damages 
from a failure to observe the duty to disclose are difficult to measure.138 It 
may be difficult for a court to reconstruct a likely transaction scenario that 
would have ensued had there been no violation of fiduciary duties. For ex-
ample, in discussing whether the irreparable injury requirement for a pre-
liminary injunction is satisfied in a case involving a breach of the Revlon 
duty, the Delaware Chancery Court stated: 
No doubt there is the chance to formulate a rational remedy down 
the line, but that chance involves great cost, time, and, unavoida-
bly, a large degree of imprecision and speculation. After-the-fact 
inquiries into what might have been had directors tested the mar-
ket adequately or stockholders been given all the material infor-
mation necessarily involve reasoned guesswork.139 
 
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction. Id. Such adjudication is contrasted 
with “ex post adjudication.” Id. at 685. The concept includes administrative and other types of nonjudi-
cial adjudication. In this paper the term denotes adjudication in a lawsuit against a Gatekeeper relating to 
his or her adherence to his or her fiduciary duties in performing Gatekeeping activities and of the types 
Landes and Posner contemplate. The concept therefore is different from the “preventive adjudication” 
that Samuel Bray used. See Bray, supra note 100, at 1300 n.100. Bray contrasts the concept with “reme-
dial adjudication” that “correct[s] past harm” and does not include injunction. Id. at 1276. Anticipatory 
adjudication also differs from “restorative adjudication,” which restores the status quo and includes both 
rescission and mandatory injunction. See generally, e.g., DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. 
PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY §§ 
12.02[c], 12.04[a] (2014). With respect to a typical fiduciary duty lawsuit against Gatekeepers seeking 
anticipatory adjudication, “the facts bearing on the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment have already oc-
curred . . . .” Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 699.  “[C]ases . . . in which 
the facts bearing on legal entitlement are in existence rather than contingent even though no one has yet 
been injured . . . .” Id. 
 136  Anticipatory adjudication may have yet another efficiency gain: there is no need to calculate 
damages. See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 699; William Savitt, The 
Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 583 n.41 (2012). Richard 
Brooks and Warren Schwartz pointed out certain efficiency gains from preliminary injunctions. See 
Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 126, at 384–85. The efficiency gains, however, are those derived in the 
context of and assume the existence of decisions on the merits after trial and are different from those 
described here.  
 137  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 445. 
 138  See, e.g., In re Anderson, Clayton S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 676 (Del. Ch. 1986). In the 
REX II Tokyo High Court decision, the court recognized breach of the duty to disclose but stated that 
plaintiffs failed to prove damages from the breach. See infra note 577. 
 139  In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 207 (Del. Ch. 2007). See also 
Coates, supra note 3, at 17 (pointing out that “damages from broken deals are hard to estimate and 
prove” as a factor to make the parties to agreements to acquire companies with dispersed shareholders 
prefer to have specific performance remedies in the agreements); MASAKAZU SHIRAI, YŪKŌTEKIBAISHŪ 
NO BAMEN NI OKERU TORISHIMARIYAKU NI TAISURU KIRITSU [RULES APPLICABLE TO DIRECTOR 
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If so, it will be also difficult to calculate damages. Anticipatory correc-
tions, however, should lead to informed shareholder decisions.140  In in-
stances like this, “[t]ransaction forcing remedies” may be superior.141 This 
is particularly true if the dispersed shareholders suffering from the TPs have 
agents—such as independent directors—who can effectively negotiate for 
them. Restorative remedies and anticipatory remedies can be contract-
forcing remedies. 
 (ii) Controllers as Gatekeepers 
In freeze-outs, unless a special self-help mechanism is chosen to be 
adopted,142 controllers engage in self-dealing transactions and there can be 
no real negotiation, and no re-negotiation will be induced. Further, unlike 
the situations described above,143 there is a real possibility that the self-
dealing transactions in which the controllers breach their duties to the mi-
nority shareholders will create net surpluses.144 Therefore, there is a real 
likelihood of an efficient breach. In addition, controllers typically have re-
sources to pay the monetary awards after the transactions.145 Thus, the need 
for anticipatory adjudication is less than when the Gatekeepers are directors 
in relation to non-freeze-out control transactions.146 
 
CONDUCTS IN FRIENDLY ACQUISITIONS] 510 n.1765 (2013).  
 140  Cf. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (suggesting that Delaware’s disclosure 
only settlements in relation to mergers have not meaningfully changed shareholder voting). 
 141  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 445. See also 
Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (issuing a preliminary injunction (i) enjoining 
the use of corporate funds and attempts to preempt a bidding contest designed to assist a management 
group’s defensive MBO and to prevent a third-party hostile bidder from acquiring the company, a Mich-
igan corporation, and (ii) opening a fair auction process). Often, however, damage remedies may still be 
superior. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 433, 442–43 
(regarding management’s self-dealing transactions, including MBOs). 
 142  For example, the use of both an independent committee approval and a majority of the minority 
condition may remove the self-dealing nature. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503 
(Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d by Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). See also Gilson & 
Gordon, Controlling Controlling, supra note 9, at 804 (stating that an independent negotiating commit-
tee and a rigorous judicial review serve to ensure that the minority will receive “some portion of the gain 
that would result from bargaining in a bilateral monopoly”). 
 143  See supra Part III.C.1.b.i. 
 144  See supra Parts II.A.2., II.B.2. 
 145  See supra Part III.C.1.a.ii. 
 146  See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 125, at 433 (stating that 
remedies for a majority shareholder’s breach of his or her duty to minority shareholders are usually loss 
based). 
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 2. Solutions 
As described above in the context of lawsuits against Gatekeepers, 
damage relief rendered for breach of fiduciary duties is frequently inade-
quate or inefficient. This is particularly true when control transactions are 
not self-dealing transactions. As aforementioned, restorative remedies are 
often impractical, costly, inadequate, and inefficient. Further, if they are en-
forced, restorative remedies may cause great harm to third parties who have 
entered into contracts with the companies.147 
Anticipatory adjudication rendered during the Shareholder Delibera-
tion Phase will reduce or preempt circumstances in which the court would 
have no choice other than to award damage relief even if such relief would 
be inadequate or inefficient.148 It may induce renegotiations untainted by 
conduct in breach of fiduciary duties.149 Further, it may reduce hardships to 
third-party contractors if restorative relief is rendered.150 
In anticipatory adjudication rendered in the context of control transac-
tions, predictability is less of a concern since the court expresses its view 
before decisions of Gatekeepers can have real negative consequences. No 
irreversible shareholder decisions have been made. Often their breach of fi-
duciary duties has not yet caused fatal, irreparable damages.151 Anticipatory 
adjudication has an added benefit of allowing the court to render decisions 
tailored to the specific circumstances.152 
 
 147  See, e.g., Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate 
Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1999); Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Con-
tract and Corporate Law Tension Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561 (1999). 
 148  The ex post aspect sometimes creates a less-than-ideal situation in which, due to deal dynamics, 
it is too late for the court to fashion anticipatory relief. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 
A.3d 432, 449–52 (Del. Ch. 2012). See also supra note 112. 
 149  See supra Part III.C.1.b.i 
 150  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 842 (Del. Ch. 2011) (indicating 
the possibility for a contractual right of a third party to prevail over the interests of shareholders once the 
challenged transaction has been completed and thus an egg has been scrambled). See infra text accom-
panying note 260. See also supra note 148. 
 151  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 250–51 (1985); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Com-
petition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1085 (2000) (indicating that an injunction, a 
form of anticipatory relief, does not require as much predictability as a damage remedy). Ehud Kamar 
stresses the importance of predictability in business planning and strongly suspects the suboptimality of 
Delaware’s indeterminacy. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corpo-
rate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919–23 (1998). Significantly, however, Kamar failed to recognize 
that predictability is less important if judicial determination is in the form of anticipatory adjudication. 
See also Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 881–87 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, Structural Approach] (de-
scribing possible demerits of specific rules). 
 152  See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 151, at 1084 (“Corporate law in particular, because of the essentially 
unlimited range of structural possibilities, may make ex ante specification difficult.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  10:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:45 (2016) 
80 
80 X 
Anticipatory relief, however, has to be timely, and the window availa-
ble for the adjudication is often narrow.153 In particular, with respect to con-
trol transactions that the Gatekeepers have agreed to let shareholders de-
cide, the adjudication must be made before the shareholders’ collective 
decisions. To reduce TPs relating to the shareholder decisions, the U.S. 
model gives a minimum window of time leading up to the decisions.154 In 
lawsuits seeking anticipatory relief, “time is of the essence,” and the court 
renders decisions “on the fly.”155 Thus, the court that handles lawsuits seek-
ing anticipatory relief must be equipped to move quickly. It may not have 
time to hold a trial or other formal fact-finding proceedings. Further, antici-
patory adjudication generally has greater administrative and error costs.156 
If interlocutory injunctions are erroneously rendered, often due to deal dy-
namics ultimately attributable to TPs, they are likely to cause irreversible 
consequences.157 Delay in the timing of the initiation of the adjudication 
may increase the ripeness of the matter and reduce such costs. However, 
that will further shorten the window of time to render the adjudication. In 
addition, crafting injunctive remedies requires intimate knowledge of deal 
documents and familiarity with deal dynamics.158 
Specialized judges help remove or alleviate these potential risks.159 
 
Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in 
the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1275 (2001) (“Complex human behavior rarely lends itself to bright-line 
rules.”). Lack of predictability, however, also creates the need for anticipatory adjudication to avoid dire 
adverse consequences that might result from corporate fiduciaries’ misapplication or misinterpretation 
of fiduciary duty law. 
 153  In the context of a hostile offer, the bidder does not necessarily have a fixed deadline. However, 
if another bidder surfaces all of a sudden, it becomes necessary for the dispute to be resolved before the 
shareholder action on the other bid. Further, it is costly for the hostile bidder to maintain the hostile bid 
for a prolonged period. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Stag-
gered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 922–23 (2002) [hereinafter Beb-
chuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards]. 
 154  See supra Part II.C.  
 155  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 914, 
916 (1997) [hereinafter Gilson, The Fine Art] (“[T]he Court of Chancery was, de facto, the court of first 
and last resort for many takeover contests and was restructuring corporate law on the fly.”). 
 156  Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 685.  
 157  First, a window of time to correct the errors that control transactions can afford to have is too 
short for the court to render final decisions. Second, the erroneous decisions tend to have immediate and 
irreversible effects on the deal dynamics of a transaction. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 
135, § 10.02 (referring to “the powerful and often sweeping effects that such a conclusion and the issu-
ance of an interim injunction can engender”). 
 158  See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 449–52 (Ch. Ct. 2012). 
 159  There can be “specialist” judges in courts of general jurisdiction. See Edward K. Cheng, The 
Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008) (stating that judges are more specialized 
than popularly understood and discussing the merits and demerits of specialization). See also Rochelle 
C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
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They are familiar with both typical fact patterns160 and legal issues, and do 
not require time to get up to speed.161 This also helps reduce court adminis-
trative costs.162 It may be difficult to have time to appeal lower court deci-
sions.163 Thus, it would be desirable if such specialists existed at the level of 
the court of first instance. 
There is yet another factor that would complicate the administration of 
anticipatory adjudication in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers: such 
adjudication often must be made in response to class action lawsuits. The 
judiciary has to address the agency problems of the attorneys representing 
the classes. 164  Class action lawsuits seeking anticipatory relief present 
unique agency problems compared to class actions seeking damage relief. 
This is because the attorneys have to make judgments on wide-ranging is-
sues, including business issues, and negotiate with the Gatekeepers and 
possibly other parties to craft tailored equitable remedies. Judges handling 
such lawsuits deal with wide-ranging issues and exercise wider discretion 
than judges in damage suits. Again, specialist judges are the answer to the 
need to deal with such agency problems in the fast-moving and complex ju-
dicial proceedings. 
 D. Summary 
TPs continue to plague control transactions during shareholder law-
suits to resolve agency problems closely related to such TPs. They plague 
lawsuits at both Stage I and Stage II. Conceptually, it is easy to identify so-
lutions for the TPs at Stage I. As to Stage II, damage relief as an alternative 
to restorative relief is often inadequate and inappropriate, particularly with 
respect to lawsuits involving third-party acquisitions. Often anticipatory re-
lief substantially sidesteps the adverse consequences of restorative relief re-
lating to control transactions. It may also induce economically efficient 
transactions. However, the relief imposes a heavy burden on the judiciary 
 
 160  This may be important in relation to decisions, such as interlocutory injunctions, that are issued 
without a full fact-finding proceeding. For example, specialist judges are able to contextualize state-
ments in deposition transcripts. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private 
Benefits of Control: Ex ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex post Transaction Review, 169 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 160, 178 (2013) (describing a situation in which a specialist judge does not need a 
trial to reach an accurate result but an inexpert judge may reach a wrong result even after a trial). 
 161  See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 713; Cheng, supra note 159, 
at 548–90.  
 162  See Landes & Posner, Anticipatory Adjudication, supra note 99, at 714. The greater administra-
tive cost may be unavoidable. However, the sizes of the stakes in shareholder class actions against Gate-
keepers may warrant the greater cost.  
 163  See Gilson, The Fine Art, supra note 155, at 915–16 (stating that many preliminary injunction 
cases did not have a chance to reach the Delaware Supreme Court).  
 164  See infra Part IV.A.1.a.i. 
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and requires the judiciary to have special attributes. 
 
 IV. UNITED STATES 
 A. Delaware 
 1. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and 
Prosecution of Lawsuits 
 (a) Collective Action Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of 
Lawsuits 
 (i) Class Actions 
Under Delaware’s judge-made law, directors of Delaware corporations 
owe fiduciary duties to the company shareholders as well as to the corpora-
tions.165 Similarly, controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to corpora-
tions and minority shareholders.166 Shareholders167 and corporations gener-
ally have standing to file direct lawsuits to enforce their rights against the 
fiduciaries. 
In contested acquisitions unsolicited suitors often file lawsuits against 
the targets’ directors to seek anticipatory relief, such as preliminary injunc-
tions.168 The suitors’ standing in such lawsuits is based on their ownership 
of shares in the target companies. Economically, however, it is not their 
share ownership that justifies the lawsuits. Rather, their large stakes as hos-
tile suitors economically justifies the lawsuits.169 In these situations, other 
 
 165  See, e.g., Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1122 n.54 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 166  See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–15 (Del. 1994). 
 167  See, e.g., Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 766 (Del. Ch. 1964) (stating that beneficial 
owners of shares, such as those holding shares under street names, have standing as shareholders). Cf. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2014) (“The stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who are the 
stockholders entitled by this section to examine the list required by this section or to vote in person or by 
proxy at any meeting of stockholders”); see also, § 262 (providing that a record holder has an appraisal 
right). However, shareholders do not have standing to sue for breaches committed before they became 
shareholders. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1169–70 (Del. Ch. 
2002). With respect to derivative suits, this position is codified. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2014).  
 168  See Thompson & Thomas, The New Look, supra note 84, at 169 tbl.2. A significant percentage of 
the direct individual lawsuits were “by bidders either in hostile transactions or in second bidder situa-
tions.” Id. at 174.  
 169  See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., 809 A.2d at 1172 (indicating in a decision denying a hostile bidder’s 
standing that bidders’ interests as shareholders are often “immaterial”). See also EDWARD WELCH ET 
AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION UNDER DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW § 3.02[B] 
(2012) [hereinafter WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION]. The prospects of the 
monetary and other costs, however, might discourage potential bidders from launching the bids. Note 
Document1 (DO NOT  DELETE 




shareholders will benefit from the lawsuits, particularly if the bidders win 
anticipatory relief.170 However, the interests of the unsolicited suitors and 
the other shareholders may diverge.171 More importantly, these lucky situa-
tions are hard to come by. 
Delaware’s opt-out class actions,172 combined with a regime for the 
calculation of fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the allocation of the costs 
of the lawsuits,173 greatly alleviate shareholder CAPs in relation to the initi-
ation and maintenance of individual (versus derivative) shareholder law-
suits against corporate fiduciaries.174 The “decisions are res judicata as to 
the entire class.”175  The Delaware judiciary is keenly aware of the im-
portance of its opt-out class action regime. For example, the Chancery 
Court recently stated that “[t]he class action mechanism originated in equity 
practice and is particularly important to the substantive law of corporations 
as a mechanism to address collective action problems.”176 
The expert court monitors the agents for the classes. Class representa-
tives must be those who will fairly and adequately protect the class inter-
ests177 and owe fiduciary duties to the class.178 The selection of counsel at 
the outset of the lawsuits is one of the most important tasks of the court 
with which the lawsuits are filed.179 In selecting lead counsel, “the weight 
 
that other potential bidders might be able to free ride on the first bidders’ efforts.  
 170  See supra Part III.A.2.a. Class action lawsuits may also be filed. When bidders file lawsuits, 
however, class action plaintiffs tend to take a backseat to the bidders. See also Thompson & Thomas, 
The New Look, supra note 84, at 139–40. 
 171  See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *4–5 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1989); Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 778 (D. 
Del. 1988). 
 172  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a). The court rules governing class actions in Delaware are “modeled substan-
tially upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 
9.03[a] (citing Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 9154, 920 (Del. 1994)). For the limitation of the opt-out 
right, see, for example, In re Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 945 A.2d 1123 (Del. 2008) (stating that opt out as 
of right is available only from a class certified by Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(3)). In European juris-
dictions, “opt-in” class actions seem to predominate. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 96, at 301, and author-
ities cited therein. 
 173  See infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii. 
 174  The Delaware General Corporation Law does not authorize a class appraisal proceeding. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)–(d) (2014).  
 175  See, e.g., Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1073 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 176  In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., 2012 WL 1020471, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, remanded by BVF Partners L.P. v. New Orleans Emps. Ret. Sys. (In re Celera 
Corp. S’holder Litig.), 59 A.3d 418 (Del. 2012). See also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
879 A.2d 604, 643 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stressing the importance of maintaining the integrity of a representa-
tive suit).  
 177  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a)(4). 
 178  See, e.g., Barbieri v. Swing-N-Slide Corp., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. May 7, 
1996). 
 179  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(a)(4). See also Savitt, supra note 136, at 578–81. 
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given to the size of a plaintiffs’ holding . . . comes into play when a plaintiff 
owns a sufficient stake to provide an economic incentive to monitor counsel 
and play a meaningful role in conducting the case.”180 
It is also necessary for the court to monitor such representatives and 
lawyers on an ongoing basis to avoid or minimize the litigation agency 
costs.181 Thus, “[a] trial court has a continuing duty in a class action case to 
scrutinize the class attorney to see that he or she is adequately protecting the 
interests of the class.”182 A court “must throughout the proceedings, strin-
gently apply the requirement of adequate representation . . . .”183 Thus, for 
example, the court may order changes to the lead counsel positions.184 Set-
tlements of class action lawsuits are also subject to court approval.185 
An equally potent and “cost efficient” mechanism to control the litiga-
tion agency costs (and align the interests of the plaintiffs’ lawyers)186 is the 
court’s ability to award or adjust legal fees to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.187 Fur-
ther, recently the Delaware judiciary crafted a judicial standard that would 
reduce “settlement value” from certain types of lawsuits.188 
In Delaware, notwithstanding the race to the bottom problem that 
might have been created by the prevalence of multijurisdictional lawsuits,189 
 
 180  In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 955 (Del. 2010). See also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 
23(a)(4). Other states may still have the first-filer rule, and the divergence in the methods of selecting 
lead counsel is one reason for the prevalent multistate jurisdictional lawsuits. See, e.g., Armour et al., 
Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 60, at 1373. For an analysis of the impacts of the lead plaintiff 
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Publ. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), see, for example, James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff 
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 
(2006).  
 181  See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 9.03[a]. 
 182  In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 955 (quoting 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. 
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:22, at 417 (Thomson West 4th ed. 2002)).  
 183  Guerine v. J & W Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 184  See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 961–64. 
 185  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23(e). For the importance of this power, see, for example, Savitt, supra note 136, 
at 575. 
 186  The award of more than $304 million to plaintiffs’ counsel in the context of a derivative suit re-
sulting in an award of more than $2 billion is the most notable recent example. In re S. Peru Copper 
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. The-
riault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012). 
 187  See, e.g., Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 154–55; Savitt, supra note 136, at 576–
77. For the ability of the court to award legal fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii. 
 188  In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 504 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M & F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).  
 189  See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 14 (2013) [hereinafter Strine et al., Putting Stockholders First] (“[T]he prevalence of multi-
forum litigation and the inability or unwillingness of courts to limit such litigation can exacerbate . . . 
‘race to the bottom’- type behavior . . . .”). Delaware’s efforts to control litigation agency costs may en-
courage certain plaintiffs’ lawyers to file in courts outside Delaware. See Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, 
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litigation agency costs appear to be constrained at a level not overly exces-
sive relative to the benefits, that is, the reduction of agency costs relating to 
the Gatekeeper/shareholder relationship. 190  A delicate balancing act by 
“specialist judges”191 appears to have prevented the problems from growing 
out of control.192 
 (ii) Costs of Lawsuits 
The Chancery Court is entitled to “make such order concerning costs 
in every case as is agreeable to equity.”193 In exercising such authority,194 
the court generally allows a prevailing party to recover certain costs from 
the losing party. Such costs typically “consist of so-called court costs, wit-
ness fees, and statutory delineated charges.”195 In particular cases, the court 
can deviate from the norm.196 
As to all the more important attorney fees, however, the court general-
ly defers to the American Rule. Under the rule, each litigant is responsible 
for the fees of his or her own counsel.197 Therefore, typically each party 
bears his or her costs of attorney’s fees.198 There are certain exceptions to 
the rule.199 Under the so-called common fund or substantial (or therapeutic) 
benefit doctrine, a litigant or a lawyer who creates a common fund or 
achieves a substantial benefit, as the case may be, is entitled to a reasonable 
 
supra note 60, at 155. 
 190  At least it is not typical for acquisition agreements for control transactions to have a clause spe-
cifically providing for a price adjustment directly or indirectly linked to the cost of litigation to defend 
fiduciary duty claims raised in connection with the contemplated transaction. As to the level of legal 
fees, see infra Part IV.A.1.a.ii.  
 191  See infra Part IV.A.2.c. 
 192  See, e.g., Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 155. 
 193  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5106 (West 2015). This is viewed as a restatement of “the long-
existing rule of equity.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.01. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 6510 (2015) (providing that courts may award costs relating to declaratory judgments “as may 
seem equitable and just”). 
 194  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 54(d). 
 195  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.02[b] (footnote omitted). 
 196  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 54(d). 
 197  See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[a] (footnote omitted); WELCH ET AL., 
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 11.02[A]. 
 198  See, e.g., In re SS & C Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 948 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2008); Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386 (Del. Ch. 1966).  
 199  For the types of exceptions, see, for example, Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. John-
ston, 705 A.2d 225, 231 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff’d, 720 A.2d 542 (Del. 1998). See also ATR-Kim Eng Fin. 
Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520, at *22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), aff’d, 930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007); 
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[a] (giving a list of exceptions). As to the history of and 
exceptions to the rule, see Vargo, supra note 104, at 1570–90. 
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attorney’s fee.200 The common fund doctrine requires that the fees be paid 
out of the funds created by the litigant or lawyer.201 If the created benefits 
are therapeutic, however, no funds for such payments exist. In the context 
of a shareholder lawsuit, “because the corporation is the only vehicle 
through which the costs of obtaining the benefit can be equally shared,”202 
the court may obligate the companies to shoulder the fees.203 
In the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers, the calcula-
tion and allocation of attorneys’ fees are very important.204 The foregoing 
rules regarding attorney fees make named plaintiffs in class actions less 
concerned with the costs of class action lawsuits.205 On the other hand, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who work on a contingent fee basis, have a potentially 
significant upside of being rewarded with lucrative fees.206 The Delaware 
judiciary has made conscious efforts to craft a fee structure that gives 
healthy incentives to plaintiff’s lawyers to solve “a collective action prob-
lem that might stifle individual stockholders from litigating general breach-
es of duty”207 and to seek real benefits in class actions.208 
 
 200  See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §§ 9.05[a], 13.03[e]. These doctrines also apply 
in settings other than representative suits. See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 
1166 (Del. 1988); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 13.03[e].  
 201  See Vargo, supra note 104, at 1579–83. For an example of fee awards under the common fund 
doctrine, see Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1253 (Del. 2012).  
 202  Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 141, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1988) 
(citing Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 148–49 (Del. 1980)). See also Mills v. Elec. 
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). 
 203  See, e.g., In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d 353, 359–60 (Del. Ch. 
1999). See also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 9.05[g]; WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 5.01[C][6]. 
 204  See supra text accompanying notes103–105. 
 205  Preliminary injunctions are conditioned on the posting of a bond. However, generally the amount 
has not been prohibitively high. See, e.g., Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok: 
Diagnosis and Prescriptions, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1, 6 (2014).  
 206  See Weiss & White, supra note 55, at 1830 (“[L]itigating merger-related class actions in Dela-
ware Chancery Court appears to be a lucrative area of practice for the plaintiffs’ bar.”). See also Strine et 
al., Putting Stockholders First, supra note 189, at 15 n.49 (“The data on attorney’s fee awards in stock-
holder representative litigation show that it is not the case that Delaware judges are reluctant to award 
fees in meritorious cases.”).  
 207  WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 170, § 11.02[A][1]. 
See also In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642–48 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Fuqua In-
dus., Inc. S’holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating that the cost and fee-shifting 
mechanisms are used to “economically incentivize” private lawyers). See generally Jason W. Adkins, A 
Guide to Predicting the Calculation of Attorneys’ Fees Under Delaware Law for Shareholder Lawsuits, 
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 501 (2012).  
 208  Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1255 (Del. 2012). In May 2014, the Delaware 
Supreme Court, in response to certified questions, rendered a decision stating that a bylaw provision 
approved by a board to shift attorney fees in intracorporate litigation to losing claimants is not invalid 
per se. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 554–560 (Del. 2014). The case involved 
a Delaware non-stock corporation. However, the holding is also applicable to Delaware stock corpora-
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Studies indicate that the fees paid to plaintiffs’ lawyers in relation to 
acquisitions have been modest compared to the transaction values.209 For 
example, a study focusing on mergers for the years from 1990 to 2001 in 
which the target companies were publicly traded Delaware corporations 
with deal values in excess of $100 million shows that class action plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in settled lawsuits earned fees per case of 0.19% of the deal value 
on average, ranging from 0.005% to 1.36%.210 According to another study, 
for settlements of lawsuits of deals in 2011, the mean attorneys’ fee was 
$1.43 million, and the median fee was $580,000. There appears to be no 
discernible upward trend from 2005 to 2011.211 Class action lawsuits in-
volve players other than the plaintiffs’ lawyers, such as judges, lawyers for 
the defendants, witnesses, and people involved in document production in 
response to discovery requests. The statistical information does not include 
the costs relating to these additional players. The magnitude of the fees paid 
to plaintiff’s lawyers, however, could be a good indicator of the total costs 
of lawsuits. If so, the magnitude of the additional costs may not be prohibi-
tively high. At least it does not appear very likely that the prospect of the 
cost of class action lawsuits will significantly deter efficiency-enhancing 
transactions.212 
 (iii) Anticipatory Relief 
As described below,213 the Chancery Court has the power to render an-
ticipatory relief. Delaware recognizes issue preclusion.214 
 
tions. After much debate, Delaware amended its corporation law, which now prohibits such fee shifting 
in connection with an internal corporate claim.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(f) (2015).   
 209  See Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 45 (stating that a percentage of litigation 
costs in effect incurred by controllers is small relative to deal values). 
 210  Weiss & White, supra note 55, at 1831. These figures can be compared against the fees payable 
to “investment bankers, lawyers, and accountants in arms-length transaction,” ranging from “1.0% to 
2.0% of deal value.” Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 45.  
 211  See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 61, at 12, 13 tbl.10 (a study covering 2007–11). 
 212  See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, The New Look, supra note 84, at 140. With respect to merger 
freeze-outs, see Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 47. In a recent article Charles 
Korsmo and Minor Myers suggest various proposals to reduce attorney agency costs in shareholder class 
actions challenging mergers. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Liti-
gation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014). 
 213  See infra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 214  In Delaware mutuality is no longer required for issue preclusion. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Pep-
si-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 264 (Del. 1934).  
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  10:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:45 (2016) 
88 
88 X 
 (b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution 
of Lawsuits 
 (i) Fact-finding 
Delaware’s discovery system215 addresses the AIPs during Stage I.216 
Importantly, in the context of lawsuits against Gatekeepers, it allows share-
holder plaintiffs to expeditiously delve into and uncover the process of de-
cision making by the Gatekeepers and their advisors, including the docu-
ments, e-mail communications, and conversations crucial to their cases. 
Subject to certain exceptions, the parties are entitled to obtain discov-
ery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, including the existence, description, 
nature, custody, condition and location of any documents, electronically 
stored information, or tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.217 
“Relevance” is defined broadly.218 The parties may seek information 
that is “inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasona-
bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”219 In addi-
tion, the court does not have jurors.220 Thus, the judge in charge of the case 
reviews the results of the discovery directly without first removing inadmis-
sible evidence. 
Discovery tools include depositions, interrogatories, production of 
documents, and requests for admission.221 In the context of fiduciary duty 
 
 215  DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–37. The Chancery Court’s discovery rules are “parallel in most respects 
their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 
6.01. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the Chancery Rules do not require the au-
tomatic production of initial disclosure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). For the role of discovery in 
shaping the corporate governance in the United States, see Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litiga-
tion Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corpo-
rate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1384 (2014). 
 216  See supra Part III.A.1.b. See also Veasey, supra note 56, at 7 (stating that Delaware corporate 
jurisprudence has a “fact-intensive aspect”).  
 217  DEL. CH. CT. R. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fish-
ing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.” 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (footnote omitted). See also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing 
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
691 (1998). On April 29 of 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States proposed amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed changes are available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. The changes became effec-
tive on December 1, 2015. The proportionality factors in the amended Rule 26(b)(1) explicitly include 
information asymmetry. 
 218  See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1413–14. 
 219  Id. 
 220  See infra note 321 and accompanying text.  
 221  DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–37.  
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lawsuits relating to control transactions, along with document requests, 
depositions222 are typically the most important tool to find out what tran-
spired behind the scenes.223 Depositions may be taken from third parties as 
well as from the parties.224 
Typically, the parties drive the discovery process, including deposi-
tions. Therefore: 
Neither leave of court nor the presence of a judge or commission-
er was required. Both supporting and hostile witnesses could now 
be deposed, including party opponents and their employees. Par-
ties were required to appear on simple notice. Third parties could 
be subpoenaed directly without leave of court. Attorneys could 
directly examine the witnesses.225 
Notice pleading is generally applicable.226 Therefore, plaintiffs only 
need to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief to overcome a mo-
tion to dismiss.227 Plaintiffs can pursue discovery only after lawsuits are 
filed.228 However, plaintiffs may be able to amend original pleadings after 
the commencement of the discovery.229 Therefore, if plaintiffs do not have 
enough relevant facts or supporting evidence when they commence law-
suits, it should not necessarily lead to a judgment on the pleadings. 
Discovery may be expedited.230 Typically, discovery precedes prelimi-
nary injunction hearings.231 This is important since anticipatory relief is of-
 
 222  DEL. CH. CT. RS. 26–31. 
 223  See, e.g., WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 
8.01[B] (“Document requests and depositions are usually the most frequently used discovery tools in 
deal litigation.”). 
 224  DEL. CH. CT. R. 30(a). See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 45 (subpoena to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses).  
 225  Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1411 (footnotes omitted). 
 226  DEL. CH. CT. R. 8(a)(1). The US Supreme Court now uses “plausibility” to decide if a claim sur-
vives a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). However, the Delaware Supreme Court has not abandoned its traditional 
and less strict “conceivability” standard. See Central Mortg. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg., 27 A.3d 531, 
536–37 (Del. 2013). 
 227  For summary judgment, see infra text accompanying notes 297, 298.  
 228  Unlike the rules of some other states, the Delaware Chancery Court Rules omitted Rule 27 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony). See, e.g., JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL et al., CIVIL PROCEDURE 405 (4th ed. 2005). 
 229  DEL. CH. CT. R. 15. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 4.07[a]. Cf. Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (involving a claim plaintiffs filed after discovering new 
facts in an appraisal proceeding). 
 230  See infra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 231  To facilitate efficient discovery before a preliminary injunction hearing, the Chancery Court also 
issued the Court of Chancery Guidelines for Expedited Discovery in Advance of a Preliminary Injunc-
tion Hearing. DEL. CH. CT., COURT OF CHANCERY GUIDELINES FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY IN 
ADVANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING  (2013), 
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ten the most efficient remedy.232 
 (ii) Burden of Proof 
Discovery in Delaware, described immediately above, makes AIPs less 
acute. However, in general, it will take more time and will cost more for the 
parties who suffer from the AIPs to dig up, uncover, and assemble evidence 
on a particular issue.233 The time element is particularly important in the 
context of anticipatory interlocutory relief.234 The preponderance of the evi-
dence standard in Delaware makes the possibility of a false negative or 
Type II error less likely than when a higher standard of proof is used.235 
Burden shifting, however, may still be effectively used to further ameliorate 
the AIPs and avoid judgments that are false negatives or Type II errors.236 
Courts can use burden shifting for various reasons.237 However, the 
guiding rule for allocating the burden of proof “put[s] it on the party having 
the readier access to knowledge about the fact in question.”238 This ap-
proach has been generally used in the context of shareholder lawsuits 
 
http://courts.state.de.us/chancery/docs/PIDiscoveryGuidelines.pdf. 
 232  See supra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 233  See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Per-
spective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997). 
 234  See infra Part IV.A.2.a.i. 
 235  See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 505 (Del. Ch. 2013) (a similar statement), aff’d by 
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 
531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that the effect of burden shifting is “slight” when the standard to be 
applied is the preponderance standard, since “the outcome of very few cases hinges on what happens if 
in [sic] the evidence is in equipoise”). However, there are also certain areas in which the Delaware 
Chancery Court has applied higher evidentiary standards, such as a clear and convincing standard. For 
example, the court requires a plaintiff to show his or her entitlement to specific performance by clear 
and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re IBP S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 52 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting 
that New York’s evidentiary standard is a preponderance standard). 
 236  See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the 
City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 441 (2007) (suggesting that in England, to lighten the evidentiary 
burden of proving an improper purpose of directors when they deploy a defense measure, the common 
law could have moved to create a rebuttable presumption that “once the board has notice of a bid then 
actions that make the bid less likely to succeed are for an improper purpose”). 
 237  James, supra note 108, at 58 (“The allocation is made on the basis of one or more of several vari-
able factors.”). 
 238  Id. at 60. Similarly: 
In determining whether the normal allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the 
courts consider the knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact, the availability of 
the evidence to the parties . . . .  
. . . The court may also consider [in allocating the burden of proof] which party will usually 
be best situated to carry or meet the burden of proof. The party with greater expertise and ac-
cess to relevant information should bear the evidentiary burdens of production of evidence 
and persuasion.  
31A C.J.S. Evidence § 196 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
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against corporate fiduciaries involving the duty of loyalty.239 
In fiduciary duty cases in Delaware, “a great deal of judicial time and 
energy is devoted to explicating and refining . . . burden-shifting rules.”240 
Fiduciary duty standards may contain context-specific pronouncements re-
lating to the allocation of the burden of proof.241 The Delaware legislature 
recognizes the judiciary’s burden-shifting practice in enacting Section 203 
of the General Corporation Law, the Delaware General Assembly specifi-
cally acknowledged “the case law development of directors’ fiduciary du-
ties of care and loyalty in responding to challenges to control or the burden 
of proof with regard to compliance with those duties.”242 There is no obvi-
ous indication that the Delaware judiciary is deviating from the general 
practice described in the preceding paragraph. 
 2. Strategies to Avoid Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a 
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction 
Under the current federal tender offer and proxy rules, we do not see 
control transactions that are signed and closed simultaneously.243 As shown 
below, Delaware’s judiciary has in its arsenal the power to issue various 
types of anticipatory relief having varying degrees of formality and speed. 
The judiciary’s speed, expertise, and flexibility—each backed by equity 
tradition—help it engage in anticipatory adjudication without suffering 
from excessive administrative or error costs. Conditions for the issuance of 
anticipatory relief are also largely conducive to efficiency-enhancing reso-
lutions to shareholder disputes with Gatekeepers. The expertise helps man-
age the attorney agency costs relating to class actions, especially those that 
may arise in class actions to seek anticipatory relief. Thus, Delaware’s judi-
ciary is equipped to follow the strategy to implement the solutions outlined 
in Part III.C.2. above. In anticipatory adjudication there is less need for pre-
 
 239  See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 107, at 1053–56 (giving examples of allocating the 
burden to corporate fiduciaries when they have easier access to relevant information). 
 240  CHARLES M. YABLON, A Theory of Presumptions, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY, AND RISK 227, 231 
(2003). See also Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Corporate Law: An Essay 
on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 497 (1991).  
 241  See, e.g., Allen et al., Function over Form, supra note 117 (describing various judicial standards 
with attendant allocations of the burden of proof); Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 48, at 63 
fig.1. (showing the allocation of the burden of proof for each judicial standard applicable to a particular 
freeze-out scenario).  
 242  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (synopsis) (reprinted in DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE 
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 23.03) (emphasis added)). 
 243  See supra Part II.C. In addition, as to transactions of any significant size, premerger notification 
is also required. See generally 1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF 
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES, AND DIVISIONS § 5.04, at 5-183 to 5-184.11, § 5.09, at 5-228 to 5-240 
(2012) (describing premerger notification rules of U.S. and certain non-U.S. jurisdictions). 
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dictability. 244  Widely acknowledged indeterminacy, 245  mushiness, 246  or 
muddiness247 of the decisions of the Delaware judiciary may be attributable 
to the judiciary’s frequent use of anticipatory relief.248 Further, notwith-
standing the “mushiness” and “muddiness,” because of the Chancery 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction,249 there is less “indeterminacy” than when 
multiple courts apply such standards. 
 (a) Anticipatory Relief 
“[T]he Court of Chancery has broad flexibility and discretion with re-
spect to the relief it may award”250 or has broad discretion to “fashion such 
relief as the facts of a given case may dictate.”251 In exercising such power, 
the court issues anticipatory relief, such as declaratory judgments, tempo-
rary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions, and permanent in-
junctions. Here we will focus on the last three types of remedies.252 The 
Court of Chancery, if necessary, compels obedience to its in personam or-
ders using its contempt powers.253 
 
 244  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 245  Kamar, supra note 151, at 1909. 
 246  Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1009, 1101–03 (1997) (characterizing Delaware’s fiduciary duty case law as “mushy”). 
 247  Fisch, supra note 151, at 1083. 
 248  Id. (“Cases in which a court is considering a request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more 
indeterminate than cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal record.”). Cf. 
Kamar, supra note 151, at 1939 (“[A] more plausible explanation links the indeterminacy of Delaware 
law to the influence of the corporate bar, judicial preferences, and a court-centered legal culture.”).  
 249  See infra Part IV.A.2.c.i. 
 250  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.01[a] (footnote omitted). 
 251  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). See also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bo-
marko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 2000); GPC XLI L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Communs. Consol. 
Litig., 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *119 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (“Our Supreme Court has empha-
sized the broad remedial power of this court to address breaches of the duty of loyalty”). See also 
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.01[a] (footnote omitted); Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce 
Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2005) (a 
transcribed version of the Regent’s Lecture that Justice Jack B. Jacobs gave at the University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles, School of Law on Feb. 3, 2005, in Los Angeles); Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Del-
aware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 191–92 
(2007). 
 252  In some situations shareholders sought declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., 
Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (plaintiff seeking both declaratory and injunctive remedies); 
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011) (same). For the explicit 
authority of the court to render declaratory judgments, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501–13 (2015). 
See also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 57. Sometimes the threshold issue is whether the claim is ripe: the court does 
not entertain the request unless the issue is fit for review in a situation where hardship will not result if it 
withholds its judgment. See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 253  See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, §§ 12.01, 12.02[b]. 
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 (i) Interlocutory Injunctions 
TROs and preliminary injunctions are interlocutory injunctions. Unlike 
a TRO, a motion for a preliminary injunction is typically heard after the 
parties have had an opportunity to take discovery and develop a record.254 
Unlike permanent injunctions, however, preliminary injunctions may be is-
sued without having a full trial. Thus, it takes less time for the court to de-
cide on motions for preliminary injunctions than permanent injunctions.255 
In the context of control transactions, preliminary injunctions have 
been the most important tool for shareholders when they challenge Gate-
keepers.256 In a preliminary injunction proceeding, the applicant must show: 
(i) that there is a reasonable probability of success on the merits, (ii) that he 
or she will suffer an irreparable injury if such relief does not issue, and (iii) 
that the balance of the equities favors the issuance of the injunction, that is, 
that the harm from the injunction will not invite greater harm to the defend-
ants, the public, or other identified interests.257 These conditions are not 
mechanically applied, and the court may take into account the strength or 
weakness of the showing of each element to come to a final resolution.258 
Both factual and legal issues can affect the likelihood of success. If the 
issues are factual, however, due to the absence of a full trial, the court 
seems reluctant to resolve them.259 This approach helps the court reduce 
 
 254  See supra text accompanying note 231. 
 255  See, e.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering 
a redemption of a poison pill; criticized as a “narrow and rigid construction of Unocal” and “re-
ject[ed] . . . as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis” by Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time 
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)). 
 256  See, e.g., WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATIONs, supra note 169, § 
10.03[B][2] (“Deal litigation frequently involves a request by the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction 
preventing the parties to a merger or stock purchase agreement from completing the transaction.”); Sa-
vitt, supra note 136, at 590 n.56 (stating the Chancery Court’s “receptivity to preliminary injunction 
applications”).  
 257  See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 435 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re Del Monte 
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 829–30, 39 (Del. Ch. 2011); Lennane v. ASK Computer Sys., 
Inc., 1990 WL 154150, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1990). The Chancery Court has on occasion formulated 
the requirement differently and replaced the third element with the following two: “(3) a balance of the 
harms plaintiffs would suffer in the absence of an injunction against the harms defendant would suffer 
by the issuance of the injunction; and (4) the public interest.” In re CheckFree Corp. S’holders Litig., 
2007 WL 3262188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007). See also Wayne County Employees’ Retirement Sys. 
v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2008) (indicating that the modified formulation is in accord 
with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 
135, § 10.02[b][5]. The court, however, considers the fourth factor of the four-factor articulation within 
the third factor of the more common three-factor articulation. See, e.g., Braunschweiger v. Am. Home 
Shield Corp., 1989 WL 128571, *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1980).  
 258  See, e.g., In re TWA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 
1988).  
 259  See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1188 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2000); WOLFE & 
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false positives or Type I errors in preliminary injunction proceedings.260 
“Harm is irreparable unless ‘alternative legal redress [is] clearly avail-
able and [is] as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt 
administration as the remedy in equity.’”261 If monetary damages are ade-
quate, the requirement is not satisfied. Difficulty in calculating damages, 
however, may also lead to the inadequacy.262 Further, if defendants do not 
have financial resources to pay potential damage awards or are not credit-
worthy,263 or if the law limits damage claims,264 the adequacy of damage 
relief is also questionable. When controllers are sued in relation to freeze-
outs, however, their ability to pay typically is not an issue.265 In addition, 
Section 102(b)(7) does not protect the controllers.266 In general, this should 
mean that it is more likely for the court to issue preliminary injunctions 
when directors are the only defendants than otherwise. Thus, the second re-
quirement is applied generally in a manner to select cases where the use of 
 
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][2]. 
 260  Thus, the court tends not to resolve “factual indeterminacy.” For the terminology, see infra note 
301. For the error costs of anticipatory adjudication, see supra note 157. The approach will not reduce 
false negative decisions. However, the plaintiffs may have opportunities to seek relief after a trial, such 
as permanent injunctions and damage remedies in later proceedings. 
 261  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 838 (Del. Ch. 2011) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted) (quoting T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536, 557 
(Del. Ch. 2000). 
 262  See, e.g., In re Staples, Inc., 792 A.2d 934, 960 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[A]n after-the-fact damages 
case is not a precise or efficient method by which to remedy disclosure deficiencies.”); see also Savitt, 
supra note 136, at 583. As to the prevalence of disclosure only cases, see, for example, Strine et al., Put-
ting Stockholders First, supra note 189, at 8–9. 
 263  See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 448 (Del. Ch. 2012) (stating that a 
defendant may be wealthy but not likely to be wealthy enough to pay a potential adverse judgment). 
 264  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods, 25 A.3d at 838 (“Exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) can ren-
der empty the promise of post closing damages.”) (“For directors who have relied on qualified advisors 
chosen with reasonable care, Section 141(e) provides another powerful defense.”); see also WOLFE & 
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][4][ii]. 
 265  See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 420 (Del. Ch. 2010) (denying a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction, stating, among others things, that “[n]o question has been raised . . . to 
cast doubt on [the controller’s] solvency or ability to satisfy a damages award”). The availability of ap-
praisal rights may be considered to tip the balance in favor of not granting injunctive relief. See, e.g., In 
re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Lear Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 123 (Del. Ch. 2007); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. System v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 
1172, 1185 (Del. Ch. 2007); Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., 2013 WL 2181518, at *22 (Del. Ch. 
May 21, 2013); In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *38 n.87 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 11, 2011). It, however, does not necessarily preclude the availability of anticipatory relief. See, e.g., 
Cede & Co., v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hung Chem. 
Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985); cf. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 
2001) (stating that absent fraud or misleading or inadequate disclosure, a short-form merger is contested 
only in an appraisal proceeding). Importantly, the direct and immediate benefits of such rights accrue 
only to those who have voted against such organic change and take other steps to perfect the rights. As 
to the hurdles of Delaware’s appraisal rights, see supra note 86. 
 266  See, e.g., In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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injunctions may be warranted under the analysis of Part III.C. above. 
To satisfy the irreparable injury condition in preliminary injunction 
proceedings, there must also be a threat of an injury that will occur before a 
trial and will not be fully remediable by final equitable relief, such as per-
manent injunctions267 and rescissions.268 In Delaware, this determination of-
ten translates into a determination whether the final relief can be rendered 
before a collective action by shareholders on the recommendation by the 
defendant Gatekeeper. Often, after the shareholder decision date, due to the 
TPs anticipatory relief also becomes inadequate. Thus, for example, the 
Chancery Court once stated that a shareholder vote: 
[C]an be reversed or . . . declared invalid, the effect of reversing 
any exercise of ‘the will of the stockholder’, even for their own 
benefit, is to create an insurmountable obstacle of confusion and 
antipathy. The Plaintiffs will not be able to achieve the real reme-
dy, i.e., a fair proxy contest with an informed electorate. This dis-
advantage in waging a later contest substantially tips the “balance 
of harms” in favor of the Plaintiffs.269 
This is entirely consistent with Part III.C. above. 
Further, the court does not grant a preliminary injunction if the “harm, 
discounted by its likelihood, is greater than harm to any other person that 
the granting of the relief would occasion, discounted by its probability of its 
occurring.”270 Even if the court decisions are rendered before shareholder 
decision dates, it is possible that the decisions or conduct of the Gatekeep-
ers have already caused procedural harms that are not easily reversible often 
due to the twin problems. In such cases, injunctions have restorative ef-
fects.271 The balancing of the equities requirement allows the court to re-
frain from rendering preliminary injunctions in such situations, which is not 
inconsistent with Part III.C. above. 
Delaware allows mandatory preliminary injunctions. For example, in a 
contested acquisition, if the target has already adopted a rights plan and the 
 
 267  See, e.g., Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930 A.2d 104, 132 (Del. Ch. 2007); 
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also WOLFE & 
PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[b][4][i]. 
 268  Also rescissory damages, i.e., “a ‘money award designed to be as nearly as possible the financial 
equivalent of rescission.’” MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. S’holders Litig. v. MAXXAM, Inc., 659 
A.2d 760, 775 n.15 (Del. Ch. 1995). Sometimes this requirement is considered only implicitly. See, e.g., 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
 269  American Pac. Corp. v. Super Foods, Servs., Inc., 1982 WL 8767, at *326 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 
1982); see also Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (mak-
ing a similar statement in a case involving a flawed proxy context for the election of directors). 
 270  Crown Books Corp. v. Bookstop, Inc., 1990 WL 26166, at *731 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1990); Pitts v. 
City of Wilmington, 2009 WL 1204492, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 
WL 1515580 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2009). 
 271  See supra notes 112, 135. 
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bidder needs to avoid a dilution resulting from the rights plan, the bidder 
may seek an affirmative injunction requesting that the target board redeem 
the plan before a trial.272 In addition, the availability of a mandatory injunc-
tion sometimes allows the court to fine-tune its remedy.273 They are restora-
tive. If the court decisions are rendered before the shareholder decision 
date, however, they do not reverse shareholder decisions. Therefore, man-
datory preliminary injunctions are consistent with Parts III.B. and III.C. 
above.274 
“An applicant for a TRO requires the applicant to show a colorable 
claim, an imminent irreparable harm that will be suffered if the TRO does 
not issue, and a balance of equities favoring issuance of the TRO.”275 A mo-
tion for a TRO may be due if, from a timing standpoint, the plaintiff is not 
in a position to go through “discovery, develop a record, and present legal 
arguments to the court in an orderly, if expedited, fashion,”276 and TROs 
generally provide for scheduling for related preliminary injunction proceed-
ings and limit their durations based on such schedules.277 TROs can be is-
sued through ex parte proceedings278 but are uncommon in the context of 
control transactions.279 For the reasons stated above in relation to prelimi-
 
 272  See, e.g., Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital 
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 552 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 
Inc., 1988 WL 108332, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261 
(Del. 1989). There are situations where shareholders have time to seek permanent injunctions. See the 
first two cases cited in supra note 252.  
 273  For example, when a disclosure claim relating to proxy materials is made, the court may choose 
to obligate a supplemental disclosure rather than completely enjoin the shareholders meeting to which 
the proxy materials relate.  
 274  Generally, mandatory injunctions need to meet higher thresholds. See, e.g., Pomilio v. Caserta, 
215 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1965) (stating that mandatory injunctions are “issuable only in the exercise of 
extraordinary judicial caution”); Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574, 575 (Del. 1955) (stating that a man-
datory injunction “will not issue unless the legal right to be protected is clearly established”); In re El 
Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 451 n.61 (Del. Ch. 2012). Mandatory preliminary injunctions, 
if proved to be wrong, may have irreversible consequences in which the court proceeds even more cau-
tiously. See, e.g., Kingsbridge Capital Group v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *13 
(“a great likelihood of eventual success should a full trial be held”). 
 275  WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 10.03[A]. 
“[T]he merit based standard for a TRO is often lower than for a preliminary injunction,” and “the em-
phasis is on the risk of imminent irreparable harm.” Id. 
 276  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.02[a].  
 277  Id.; see, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1228 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal 
dismissed on the basis of mootness, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988) (indicating that expedited discovery en-
sued after the issuance of a TRO). 
 278  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 65(b). See Frederick P. Santarelli, Preliminary Injunctions in Delaware: The 
Need for a Clearer Standard, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 107 (1988). 
 279  WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 10.03[B][1][a]. 
For an exception, see MacAndrews & Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc. 501 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Del. 1986). 
Further, they cannot last more than ten days unless extended by the court during the original period. Del. 
Ch. Ct. R. 65(b).  
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nary injunctions, conditions for TROs are also consistent with Parts III.B. 
and II.C. above. 
 (ii) Permanent Injunctions 
“To obtain injunctive relief, [the applicant] must not only prove ‘actual 
success on the merits,’ but also ‘irreparable harm’ and that ‘the harm result-
ing from a failure to issue an injunction outweighs the harm to [the other 
party] if the court issues the injunction.’”280 Thus, as indicated in the con-
text of preliminary injunctions,281 the court may not issue permanent injunc-
tions unless the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injuries. The primary is-
sue is whether damage remedies would provide full and effective relief,282 
and if not, the irreparable injury requirement is typically met.283 As to the 
balancing of the equities requirement,284 it is an important factor in crafting 
the relief.285 These conditions for permanent injunctions are also generally 
consistent with Parts III.B. and III.C.286 
 (b) Speed 
The following long quotation from a 1987 remark by an associate jus-
tice of the Delaware Supreme Court vividly illustrates how takeover dis-
putes were brought and resolved in Delaware: 
First, let me explain the legal context in which some of the more 
recent, “celebrated” cases have arisen. The Unocal and Revlon 
cases are perfect examples. The court of chancery almost invaria-
bly gets the case on short notice, usually in the context of a pre-
liminary injunction to enjoin one side or the other. The injunction 
is either granted or denied, and immediately—in fact, even before 
the order is issued—calls come to the supreme court, generally 
 
 280  Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1144 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(quoting COPI of Del., Inc. v. Kelly, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996)), aff’d, 
68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (as corrected on July 12, 2012). See also Airo Assocs., L.P. v. Hayward, 2003 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 112, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2003); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 281  See infra Part IV.A.2.a.i. 
 282  See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, at *68–69 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 6, 2012); In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *17 (Del. Ch. June 13, 
2001).  
 283  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.02[e]. 
 284  Id. § 12.02[f].  
 285  Id.; see also Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1227–28 
(Del. 2012) (stating that the Chancery Court crafted the appealed injunctive remedy with relative equi-
ties in mind). 
 286  Plaintiffs sometimes seek redemption of rights plans. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  10:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:45 (2016) 
98 
98 X 
from both counsel, saying: “We understand that at four o’clock 
today the court of chancery is going to release its decision in the 
XYZ case, and no matter who wins, the loser is going to seek an 
immediate conference to apply for an interlocutory appeal.” The 
justice preliminarily responsible for hearing such matters that 
month gives the parties an appointment at four o’clock, or shortly 
thereafter. . . . What we do, after the motion justice confers with 
the court, is to set the case down for briefing and oral argument 
on a very tight schedule. One brief may be due the next day, the 
answering brief two days later, and a reply brief a day later, brief 
oral argument the following day, and a decision announced from 
the bench either at the conclusion of the oral argument, or the 
next morning before the stock exchanges open officially.287 
The foregoing remains valid today.288 Equally important for sharehold-
ers seeking anticipatory adjudication is a credible commitment to timely ad-
judication. “The State of Delaware’s investment in a Chancery Court and a 
Supreme Court that can act with the speed and expertise to meet the busi-
ness community’s needs is an important element of service it provides to its 
corporate domiciliaries and their stockholders.”289 
Therefore, “motions for expedited proceedings . . . are available proce-
dural avenues in virtually any suit commenced in the Court of Chancery in 
which such treatment is shown to be necessary.”290 The court upon mo-
tion291 ordinarily gives expedited treatment when interlocutory injunctions 
are sought.292 Proceedings for permanent relief—which requires a trial un-
 
 287  Andrew G. T. Moore, II and Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 779, 780 (1987) (remarks by Andrew G.T. Moore, II) (footnote omitted). See also William H. 
Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of 
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (“Because the Court of Chancery . . . has no jurisdic-
tion over criminal and tort cases . . . corporate litigation can proceed quickly and effectively. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court, similarly, is poised to act quickly in important corporate cases.”); Box v. Box, 697 
A.2d 395, 398 (Del. 1997) (citing Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s article).  
 288  See Black & Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1914 (stating that [Delaware] 
judges involved in takeover contests make decisions overnight to ensure that judicial delay does not kill 
a challenged transaction); Kurt M. Heyman, Expedited Proceedings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
Things of the Past?, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 145 (1998) (“In that time, the court developed an estima-
ble reputation for its willingness and ability to hear litigants on an expedited basis and to render deci-
sions quickly enough to keep pace with the fast-moving demands of business.”) (footnote omitted). 
 289  Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value 
Be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 588 (2003).  
 290  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 8.01.  
 291  Id. A motion for a summary judgment, a TRO, or a preliminary injunction must accompany a 
motion for an expedited proceeding. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 3(bb)(1).  
 292  See, e.g., Savitt, supra note 136, at 582–84. If such treatment is granted, various default periods 
are shortened. Thus, “[e]xpedited cases are unique. The Court gives them priority. Counsel should give 
them similar priority.” DEL. CH. CT., GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS PRACTICING IN THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY II.4.e.i., http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/docs/CompleteGuidelines2014.pdf [hereinafter 
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less a summary judgment can be issued—may also be expedited.293 When a 
request for expedited treatment is granted, the parties move on a fast-track 
basis, know more about the timing of the court events in advance,294 and if 
feasible, adjust deal schedules. The court is also ready and willing to move 
fast if it is legitimately necessary from a deal perspective.295 Since there is 
no jury, it does not slow the court.296 The Chancery Court also has the abil-
ity to summarily dispose of a claim when “there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.”297 Summary judgment is a method for prompt disposition of ac-
tions in which there is no genuine material factual issue, and it may be is-
sued without a trial.298 
Under certain circumstances, the Delaware Supreme Court also allows 
expedited appeals299 in which the case briefing, oral argument, and decision 
are conducted and rendered in a compressed time frame.300 To meet the 
needs of the parties, it is not unusual for the supreme court to announce its 
decisions promptly after oral argument and issue full-blown written opin-
ions later.301 
 
GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS]. With respect to unusual instances in which the court refused to grant 
such treatment, see WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.07.  
 293  Obviously, however, due to the heavy costs of such an expedited process imposed on the court as 
well as the respondents, the court needs to have the power to refuse to entertain such requests: “[T]he 
court is likely to deny an application for expedition if there is no colorable theory of irreparable harm or 
if the plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in bringing their companion motion for interim equitable relief.” 
Heyman, supra note 288, at 146. See also, e.g., In re Blockbuster Entertainment Corp. S’holders’ Litig., 
1994 WL 89011 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 1994) (denying a motion for a scheduling conference due to the plain-
tiff’s delay in filing a lawsuit despite the party’s awareness of the transaction the party sought to enjoin 
temporarily). With respect to the use of laches to deny expedition, see WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 2.02[C][1]. If the court becomes strict in granting 
the expedited treatment that plaintiffs’ lawyers request, it could encourage them to file lawsuits else-
where. See, e.g., Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 61, at 1367. 
 294  See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 10.07. 
 295  The Chancery Court’s uncrowded docket helps it move quickly when necessary. See infra text 
accompanying note 308.  
 296  See infra text accompanying notes 321–322. In other states, litigants opt out of the use of juries if 
they are available. See infra text accompanying note 350. 
 297  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 56(c). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second 
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990).  
 298  Summary judgments issue when only “lexical indeterminacy” exits and there is no “fact-based 
indeterminacy.” For the distinction between “lexical indeterminacy” and “fact-based indeterminacy” and 
the implications of the distinction, see Bray, supra note 100.  
 299  Del. Sup. Ct. R. 25(d). See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 
1998); Interco Inc. v. City Capital Assocs. L.P., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). 
 300  WELCH ET AL., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL LITIGATION, supra note 169, § 12.07[B].  
 301  See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (a 
formal opinion dated July 10, 2012, and as corrected on July 12, 2012, issued after announcing its deci-
sion on May 31, 2012); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993) (a 
short order was issued on Dec. 9, 1993, followed by a full written opinion on Feb. 4, 1994); Paramount 
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The judiciary also has a weapon to encourage shareholders not to sit 
idle when they have chances to seek anticipatory relief. It can use the equi-
table doctrine of laches.302  In expedited proceedings the judiciary gives 
them priority but also expects counsel to give similar priority.303 
 (c) Expertise and Flexibility 
 (i) Chancery Court 
The Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity304 and is a court 
of limited jurisdiction.305 No other courts in Delaware handle equity.306 Un-
der the jurisdictional setup, the court’s docket turned out to consist signifi-
cantly of corporate matters—in particular corporate governance matters re-
lating to public company mergers and acquisitions (M&As)—which makes 
the court a specialist in the area.307 The arrangement also contributes to “[a] 
sufficiently un-crowded docket [that] permits urgent cases to be resolved 
expeditiously.”308 
 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990) (a written opinion dated Feb. 26, 1990 
and revised Mar. 9, 1990, explaining the rationale for a bench ruling rendered on July 24, 1989, Literary 
Partners, L.P. v. Time Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946 (Del. 1985) (a written opinion dated June 10, 1985, explaining the rationale for an oral ruling ren-
dered on May 17, 1985). 
 302  See, e.g., Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, *21 n.128 (Del. Ch. 
July 29, 2008) (citing the possible use of the doctrine of laches to bar a claim for monetary damages for 
a defective disclosure when the shareholder had an ample opportunity to seek an injunctive remedy). For 
the use of laches to deny a motion for expedition, see supra note 293. In expedited proceedings, the ju-
diciary gives them priority but also expects counsel to give similar priority.  
 303  See GUIDELINES TO HELP LAWYERS, supra note 292, at II.4.e.i. 
 304  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2014) (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine all matters and causes in equity.”). 
 305  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 342 (2014) (“The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to de-
termine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other 
court or jurisdiction of this State.”); Clark v. Teeven Holding Co., 625 A.2d 869, 875 (Del. Ch. 1992) 
(stating that the court is a general court of equity having “the same jurisdiction as the English High 
Court of Chancery had in 1776”). Its subject matter jurisdiction was expanded, for example, by the Del-
aware Business Corporation Act. See, e.g., WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 2.02. That the 
Chancery Court is a court of equity does not necessarily preclude it from awarding damages. For exam-
ple, claims for damages for violation of equitable rights, such as those based on fiduciary obligations, 
are within the court’s jurisdiction. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A2d 487, 500 (Del. 1982). 
See also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 12.10[2].  
 306  See Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 8. Delaware regards class actions as well as derivative suits eq-
uitable in nature. Id. at 7. 
 307  See id. at 5–8. “Delaware’s small size and its many corporate charters” contribute to the concen-
tration. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 542, 589 (1990). 
 308  Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1760 (2006). 
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The chancellor and four vice chancellors309 are nominated by the Gov-
ernor of Delaware and confirmed by the state’s Senate for 12-year terms.310 
The nomination and confirmation process focuses on the expertise and 
competence of the appointees and is generally divorced from party poli-
tics.311 Judges are appointed to the court on “their expertise in Delaware 
corporate law and cannot help but become even more expert by virtue of 
their deep and continuous exposure to that law.”312 “[T]he five Delaware 
Chancery judges frequently compare notes about . . . emerging corporate 
law issues, which enable[] them to begin mulling over new developments 
long before a particular dispute arises.”313 These traditions and practices 
further enhance the quality of and coherence in the adjudications the court 
makes.314 
In the 1960s, the court was more deferential to decisions made by fi-
duciaries in relation to control transactions than it is today.315 By the mid-
1980s, “equitable principles took on an entirely new dimension,”316 and the 
court started to assert its abilities and powers related to equity more in adju-
dicating disputes relating to control transactions.317 Such tradition remains 
intact.318 As a court of equity, the court is less constrained by precedents 
and the range of available remedies, and it resolves disputes based on the 
 
 309  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 307 (2014). 
 310  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (as amended through 1997). 
 311  Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1603. See also David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 133–34 (1997) (in connection with 
the selection of Delaware Supreme Court Justices). 
 312  Savitt, supra note 136, at 585. 
 313  Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1749. See also Savitt, supra note 136, at 595 (“The judges con-
sult with one another on thorny new matters, further ensuring that each has a substantially complete 
view of the field.”). 
 314  See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 16–19. The quality and coherence may be lost if non-
Delaware courts render decisions on Delaware corporation law issues. For the recent surge of lawsuits 
filed with non-Delaware courts, see supra note 61. 
 315  Jacobs, supra note 251, at 6 (“[B]efore the 1970s, corporate law jurisprudence fell closer to the 
‘law’ than the ‘equity’ side. . . . [T]he 1960s were the tail end of a decades-long era during which courts 
were far less skeptical about the motivations, and were far more confident of the decisions, of corporate 
managers and boards than they are today.”). 
 316  Id. at 8.  
 317  The court started to favor the equity side in the 1970s, and this trend accelerated in the 1980s. See 
id. at 4–9 (referring to, as examples of cases creating such a shift to the equity side, Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. 
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
 318  See generally Jacobs, supra note 251, at 9–15. Recently, a noted M&A litigator made the follow-
ing observation regarding the Chancery Court’s evolving jurisprudence: “[A] system of mergers and 
acquisition regulation that resembles old-fashioned equitable judging, but which yields special benefits 
typically obtained only through the operation of modern regulatory agencies.” Savitt, supra note 136, at 
571. 
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particular facts of the disputes brought before it.319 The court’s broad dis-
cretion to fashion remedies allows it to craft prescriptions that are efficiency 
enhancing under the particular set of facts.320 
As a court of equity, the Chancery Court has no juries.321 This assures 
that the court resolves factual issues quickly, even in situations in which tri-
als need to be held,322 and without the risk of making errors that may result 
from having a lay jury.323 
 (ii) Supreme Court 
Decisions of the Court of Chancery may be appealed directly to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, and “[i]f needed, appeals from the Court of 
Chancery are heard by the Delaware Supreme Court quickly and decided 
promptly after oral argument.”324 
The Supreme Court justices are, like the judges of the Chancery Court, 
nominated by the Governor of Delaware and confirmed by the state’s sen-
ate.325 As with the nomination and confirmation of Chancery Court judg-
es,326 the process is largely divorced from party politics and focuses on the 
expertise and competence of the appointees.327 “[N]ot all of the Supreme 
Court’s cases are corporate law cases. . . . But the corporate law cases have 
 
 319  See Steele & Verrett, supra note 251, at 191 (“The Delaware Court of Chancery, as an equity 
court, has wide latitude to craft remedies and mold precedent to fit particular fact patterns in the tradition 
of the English High Court of Chancery.”). See also William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of 
Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1999); Susan Black, 
A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decision 
Makers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1984); Kamar, supra note 151, at 1943; Fisch, supra 
note 151, at 1071. 
 320  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 814, 818–19 (Del. Ch. 2011) (pre-
liminarily enjoining the board of a target company from holding a stockholder meeting for twenty days 
to allow a potential topping bid). As to the efficiency-enhancing effects, see Part III.C.2 above. 
 321  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10; Park Oil, Inc. v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 407 A.2d 533, 535 (Del. 
1979); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147, 150 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
 322  See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 151, at 1077; Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence 
and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 703–04 (1992) (stating that the absence of a 
jury enables the court “to respond rapidly to parties’ requests”).  
 323  See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 89, at 207 n.105 (“A lay jury as the trier of fact is a significant 
independent source of potential error in complex commercial cases.”). As a court of equity, the court 
traditionally does not have the power to award penalties. See, e.g., Beals v. Washington Int’l, Inc., 386 
A.2d 1156, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1979) (regarding punitive damages); WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 
2.05.  
 324  Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1605.  
 325  DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 326  See supra Part IV.A.2.c.i. 
 327  Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1603. The Delaware Constitution pro-
vides that three of the justices are of “one major political party” and two are of “the other major political 
party.” DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.  
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an obvious prominence.”328 Since the beginning of 2014, four justices have 
retired from the court. Out of the four replacements, three are experienced 
in corporate control matters.329 The fact that there is only one trial court, 
and only one appellate review of the trial court decisions contributes further 
to consistent and speedy resolution of disputes related to control transac-
tions.330 
 B. Other States 
 1. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and 
Prosecution of Lawsuits 
 (a) Collective Action Problems re Initiation and Prosecution of 
Lawsuits 
Most states recognize opt-out class actions, and as in Delaware, 331 
many states have class action systems based on Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.332 Thus, Delaware is not unique in this respect. 
Neither the common fund doctrine333 nor the substantial benefit doctrine334 
is unique to Delaware’s judiciary.335 Further, issue preclusion, which can be 
used to address or ameliorate CAPs in relation to lawsuits against Gate-
keepers, is not unique to Delaware either.336 
 
 328  Skeel, supra note 311, at 134 n.21. See also Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the 
Creation and Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 216 n.583 (2004) (call-
ing the Delaware Supreme Court “a pre-eminent ‘business court’” due to the importance of the corporate 
cases it deals with and the time the court spends on corporate matters); Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 28–
29.  
 329  See, e.g., Markell’s Supreme Court, and a Missed Opportunity, DELAWARELIBERAL.NET (Feb. 
24, 2015), http://www.delawareliberal.net/2015/02/24/markells-supreme-court-and-a-missed-
opportunity; see also Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1602 (“[S]everal of the 
five supreme court justices . . . are former members of the chancery court.”).  
 330  See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 159, at 28.  
 331  See supra note 172. 
 332  See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 228, at 774; CLASS ACTION & DERIVATIVE SUITS 
COMM. OF ABA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 2012–2013 (Elizabeth J. Cabraser 
& Fabrice N. Vincent eds., 2013).  
 333  Ferdinand S. Tinio, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1384, §§ 4[a], 4[b] (1971); 
Knebel v. Capital Nat’l Bank in Austin, 519 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1975) (citing 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1150, 
1170, 1171; 107 A.L.R. 749) (stating that the doctrine “has been recognized with approval in Texas and 
elsewhere, particularly in federal jurisdictions”); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 65 (2014).  
 334  See, e.g., Tinio, supra note 333, § 4[c]; 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 67 (2014). 
 335  For a compilation of cases relating to attorneys’ fees in class actions generally, see Tinio, supra 
note 333; 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 7:10 (3d ed. 2013); Adolf Homburger, State Class 
Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1971). 
 336  See generally, e.g., 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 487–500 (2014). Unlike Delaware, however, 
some courts still require that both parties to the proceedings be identical. See id. § 491. 
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 (b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution 
of Lawsuits 
Again, nearly all states have discovery.337 As in Delaware,338 many 
states have discovery regimes based on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.339 Delaware is not known to have standards for the burden of proof 
that are systemically different from those of other jurisdictions.340 Further, 
burden-shifting341 techniques that can be used to address or ameliorate AIPs 
in relation to lawsuits against Gatekeepers are not unique to Delaware.342 
 2. Strategies to Avoid Ex post Restorative Relief to Undo a 
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction 
 (a) Anticipatory Adjudication 
In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctions, generally, the 
following are the “four most important factors”: 
(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if 
the injunction is not granted; 
(2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that 
granting the injunction would inflict on defendant; 
(3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and 
(4) the public interest.343 
The approach is substantially analogous to that of Delaware.344 The same is 
true with respect to both permanent injunctions345 and TROs.346 
 
 337  See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 228, at 397. 
 338  See supra note 215. 
 339  See, e.g., 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 2 (2014).  
 340  See generally, 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173 (2014); 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 1624, 1627 
(2014); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURES 1344–32 
(10th ed. 2010.) 
 341  See generally, e.g., 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 203 (2014); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 175 (2013). 
See also supra text accompanying notes 240–242. 
 342  See supra text accompanying notes 240–242. 
 343  11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 122–24 (3d ed. 
2013). 
 344  See supra Part IV.A.2.a. Delaware’s regular formulation does not explicitly mention the fourth 
requirement. However, when appropriate Delaware takes the forth requirement into account. See supra 
note 257. 
 345  See generally 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 28 (2014). As to Delaware, see supra Part IV.A.2.a.ii. 
With respect to permanent injunctions, the U.S. Supreme Court recently stated that the following are the 
requirements:  
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering 
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warrant-
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Declaratory judgments are also available in non-Delaware jurisdic-
tions.347 Therefore, in non-Delaware jurisdictions in the United States gen-
erally, anticipatory adjudication is an available tool to address the TPs or 
the issues the TPs present. 
 (b) Speed  
It has been observed that courts in states other than Delaware “also 
move quickly on high profile corporate cases where time is of the es-
sence.”348 As stated, there has been a significant recent increase in the num-
ber of lawsuits filed outside Delaware.349 Since it is not likely that plain-
tiffs’ lawyers will file lawsuits with courts they know will not be able to 
move speedily, the increase also seems to suggest that there are non-
Delaware courts that can render decisions quickly. The existence of a jury 
could slow the judicial proceedings. However, the parties do not appear to 
have incentives to choose a jury trial.350 
 (c) Expertise and Flexibility 
There are a number of specialized business courts.351 No other judici-
ary, however, is remotely as specialized as the Delaware judiciary with re-
spect to shareholder lawsuits against corporate fiduciaries of public compa-
nies, such as those against Gatekeepers. The number of courts of equity in 
 
ed; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.  
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The Delaware Chancery Court noted that 
the Supreme Court’s formulation is in accord with the Chancery Court’s formulation of requirements for 
preliminary injunctions. Wayne Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 (Del. Ch. 2008). For 
the analyses of the Supreme Court case, see, for example, Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s 
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012); Rachel 
M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597 (2010). 
 346  See generally, e.g., 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 31. Unlike Delaware’s, however, this formulation 
maintains a merit standard almost identical with the one for preliminary injunctions. For Delaware’s 
formulation, see supra note 277. 
 347  See generally, e.g., 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 169 (2014). 
 348  Black, supra note 307, at 590. 
 349  See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 350  See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 477 (2015) (“No transaction in our sample is decid-
ed by a jury . . . .”). 
 351  See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 328, at 147; Lee Applebaum, The Steady Growth of Business 
Courts in National Center for State Courts, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011 70 (2011), 
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/Specialized-Courts-
Services/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends/Author%20PDFs/Applebaum.ashx. This should 
not suggest that specialization of judges occurs only in a specialized court. See supra note 159. 
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the United States is small.352 Further, at the turn of the twentieth century the 
Chancery Court of Delaware adhered more closely to the English Chancery 
Court than did those of any other states.353 Therefore, the Chancery Court of 
Delaware is almost systemically different from most others in the United 
States with respect to its ability to handle shareholder lawsuits against 
Gatekeepers. 
 C. Summary 
U.S. state judiciaries generally have tools to satisfy the Stage I prereq-
uisites. However, this is not necessarily the case with respect to the Stage II 
prerequisites. Delaware’s judiciary is unique compared to the other state ju-
diciaries in its ability to engage in anticipatory adjudication in relation to 
shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers. In large measure, Delaware’s ju-
diciary has strategies, tools, and attributes to implement the solutions to the 
TPs or the issues they raise at Stage II. The speed, expertise, and flexibility 
of the Delaware judiciary are particularly crucial for anticipatory adjudica-
tion, and the supremacy of Delaware’s judiciary in shareholder lawsuits 
against Gatekeepers has normative foundations. The court’s expertise and 
specialization also makes it most qualified to alleviate attorney agency costs, 
especially in opt-out class actions seeking anticipatory adjudication. The 
“indeterminacy” of its judgments in the context of anticipatory adjudication 
is not as malignant as the term implies and is even benign. 
 V. NON-US JURISDICTIONS 
 A. Introduction 
There is no single perfect solution for the dilemmas identified in Parts 
II.A. and II.B. that works for all jurisdictions354 or all companies.355 Pre-
sumably, judiciaries are the default institutions that solve legal disputes in 
most countries. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to examine whether non-
U.S. jurisdictions, as in the United States, have judiciaries equipped to in-
tervene and solve the dilemmas. There appears to be no reason for non-U.S. 
judiciaries to be spared from the CAPs and the AIPs that plague the judici-
aries in the United States. Do they have effective strategies and tools to 
 
 352  See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 903 (1990); see also WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 135, § 1.01.  
 353  See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery, 1772–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 840 (1993).  
 354  See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 15, at 1952–63 (proposing 
models for emerging markets). 
 355  See, e.g., Enriques et al., The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law, supra note 37, at 5 
(“[I]ndividual companies should be able to decide ‘who decides.’”). 
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solve TPs? Japan is a rare jurisdiction that has given directors and control-
ling shareholders the authority to Gatekeep for dispersed shareholders and, 
without a designated substitute organ or institution, lets judiciaries police 
them.356 Japan’s experience will be used to illustrate possible differences 
between the judiciaries in the United States and elsewhere and to highlight 
international ramifications of the use of judiciaries to police Gatekeepers. 
This section first confirms that Japan basically uses the U.S. model. 
Part V.B. then examines whether Japan’s judiciary satisfies the Stage I pre-
requisites and the Stage II prerequisites. Part V.C. considers the feasibility 
of judicial policing in other non-U.S. jurisdictions. 
 B. Japan 
 1. Background 
 (a) Landscape 
A recent study indicates that Japan’s listed companies have dispersed 
ownership structures. While those structures are not as straightforward as 
the level of dispersion suggests,357 the TPs in Japan appear to be no less 
acute than those in the United Kingdom or the United States. There are also 
controlled companies with dispersed minority shareholders.358 The minority 
shareholders also suffer from the TPs. 
The provisions of Japanese Companies Act (JPN Companies Act) are 
more shareholder-centric than those of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law.359 The business and affairs of the companies, however, are managed 
 
 356  The Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal appears to be another example. See, 
e.g., J. van Bekkum et al., Corporate Governance in the Netherlands, 14.3 ELEC. J. COMP. L. 22 para. 
3.2.2. (2010), www.ejcl.org/143/abs143-17.html. 
 357  See, e.g., Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century 47 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper Series No. 410/2014, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397142 (“Japan has . . . become more outside in 
relating to the presence of outside investors but it has not in the Anglo-American sense.”); Edward Rock 
et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH ch. 7, § 3.7 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2d ed., 2009) (pointing out, for example, 
the existence of manager-friendly shareholders having business ties with the issuers); Rafael La Porta et 
al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
 358  “356 or 15.6% of TSE-listed companies have controlling shareholders. Out of these, 67.7% 
(10.6% overall) have parent companies, and 32.3% (5.1% overall) have controlling shareholders other 
than parent companies.” TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2013 7 (2013), http://www.tse.or.jp/rules/cg/white-
paper/b7gje60000005ob1-att/b7gje6000003ukm8.pdf. 
 359  This is not surprising, since corporation laws in the United States, in particular the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, are the most board centric among those in Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. See generally, Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: 
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by or are under the direction of boards of directors.360 Most of the major 
techniques to effect control transactions in Delaware or their functional 
equivalents now exist in Japan. Controllers can freeze out minority share-
holders with a two-thirds supermajority vote.361 In general, Japanese com-
panies are able to issue or distribute shares or share warrants without specif-
ic shareholder approval and without being subject to shareholder 
preemption rights.362 
The Japanese tender offer rules and the U.K. Takeover Code have fea-
tures referred to by similar nomenclatures. As described below, however, 
Japan regulates control transactions fundamentally differently from how the 
Takeover Panel does under the Takeover Code. Rather, the combination of 
the JPN Companies Act and tender offer and proxy rules presents a regime 
much closer to the U.S. model. As in the United States,363 in Japan the task 
of policing Gatekeepers in control transactions falls on the judiciary.364 
 
The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, supra note 117, § 3.7. In June 2014 the JPN Companies Act 
was significantly amended. See Kaishahō no ichibu wo kaiseisuru hōritsu [Law to Make Partial 
Amendments to the Companies Act], Law No. 90 of 2014 (Japan). The amendments made the JPN 
Companies Act slightly less enabling. 
 360  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 362 (Japan). Most Japanese companies 
listed on the exchanges in Japan have two boards, a board of directors and a board of statutory auditors. 
Statutory auditors have compliance functions. Id. art. 390. It is a common view, however, that they have 
not effectively performed such functions. See, e.g., KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKIKAISHAHŌ [LAW OF 
STOCK CORPORATIONS] 511–11 (5th ed. 2015). A small fraction of Japanese public companies have 
boards of directors only. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 404 (Japan). For the percentage of the Japanese com-
panies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with boards of directors only, see TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE 
INC., supra note 358, at 14 (stating that these companies “account for only 2.2% of TSE-listed compa-
nies”). After the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, Japanese companies are allowed to have “audit 
committees” in their boards of directors. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, para. 1, item 11-2, art 326, para 2, 
art. 327, para. 1, item 3 (Japan). Either way, for practical purposes these types of boards of directors 
have functions largely analogous to those of Delaware corporations in relation to control transactions. 
Unless otherwise stated, however, this paper focuses on the companies with both a board of directors 
and a board of statutory auditors.  
 361  See infra Part V.B.1.b.ii. 
 362  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 201, para. 1 (Japan). Due to the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, 
shareholder approval generally is now required when the transaction would create a majority owner of 
the issuer and shareholders owning 10% or more object to the transaction. Id.  art. 206, para. 2. Cf. 
TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC., SECURITIES LISTING REGULATIONS 78–79 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rules-participants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-
att/securities_listing_regulations_20141201.pdf (making the requirement not mandatory).  
 363  See supra Part II.C. 
 364  See, e.g., TOSHIYUKI TAMAI, KAISHAHŌ NO KISEIKANWA NI OKERU SHIHŌ NO YAKUWARI [ROLE 
OF JUDICIARY AFTER LIBERALIZATION OF CORPORATION LAW] 302–03 (2009) (stating that the Japanese 
judiciary should play roles similar to the Delaware judiciary). In one respect the JPN Companies Act 
relies more on the judiciary, since it does not have an antitakeover statute analogous to Section 203 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law. See infra note 513. “Internationally, corporate law rules are to a 
large extent publicly enforced.” Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism, supra note 49, at 1605. In this 
respect Japan follows the international norm, and the JPN Companies Act has retained, among others, 
provisions criminalizing certain director misbehavior. See, e.g., Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 960 (violation 
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In the second half of the last decade, the Japanese judiciary showed its 
willingness to assume such a role by essentially referring to a standard that 
evokes Unocal in determining whether the distribution or issuance of share 
warrants uses as a defense measure should be enjoined.365 Transplantation 
of additional enhanced substantive judicial standards to determine Gate-
keepers’ compliance with their duties in relation to control transactions has 
also been discussed.366 There seems to be a growing shared sense, however, 
that policing by the Japanese judiciary has been less than optimal. The dis-
enchantments are expressed mainly as proposals either to tweak the current 
regime or to adopt a regime similar to the U.K. model.367 The underlying 
assumption of these views is that in general the Japanese judiciary has op-
erated at suboptimal levels.368 
 
of duties, including fiduciary duties), 964 (false disclosures), 967 (receipt of bribe) (Japan).  
 365  For the provisions of the JPN Companies Act that were relied on, see infra text accompanying 
notes 500–504. For chronological developments in the last 10 years, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shad-
ow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005); Kenichi 
Osugi, Transplanting Poison Pills in Foreign Soil, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EAST 
ASIA Part I.2 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese 
Soul? Courts, Corporations, and Communities–A Comment on Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 348–56 (2009) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce]; Armour et al., 
The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes, supra note 86, at 250–57.  
 366  For example, in the REX II Tokyo High Court decision, the court acknowledged directors’ gen-
eral duties to make a fair disclosure and to achieve an objectively fair price for shareholders. See infra 
note 571. However, first, the court did not explicitly state that directors owe fiduciary duties directly to 
shareholders. Second, it is unclear if the duty to achieve a fair price is an obligation analogous to the 
Revlon duty in Delaware. See Hidefusa Iida, Rekkusu hōrudingusu songaibaishō seikyūjiken kōsai 
hanketsu no kentō (jō) [Examination of REX Holdings Damage Suits Tokyo High Court Judgment Part 
I], 2022 SHŌJI 4, 8–9 (2014); Hidefusa Iida, Rekkusu hōrudingusu songaibaishō seikyūjiken kōsai 
hanketsu no kentō (ge) [Examination of REX Holdings Damage Suits Tokyo High Court Judgment Part 
II], 2023 SHŌJI 17, 21–23 (2014). See also SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 505 (recommending an adoption 
of the Revlon duty). As to the duty to disclose under Delaware law, see, for example, Arnold v. Soc’y 
for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994); as to the Revlon duty in Delaware, see Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). As to controllers’ fiduciary 
duties to minority shareholders, see infra text accompanying note 417.  
 367  See generally, Hidefusa Iida, Kōkaikaitsuke kisei no kaikaku–Ōshūgata no gimuteki 
kōkaikaitsuke no taishutsuken no kangaekata wo donyūsubeki ka [Reforming Tender Offer Regulation: 
Should A Mandatory Bid Rule Used in Europe Be Introduced?], 1933 SHŌJI 14 (2011); WATARU 
TANAKA, KIGYŌBAISHŪ TO BŌEISAKU [CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DEFENSES] 394–406 (2012).  
 368  In 2004 when Japanese lawyers were cooking up Japanese-style pills, Ronald Gilson warned that 
“it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the weight of” “the burden of assuring the sensible oper-
ation of the poison pill.” See Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 42 (2004). The warning was timely but was not well heeded. There are 
optimistic views as to the future transformation of the Japanese judiciary as well. See, e.g., SHIRAI, su-
pra note 139, at 533–34. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2016  10:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:45 (2016) 
110 
110 X 
 (b) Basic Legal Framework for Control Transactions 
Under the JPN Companies Act, one may acquire 100% of another 
company through a merger369 or a share exchange370 using cash as a consid-
eration. Due mostly to the dual entity-level tax of the target or controlled 
company and the shareholder-level tax applicable in one-step cash acquisi-
tions,371 cash freeze-outs have been effected through de facto reverse stock 
splits.372 Further, in most control transactions—including friendly acquisi-
tions—tender offers precede the de facto reverse stock splits. This could be 
due in part to a perceived reduction of risks arising from the direct in-
volvement of Gatekeepers in freezing out minority shareholders in the de 
facto reverse stock splits.373 
 (i) Tender Offer 
Japan’s tender offer rules, when legislated in 1971, were largely mod-
eled after the Williams Act enacted in the United States in 1968.374 Howev-
er, due to significant amendments in 1990 and in the last decade, the rules 
have diverged in many respects from their U.S. counterpart. The current 
Japanese rules are highly technical, and it is difficult to see any single co-
herent policy behind them. As described below, the rules require that cer-
tain share purchases be made in the form of a formal (or conventional) ten-
der offer (the JPN MBR) and are often referred to with names identical with 
or similar to those used to refer to the U.K. MBR, such as “mandatory offer 
rules”375 or “mandatory bid rules.”376 
 
 369  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, para. 1, no. 27 (Japan). 
 370  Id. no. 31. 
 371  Hōjinzei hō [Corporation Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965, arts. 62, 62-9 (Japan). The entity-level 
tax is questionable from a tax policy standpoint. The JPN Companies Act does allow forward triangular 
mergers but does not allow reverse triangular mergers. See, e.g., id. art. 749, para. 1 (not requiring that a 
merger agreement include a provision relating to consideration payable to the surviving companies’ 
shareholders). 
 372  The de facto reverse stock split requires at least conceptually successive amendments to the sub-
ject company’s articles of incorporation followed by a redemption of all the outstanding shares for a new 
class of stock at a ratio that would cause all the shareholders other than the shareholder who would be-
come the sole owner to notionally receive fractions of the new class of stock payable in cash. See Law 
No. 86 of 2005, art. 108, para. 1, no. 7, art. 111, para. 2, no. 1, art. 171, para. 1, no. 1, item i, art. 173, 
art. 234, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). After the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, it is clear that actual 
reverse stock splits may be used to squeeze out minority shareholders. See id. arts. 182-4, -5 (appraisal 
rights).  
 373  See infra text accompanying notes 419–421. This combined with the entity-level tax creates a 
perverse effect analogous to one that existed at least before the adoption of the unified standard by the 
Delaware Chancery Court in In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holder Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). See, 
e.g., Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs, supra note 16. 
 374  With respect to the Williams Act, see supra Part II.C.  
 375  Tomotaka Fujita, The Takeover Regulation in Japan: Peculiar Developments in the Mandatory 
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They generally require a tender offer for anyone to purchase voting 
shares of a reporting company through any off-market377 transaction: (i) if, 
after the purchase, the purchaser would have acquired shares from eleven or 
more persons during the sixty-one day period ending on the date of the rel-
evant purchase and would own more than 5% of the voting shares of the 
target company,378 or (ii) if, after the purchase, the purchaser would have 
acquired shares from ten or fewer persons during the sixty-one day period 
ending on the date of the relevant purchase and would own more than one-
third of the voting shares of the target company.379 Further, the following 
may not be made outside a tender offer: (a) any on-market purchase execut-
ed on a non-auction market of an exchange after which the acquiring person 
would own more than one-third of the voting shares of the target compa-
ny,380 and (b) when a person acquires in a three-month period more than 
10% of a company’s voting shares more than 5% of which consist of shares 
acquired off market or on a non-auction market of an exchange and, after 
the acquisitions, owns more than one-third of the shares of the company, 
the purchases of outstanding shares among such acquisitions.381 No off-
market purchase, however, needs to be made through a tender offer if, after 
the relevant purchase, the purchaser would not have made off-market pur-
chases from eleven or more persons during the sixty-one day period ending 
on the date of the relevant purchase, has already owned more than 50% of 
the target company as of the first of the off-market purchases during the six-
ty day period, and would own less than two-thirds of the voting shares of 
 
Offer Rule, 3 UT SOFT L. REV. 24, 30 (2011). 
 376  Davies & Hopt, supra note 19, § 8.2.5.4; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional 
Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295, 306 (Curtis J. Mi-
lhaupt ed., 2003). Hereinafter the Japanese tender offer rules requiring that share purchases be made 
through tender offers will be the JPN MBR. 
 377  For the purposes of the application of the rule described in (i), certain trading through designated 
alternative trading systems is treated as on-market trading. Kinyūshōhin torihikihō [Financial Instru-
ments and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan); Kinyūshōhin torihikihō 
shikōrei [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Cabinet Order], Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 
6-2, para. 2, no. 2, para. 3 (Japan).  
 378  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 
321 of 1965, art. 6-2, para. 3, art. 7 (Japan).  
 379  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 6-2, 
para. 3 (Japan). However, subject to the exception described in (C) below, no purchases through an al-
ternative trading market may be made if, after the purchase, the purchaser’s ownership percentage would 
exceed 1/3. See Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 6 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, 
art. 7, para. 7, no. 1 (Japan).  
 380  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 3 (Japan). 
 381  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1, no. 4 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 7, pa-
ras. 2–4 (Japan). 
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Under the tender offer rules, tender offer periods must be at least twen-
ty business days, but unless an exception is applicable, not longer than sixty 
business days.383 The offers must be made to all holders and at the same 
prices.384 In general, no purchases outside the tender offers may be made 
during the tender offer periods.385 Partial tender offers are prohibited when 
the offerors have the potential to acquire two-thirds or more of the shares 
through such offers.386 There is a proration requirement when a partial offer 
is made.387 
As indicated, similar nomenclature is used to refer to the JPN MBR 
and the U.K. MBR. The two, however, call for fundamentally different 
roles for the boards of the target companies.388 As stated,389 the U.K. MBR 
requires holders of 30% or more of the shares of a company to launch a 
general offer for the remaining shares at the best price paid for shares dur-
ing the preceding twelve months. This minimizes shareholder CAPs and 
coercive effects that would result but for the requirement. 
First, the JPN MBR does not prohibit partial offers except in cases 
where the bidders through the offers would end up owning two-thirds or 
more of the target shares. Second, while the JPN MBR obligates the offe-
rors to give the same prices to all tendering shareholders,390 it permits the 
bidders to pay less than the prices they pay before the commencement of 
the tender offers. Third, they do not require those who have acquired con-
trol to make an offer to buy the remaining shares. The effects of the Japa-
nese tender offer rules are much closer to the combined effects of the Rules 
on Substantial Acquisition of Shares (or the SARs), abolished in 2006, and 
 
 382  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1 (proviso) (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 6-2, 
para. 1, no. 4 (Japan). 
 383  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 1 
(Japan). Therefore, for example, a bidder who has launched a tender offer may have to launch a new 
tender offer if the Japanese judiciary fails to resolve the bidder’s dispute with the target before the initial 
tender offer period ends.  
 384  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 3 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, paras. 2–3 
(Japan). 
 385  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-5 (Japan). 
 386  Id. art. 27-2, para. 5; Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 5, no. 3 (Japan); Hakkōsha igai 
no mononiyoru kabuken tō no kōkaikaitsuke no kaiji ni kansuru naikakufurei [Prime Minister’s Office 
Ordinance Concerning Disclosure Relating to Third Party Tender Offers for Shares, etc.], Ministry of 
Fin. Ordinance No. 38 of 1990, art. 5 (Japan). 
 387  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-13, para. 5 (Japan). Further, there are rules modeled on Sections 
13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. arts. 27-23 to 27-30.  
 388  See, e.g., Fujita, supra note 375, at 24. The JPN MBR is not the proration version of the equal 
opportunity rule either. See Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales, supra note 18, at 960. 
 389  See supra Part II.C. 
 390  Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 2 (Japan); Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965, art. 8, para. 2 
(Japan). 
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Rule 5 of the Takeover Code except that the Japanese rules slow down 
share accumulations more significantly than the U.K. rules.391 Therefore, 
the JPN MBR does not address the coordination/coerciveness issues that the 
U.K. MBR addresses. For example, the JPN MBR does not prevent a coer-
cive two-step acquisition. Thus, unlike the U.K. MBR, the JPN MBR can-
not afford to adopt the no-frustrating action rule. By default, the Japanese 
judiciary is put in a position to police target boards’ Gatekeeping activi-
ties.392 
 (ii) Freeze-outs 
Freeze-out transactions may be used as the second step in noncontrol-
lers’ acquisitions of corporate control393 or as preexisting controllers’ minor-
ity freeze-out transactions. Under the JPN Companies Act, there are several 
ways to freeze out minority shareholders for cash, provided either that a 
two-thirds supermajority vote is obtained at a shareholders’ meeting394 or 
that the controllers own 90% or more of the company.395 Due to the same 
 
 391  See RS 2005/4 Issued on 21 April 2005. 
 392  For a prominent example of the use of a poison pill in Japan, see Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 
7, 2007, Hei 19 (kyo) no. 30, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2215 (Japan), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070927142919.pdf. The four authorities cited in supra note 366 
discuss the case. A number of Japanese companies have adopted a variation of a rights plan (or poison 
pill) in the United States. See, e.g., HIDEKI KANDA, KAISHAHŌ [COMPANY LAW] 162 n.3 (17th ed. 
2015) [hereinafter KANDA, COMPANY LAW] (giving rights plans and golden shares as examples of pos-
sible defense measures). As of the end of July 2013, approximately 14.5% of Japanese public corpora-
tions in Japan had such plans. Mogi Miki & Koji Tani, Tekitaitekibaishū bōeisaku no dōnyū jyōkyō [Sta-
tus of the Adoption of Defense Measures against Hostile Acquisitions; An Analysis After June 2013 
Shareholder Meeting Season], 2012 SHŌJI 49, 50 (2013). Authorized shares specified in the issuer’s arti-
cles of incorporation may not exceed four times as much as the outstanding shares. Kaisha-hō [Compa-
nies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 37, para. 3, art. 113, paras. 3–4, art. 184, para. 2 (Japan). Thus, the 
dilutive effects of Japanese poison pills are limited. Staggered boards are possible. However, the maxi-
mum term of office is two years. Id. art. 332. In addition, shareholders can remove board members for 
no cause at any time at a shareholders meeting. Id. art. 341. At the substantive law level, these make 
Japanese pills weaker than the pills for Delaware corporations. See, e.g., TANAKA, supra note 367, at 
317–21 (a preprint of an article with Peng Xu) (giving an example where a Japanese company lost to a 
hostile suitor in a proxy fight despite the use of a pill). As to the strength of poison pills combined with 
staggered boards, see Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards, supra note 
154; Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a 
Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002). 
 393  Note that the de facto reverse stock split method described in note 372 does not work unless the 
acquiring person is already the largest shareholder of the subject company.  
 394  See supra text accompanying notes 369–371.  
 395  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 784, para. 1 (short-form mergers and share exchanges) (Japan). After 
the 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments, it is possible for a shareholder owning 90% or more of a 
company to choose to buy out the remaining shareholders if the company’s board consents to the buy-
out. Id. arts. 179 to 179-10. 
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Japanese tax that makes one-step cash acquisitions unpopular,396 however, 
most freeze-outs have been effected through de facto reverse stock splits.397 
The controllers, whether they become controllers after the first step of 
a two-step transaction or are preexisting controllers, are not prohibited from 
voting their shares if shareholder consent is required.398 Moreover, if the 
freeze-out is the second step of a two-step acquisition, there is no statutory 
requirement that the proceeds payable to the minority on a per share basis 
should be no less than the price paid in the first step tender offer.399 Thus, 
the regime for freeze-outs in Japan is closer to that in the United States, and 
if there is anyone that can step in to fill the gap and police controllers acting 
as Gatekeepers in freeze-out transactions, it is the Japanese judiciary. 
The JPN MBR economically discourages bidders from establishing 
control positions short of 100% ownership, because they are unable to sub-
sequently resell the entire controlling positions except in response to a ten-
der offer. The all holders rule, the same price rule, and the proration re-
quirement make it impossible for the controller-resellers to obtain the prices 
that reflect the control premiums the controlling interests should otherwise 
command. Rule 5.2(a) of the Takeover Code allows controllers to sell their 
positions to others outside an offer. However, the U.K. MBR obligates the 
buyers of such positions to make a general offer. Therefore, as in Japan, 
those buying from the controllers are unable to pay control premiums ex-
clusively to the controllers. Consequently, the U.K. MBR also economically 
discourages the establishment of control positions. As indicated, however, 
unlike the U.K. MBR, in general the JPN MBR does not prevent partial of-
fers. Thus, if bidders wish, it is easy in Japan for the bidders to establish 
controlling positions owning the percentage of shares desirable for the bid-
ders.400 If the controllers later wish to resell their interests without sharing 
the control premiums with the minority shareholders, they may first try to 
freeze out the minority shareholders at a price reflecting a minority discount 
and then sell their entire interests to third parties.401 Thus, there may be a 
stronger need for the Japanese judiciary to police controllers in freeze-out 
transactions than in the United States. 
 2. Strategies to Reduce the Twin Problems of Initiation and 
 
 396  See supra text accompanying note 371. 
 397  See supra note 372. 
 398  For the possibility of a revocation of the shareholder resolutions, see infra text accompanying 
note 418. 
 399  For anticipatory relief that may be available for minority shareholders, see infra Part V.B.3.a.i. 
 400  As to the percentage of controlled companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, see supra note 
358. 
 401  Alternatively, the controllers may first sell up to one-third of the controlled company shares at a 
premium and subsequently sell a portion of the rest in response to a tender offer. The strategy should 
permit the controllers to partially escape the predicament of the JPN MBR. 
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Prosecution of Lawsuits 
 (a) Collective Action Problems re: Initiation and Prosecution of 
Lawsuits 
The circumstances in which shareholders have direct claims against 
Gatekeepers are limited. Japan lacks opt-out class actions. Further, the rules 
and current practices regarding allocation of costs of lawsuits do not help 
alleviate CAPs. The Japanese Supreme Court also declined to follow a 
scholarly suggestion402 to recognize issue preclusion under certain circum-
stances.403 
 (i) Class Actions 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to use postal mail404 and Internet sites405 to at-
tract shareholders willing to join in filing shareholder lawsuits. In Decem-
ber 2013, a class action act was enacted.406 The act adopts an opt-in system 
that allows a qualified consumer organization to file lawsuits seeking the 
enforcement of certain types of monetary claims by individuals against 
businesses relating to contracts between the individuals and the business-
es.407 At least preliminarily, the act does not seem to have any applicability 
to shareholder claims against Gatekeepers.408 
At present the list of recognized shareholder fiduciary duty claims 
against Gatekeepers is small. There is, however, room for the Japanese ju-
diciary to consider additional types of shareholder fiduciary duty claims.409 
The small size of the list appears to be a reflection of the scarcity of share-
holder fiduciary duty lawsuits that—to a significant extent—have resulted 
 
 402  See, e.g., MAKOKO ITO, MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 563–69 (4th ed. 2014). 
 403  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1956, Shō 29 (o) no. 110, 10 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 965 (Japan). The JPN Companies Act has provisions that expand the binding ef-
fects of judgments to rescind or declare void certain corporate actions beyond the immediate parties to 
the lawsuits. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 828 (Japan). For example, a court 
decision to declare a shareholder resolution void has such effects. Id. 
 404  Shareholders are entitled to inspect share registers. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 125 (Japan). 
 405  See, e.g., Kazunari Otsuka, Naze nihondewa shōkensoshō ga kappatsuka shina no ka [Why in 
Japan Securities Lawsuits Have Not Been Vibrant?], KINYŪZAISEIJIJŌ, June 3, 2013, at 14 (Japan). 
 406  Shōhisha no zaisantekihigai no shūdantekina kaifuku no tameno minjitetsuzuki no tokurei ni kan-
suru hōritsu [Law Relating to Special Civil Procedural Measures for the Collective Recovery of Finan-
cial Damages Suffered by Consumers], Law No. 96 of 2013 (Japan). The law, however, has not taken 
effect yet.  
 407  Id. art. 3. 
 408  Under the traditionally prevailing view, Japanese corporations are not contractual constructs, and 
there are no contractual relationships between shareholders and directors. See, e.g., EGASHIRA, supra 
note 360, at 56–58.  
 409  See infra notes 412, 417. 
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from the procedural deficiencies discussed in this Part V.B.2., which has 
deprived the Japanese judiciary of the opportunities to exercise “lawmaking 
and law enforcement powers”410 and to expand the list of such direct claims. 
Directors owe statutory duties of care and loyalty to companies.411 Un-
der the traditionally prevailing view, they do not owe fiduciary duties di-
rectly to shareholders.412 The growing trend, however, is toward a view that 
they in fact owe such duties.413 Anyone, including a shareholder, has a stat-
utory right to directly sue directors for damages if the directors knowingly 
or grossly negligently breach their duties and as a consequence cause dam-
ages to the person.414 Shareholders may also directly sue directors for dam-
ages under a tort theory.415 Finally, the JPN Companies Act provides specif-
ic circumstances in which shareholders may seek to enjoin certain corporate 
and director actions.416 
Under the prevailing view, controlling shareholders do not owe fiduci-
ary duties either to the companies or to minority shareholders.417 If a share-
 
 410  Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: 
Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 78, 78 (Curtis J. Mi-
lhaupt ed., 2003). 
 411  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 330 (subjecting directors to the same du-
ties that agents generally owe to their principals), 355 (imposing the duty of loyalty) (Japan). The duty 
of loyalty provision is a 1950 transplant from the United States. For the historical origin of the duty of 
loyalty and analysis of how after a long incubation period it started to show signs of life, see Hideki 
Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japa-
nese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 893–96 (2003). As stated, a recent case recognized direc-
tors’ duty to disclose. See infra note 571.  
 412  For various positions on this issue, see Yo Ota & Masahiro Yano, Taikō-teki baishū teian wo 
uketa taishōkaisha torishimariyaku ha ikani kōdōsubeki ka: Wagakuni kaishahō to Reburon “gimu” 
[How Should Target Directors Act When Competing Bids Surface?: Our Company Act and Revlon “Du-
ty”], in M&A HŌMU NO SAISENTAN [FRONTIERS OF M&A LAW] 42–46 (Masakazu Iwakura & Yo Ota 
eds., 2010).  
 413  See, e.g., id. at 45–46 (listing academic authorities taking this position); TAMAI, supra note 364, 
at 306–09. 
 414  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 429, para. 1 (Japan). See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Nov. 26, 
1969, no. 11, 23 Saikō Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [MINSHŪ] 2150; Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo 
Dist. Ct.] Sep. 29, 2011, Hei 22 (wa) no. 26190, 1375 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 187 (Japan) (denying 
directors’ liabilities to shareholders under Article 429, paragraph 1, for damages claimed to have been 
caused by a share exchange). There are conflicting views as to whether directors owe liabilities to share-
holders when the shareholders indirectly suffer damages due to damages the company has suffered. See, 
e.g., EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 504 n.3.  
 415  MINPŌ [CIV. C.] arts. 709, 710 (Japan). 
 416  See infra Part V.B.3.a.i. 
 417  See, e.g., EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 432–33, 444–45; Mitsuo Kondo, Commentaries on Arti-
cle 355 of the Companies Act, in KAISHAHŌ KONMENTĀRU [8 COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT: 
ORGANS (2)] 57 (Seiichi Ochiai ed., 2009). Cf. TAMAI, supra note 364, at 309–13. In the REX II Tokyo 
High Court decision, the court responded to plaintiffs’ claims under both Article 429 of the JPN Com-
panies Act and Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code (a tort claim for damages). See infra note 571. 
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holder resolution to effect a freeze-out is “severely unjust” due to a vote 
cast by a controller, however, minority shareholders are statutorily author-
ized to request that a court revoke the resolution.418 Further, under an in-
creasingly influential view, in such a case the minority shareholders should 
be able to seek a provisional injunction of the freeze-out transaction.419 In 
considering the unjustness of a shareholder resolution to effect a virtual re-
verse stock split to effect the freeze-out, the court may take into account the 
availability of appraisal or equivalent rights420 as a factor against the unjust-
ness.421 This makes the efficacy of the revocation right less certain. 
 (ii) Costs of Lawsuits 
In principle, the loser must reimburse the winner for certain expenses 
the winner directly incurs and pay the court filing fees and certain expenses 
the court incurs in relation to court proceedings, such as fees payable to 
witnesses and postage.422 On the other hand, attorney fees are generally 
borne by the respective parties regardless of the outcome.423 There is no 
prohibition against contingency fees. These rules are similar to those pre-
 
 418  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 831, para. 1, no. 3 (Japan). See, e.g., 
EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 365.  
 419  See infra text accompanying notes 522–523. 
 420  As in the case of the appraisal rights in Delaware, such minority shareholders must clear proce-
dural hurdles. See Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 116, 117, 172 (Japan). It has been suggested that despite 
these hurdles, due to the lack or weakness of other means to remedy wrongs, appraisal rights have been 
forced to play a more important role than their counterparts in Delaware. See Tomotaka Fujita, 
Shinkaishahō ni okeru kabushikikaitori seikyūken seido [Appraisal Right Regime under the New Com-
panies Act], in KIGYŌHŌ NO RIRON JŌKAN [1 THEORIES ON BUSINESS LAW] 261, 284 (Etsuro Kuronuma 
& Tomotaka Fujita eds., 2007). For articles describing procedural hurdles in Delaware, see supra note 
84. Unlike in Delaware, however, in Japan there is no statutory prohibition against the counting of value 
arising from the relevant transaction in determining the fair value of shares. See Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 
116 (Japan); for Delaware, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (2014). 
 421  See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Aug. 24, 1990, Shō 63 (wa) no. 6541, 1331 
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 136, aff’d Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Jan. 1, 1990, Hei 1 (ne) no. 
2921, 77 SHIRYŌBAN SHŌJI HŌMU [SHIRYŌBAN SHŌJI HŌMU] 193 (Japan). As to the law on a similar 
point in Delaware, see supra note 266. The author’s gut sense, however, is that Japanese courts weigh 
the availability against shareholders more heavily than the Delaware judiciary.  
 422  MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 61 (Japan); Minji soshō hiyō tō ni kansuru 
hōritsu [Act on the Cost etc. of Civil Lawsuits], Law No. 40 of 1971, art. 2 (Japan); Minji hozenhō [Civ-
il Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (Japan). As to exceptions to the general rule, 
see MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] arts. 62–63 (Japan). As to the costs of lawsuits in gen-
eral, see ITO, supra note 402, at 581–86; TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN §§ 13.01–13.09 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
HATTORI & HENDERSON, Civil PROCEDURE IN JAPAN]. 
 423  Further, tortfeasors may be obligated to reimburse victims for attorneys’ fees that victims incur in 
prosecuting their claims in court. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 27, 1969, Shō 41 (o) no. 280, 
23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2, 441 (Japan). Note that shareholder lawsuits against 
corporate fiduciaries may be based on a tort theory. See supra text accompanying note 415. 
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vailing in the United States.424 There is, however, no general statutory or 
established case law doctrine in Japan similar to the common fund doctrine 
or the substantial benefit doctrine in Delaware.425 As to a shareholder suit to 
enjoin directors’ illegal actions, due to its similarity to a derivative suit, 
provisions relating to derivative suits426 may be made applicable by analo-
gy. For example, if shareholders win, they may recover attorneys’ fees from 
the companies.427 The derivative suit provisions, however, limit the recov-
ery to “an amount that is deemed appropriate,”428 and courts in Japan have 
not been as liberal as those in Delaware.429 Thus, neither shareholders’ nor 
plaintiffs’ lawyers see strong economic incentives to file shareholder law-
suits.430 
 (iii) Anticipatory Relief 
As to the availability of anticipatory relief in Japan, see below Part 
V.B.3.a. 
 (b) Asymmetric Information Problems re Initiation and Prosecution 
of Lawsuits 
With respect to civil lawsuits, Japan generally follows an adversarial 
system431 as opposed to an inquisitorial system.432 However, there is no ef-
 
 424  See supra Parts IV.A.1.a.ii., IV.B.1.a. 
 425  For the Delaware law doctrines, see supra Part IV.A.1.a.ii. 
 426  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 852, para. 1 (Japan).  
 427  See EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 496; KANDA, COMPANY LAW, supra note 392, at 273.  
 428  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 852, para. 1 (Japan). 
 429  For example, a court granted only $800,000 (at the exchange rate of US$1 = yen 100) in a deriva-
tive suit in which the company recovered more than $105 million after six years from the filing to the 
favorable judgment. Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] July 14, 2010, Hei 20 (wa) no. 16888, 
2093 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 138 (Japan). This should be contrasted with the example in Delaware de-
scribed in supra note 188. 
 430  See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 405, at 11. 
 431  See, e.g., MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 159 (effect of a failure to dispute a factual allegation by 
the opposing party), 179 (effect of an admission of fact) (Japan). See generally ITO, supra note 402, at 
295–309. With respect to provisional remedies, however, this principle is somewhat tempered. See 
HIROSHI SEGI, MINJI HOZENHŌ SHINTEIBAN [PROVISIONAL REMEDIES LAW–NEWLY REVISED] ¶ 211 
(2014) [hereinafter SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES].  
 432  In appraisal proceedings resulting from minority shareholder freeze-outs, the court is empowered 
to initiate and conduct factual investigations. Hishō-jiken tetsuzukihō [Noncontentious Cases Procedures 
Act], Law No. 51 of 2012, arts. 49–53 (Japan). In view of the relatively weak fact-finding tools in 
shareholder lawsuits, in some cases it could be strategically better for plaintiffs to sue for damages after 
the conclusion of appraisal proceedings in which the inquisitorial system should not prevail. Note that 
the damage lawsuits resulting in the REX II Tokyo High Court decision were filed after the REX I Su-
preme Court determination. See infra Part V.D. See also SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 513 n.1773 (noting 
the Tokyo High Court’s request in the REX I appraisal proceeding to the target company to disclose a 
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fective discovery or substantial functional equivalent in Japan. Written in-
terrogatories are mostly dysfunctional.433 Other main fact-finding tools may 
involve courts, which do not foster speedy disclosure or discovery of 
facts.434 If plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to support their claims, 
technically the courts may dismiss the claims prior to formal fact-finding 
before judges.435 It is even more difficult in provisional injunction settings 
for shareholders to find facts to support their claims.436 In addition, courts 
generally set a high threshold for the burden of proof and have not used 
burden-shifting flexibly in the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gate-
keepers. Therefore, the judiciary system does not adequately address AIPs 
at Stage I.437 
 (i) Fact-finding in Regular Proceedings 
The Code of Civil Procedure of Japan provides for written interrogato-
ries.438 A prospective plaintiff may initiate a mutual exchange of written 
questions.439 The prospective defendant—if [s]he has responded to the pro-
spective plaintiff’s inquiries—is entitled to send his or her own written in-
quiry. The parties may use a similar procedure once a lawsuit commenc-
es.440 Surprisingly, however, there is no direct sanction against a recipient’s 
 
valuation report used in connection with the MBO to support a statement that there is willingness among 
judges to force disclosure of corporate information to shareholder plaintiffs). 
 433  See infra note 443. 
 434  Presumably, a lack of available information in provisional injunction proceedings sometimes 
makes presiding judges nervous when they render decisions. See, e.g., Masahito Monguchi and Kenjiro 
Egashira, Kaishahō no rippō to saiban 8-kikan (2) [Drafting of Company Law and Judging], in 
KAISHAHŌ KONMENTĀRU 8 KIKAN (2) [8 COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT: ORGANS (2)] (Seiichi 
Ochiai ed., 2010) [hereinafter Monguchi/Egashira Dialogue]. Judge Monguchi was a carrier judge and 
spent several years each at the Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo High Court.  
 435  See, e.g., Sachio Ota, Amerikahō ni okeru purīdingu yōkenron no aratana tenkai [New Develop-
ments in Pleading Requirements under American Law], 19 HIKAKUHŌBUNKA 79, 94–96 (2011); see 
also ITO, supra note 402, at 196–97. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 133, para. 2, no. 2 (Japan); Minji 
soshō kisoku [Rules of Civil Procedure], Supreme Court Rule No. 5 of 1996, art. 53, para. 1 (Japan). 
 436  See, e.g., Norimitsu Arai, Emu ando ei jidai no minji hozen: Tekitaitekibaishū ni okeru ka-
rishobun wo chūshin ni shite [Provisional Remedies in the Era of M&As: Focusing on Provisional In-
junctions Relating to Hostile Acquisitions], 1317 JURISUTO 221, 224–25 (2006). 
 437  See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 405, at 12 (stating that, due to difficulties in assembling facts to 
prove their cases, securities holders and their lawyers have been hesitant to file lawsuits). 
 438  See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 422, 
§§ 7.08[8][c], 7.08[8][d]. 
 439  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 132-2 to 132-3 (Japan). For a general description, see HATTORI & 
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 422, § 7.06[8][d]. With respect to the system’s 
legislative background, see, for example, ITO, supra note 402, at 312.  
 440  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 163 (Japan). The basic concept in this article was inspired by the 
interrogatories under Rule 33 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ITO, supra note 402, at 272 
n.82.  
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failure to comply with a request.441 Due to this and other reasons, these 
written interrogatory tools are unattractive, and their use has been almost 
negligible.442 
Further, the prospective plaintiff who has initiated the mutual ex-
change of interrogatories and the prospective defendant who has responded 
to the prospective plaintiff’s interrogatories may each request via a court a 
production of documents constituting evidence clearly necessary for the re-
questors but difficult for the requestors to obtain.443 However, the recipient 
does not have any legal obligation to comply. This strategy relies on the re-
cipient’s goodwill and voluntary cooperation, which is encouraged by the 
court.444 The use of this tool has been negligible.445 
The parties may, upon application to the court, seek to take testimonies 
from experts, witnesses, and other parties to the lawsuit, and  seek court or-
ders for document production.446 Such an application, however, must con-
cretely identify the facts to be proved,447 which, strictly applied, could pre-
sent an undue challenge if the plaintiff does not know much about what 
transpired on the defendant’s part.448 If a witness fails to appear for no justi-
 
 441  See id. at 273, 314. The lawyer representing the delinquent party, however, may possibly be in 
violation of his or her ethical duties. Id. at 271, 312 n.164.  
 442  See, e.g., Yoshiki Yamaura et al., Shōko dēta shūshū no hōhō to jijitsu nintei [Means to Collect 
Evidence/Data and Findings of Fact], 1248 HANTA 5, 12–17 (2007) (transcript of a roundtable discus-
sion held on July 16, 2007; remarks by various participants). For litigators in the United States this may 
not be a surprise at all, since they know that written interrogatories in the United States have not been 
very effective. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1410. Attorneys may request that their bar 
associations send inquiries to various organizations (but not to individuals). Bengoshihō [Lawyers’ 
Law], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 23-2 (Japan). However, the effects of noncompliance by the recipients 
are similarly unclear. See, e.g., Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Feb. 8, 2013, Hei 25 (ne) no. 
212, 1430 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 25 (Japan). 
 443  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 132-4 to 132-9 (Japan). Article 23-2 allows lawyers to request that 
their bar associations seek information from public authorities and other organizations to supply infor-
mation that relates to matters the lawyers handle. Bengoshihō [Lawyers’ Law], Law No. 205 of 1949, 
art. 23-2 (Japan). However, the consequences of noncompliance with the request are unclear. For its 
legal effects, see, for example, Ōsaka Kōtō saibansho [Osaka High Court] Jan. 30, 2007, Hei 18 (ne) no. 
779, 1962 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 78 (Japan); Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Feb. 8, 2013, 
Hei 25 (ne) no. 212, 1430 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 25 (Japan). At least in the context of typical 
control transactions, its use, if any, seems to have been limited. 
 444  See ITO, supra note 402, at 315. 
 445  SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, SAIBAN NO JINSOKU-KA NI KAKARU KENSHŌ NI KANSURU 
HŌKOKUSHO 4-KAI [REPORT ON THE EXAMINATION OF SPEEDIER RESOLUTION OF CASES (4TH)] 27–29 
(2012), http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/hokoku_04_hokokusyo/index.html; Yamaura et al., supra 
note 442, at 17–19. 
 446  See generally ITO, supra note 402, at 330–31. The court can deny such requests if the evidence is 
unnecessary. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 181, para. 1 (Japan). See ITO, supra note 402, at 371 n.281. 
 447  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 180, para. 1 (Japan); Minji soshō kisoku [Rules of Civil Procedure], 
Supreme Court Rule No. 5 of 1996, art. 99, para. 1 (Japan). To call a witness, the party must set forth 
individual and specific inquiries to be addressed. Id. art. 107. 
 448  See, e.g., MIKIO AKIYAMA ET AL., KONMENTĀRU MINJI SOSHŌHŌ 4 [COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL 
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fiable reason, the court has the power to impose civil fines. The witness 
may also be subject to criminal fines and detention.449 However, Japanese 
courts have rarely imposed such sanctions.450 In fact, judges discourage par-
ties from calling unwilling witnesses.451 Witnesses have to testify under 
oath and are subject to perjury charges.452 Witnesses are rarely if ever crim-
inally sanctioned for lying,453 and presumably they are not infrequently un-
truthful.454 Further, parties who testify are not subject to the penalty of per-
jury if they lie under oath.455 
Parties by motion may ask the court to issue an order to any person to 
produce specific documents in his or her possession.456 There are exceptions 
to the general rule. For example, documents are exempt if they are for the 
exclusive use of the person to whom the order is directed.457 The language 
of the exemption may be broadly interpreted to cover many types of neces-
sary documents in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.458 With respect 
to specifically identifiable documents, the court may not be as restrictive as 
one might have feared.459 At any rate, the party who seeks the court order 
 
PROCEDURE LAW 4] 72–73 (2010). 
 449  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 192–94 (Japan).  
 450  See Watashi wa shōnin to shite yōkyū o mieru koto o kyohi shitai nodesuga, . . . [I Want to Re-
fuse Request to Appear as a Witness, but . . .], NPO HŌJIN NO HŌTEKI SEKYURITI KURABU [NPO LEGAL 
SECURITY CLUB] (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.hou-nattoku.com/consult/689.php. In a blog article, one 
practitioner speculates that such practice is a reflection of the pervasive attitude of judges in Japan that 
the parties should feel lucky if witnesses willingly show up to assist them. See Naze shōnin no gimu o 
mushi shite imasu [Why Witness Obligation is Neglected Practice of Law], PRACTICE OF LAW (May 3, 
2004, 8:42 AM), http://blog.livedoor.jp/kazsin/archives/504337.html. 
 451  A noted scholar stated that despite the available sanctions, it is difficult to force witnesses to ap-
pear against their will. ITO, supra note 402, at 386. Further, there is a risk that witnesses who are forced 
to appear are less likely to give testimony favorable to the parties calling them. If the witnesses lie, it is 
difficult to prosecute them.  
 452  KEIHŌ (PEN. C.) arts. 169, 171 (Japan) (imprisonment for a period of three months to ten years).  
 453  Id. at 775 (“[E]nforcement of the perjury law is very weak.”). The United States seems to have a 
similar problem although perhaps to a lesser extent. See Matthew L. Lifflander, The Economic Truth 
About Lying, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324532004578360941582888094.html.  
 454  See, e.g., Yasuhei Taniguchi, Code of Civil Procedure of Japan, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 775 
(1997) (“[M]ost witnesses are partisan and not always trustworthy”).  
 455  They may, however, be subject to civil fines of not more than yen 100,000 (US$1,000 at the ex-
change rate of US$1 = yen 100). MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 209 (Japan). 
 456  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) arts. 219, 220, 222–24 (Japan). 
 457  Id. art. 220, para. 1, no. 4, item (d). 
 458  See ITO, supra note 402, at 419 n.394. This exemption, however, does not cover documents le-
gally required to be created.  
 459  For example, in a recent case involving a derivative suit to recover damages that directors alleg-
edly inflicted on a company, a court ordered the company to produce internal memorandums and docu-
ments showing agendas for executive committee meetings relating to the selection of various profes-
sionals, including valuation firms and law firms, hired in relation to the examination of a management 
buyout. Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kobe Dist. Ct.] May 8, 2012, Hei 22 (mo) nos. 230, 231, 1398 KIN’YŪ 
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must provide a description and the gist of the document, and the facts the 
document seeks to prove.460 This requirement, however, is often challeng-
ing in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers, particularly with respect to 
documents not legally required to be prepared, such as e-mails. When it is 
“extremely difficult” to give such a description or gist, then the requirement 
is relaxed, and it is enough for the petitioner to provide information suffi-
cient for the holder of the document to identify the requested document.461 
In such a case the petitioner must ask the court to request that the holder 
clarify the description and gist of the document.462 However, this method of 
requesting documents has not been very effective.463 
Under the JPN Companies Act, subject to certain curve outs, a share-
holder who owns 3% or more of the voting rights of the outstanding shares 
for six months or longer is entitled to inspect the accounting books and rec-
ords of the company.464 The Act also grants shareholders the right to inspect 
other specified types of records.465 Further, in relation to tender offers and 
proxy fights, there are disclosure requirements. These are all helpful but are 
not necessarily unedited “raw materials” that reveal facts that actually tran-
spired beyond the view of dispersed shareholders. 
 (ii) Fact Finding in Provisional Injunctions 
Parties seeking provisional injunctions must make a “rough showing” 
(somei) of both the existence of a relevant legal relationship to be protected 
and the need for such provisional injunctions to avoid severe damage or 
imminent danger.466 Under this standard, the level of proof required for 
 
SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 40 (Japan). According to a blog run by the lawyers for the plaintiffs, the deter-
mination was later upheld by both the Osaka High Court and the Japanese Supreme Court. Masatoshi 
Kato, Sharure bunsho teishutsu meirei saikōsai kettei [Supreme Court’s Determination on Charle Doc-
ument Production Order], KŌBE SOYOKAZE HŌRITSU JIMUSHO KŌSHIKI BLOG (April 18, 2013, 9:34 
PM), http://www.soyokaze.ws/mt/archives/cat2/index.html. 
 460  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 221 (Japan). For the consequences of noncompliance, see id. art. 
224, para. 1, art. 225, para. 1.  
 461  Id. art. 222.  
 462  If the court issues such request, it does not have any direct means to force the holder to make the 
clarification. However, the recipient’s failure could lead to a deemed admission. See ITO, supra note 
402, at 410 n.371. Cf. AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 439–41. 
 463  Id. at 433. 
 464  Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 433 (Japan).  
 465  See, e.g., id. art. 125, para. 2 (a list of shareholders), art. 371, para. 2 (board minutes), art. 394, 
para. 2 (minutes of statutory auditor meetings), art. 442, para. 3 (certain accounting documents), art. 
782, para. 3 (surviving corporations’ merger and other similar agreements), art. 794 (disappearing cor-
porations’ merger and other similar agreements). The scope of the accessible documents and records 
seems narrower than the “books and records” that Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law covers. Further, the curve outs under the JPN Companies Act are wider than those under Section 
220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 
 466  Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, arts. 13, 23, para. 2 (Ja-
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provisional injunction proceedings is lower than the one required in regular 
proceedings.467 However, in general, judges in Japan appear to impose a 
standard no lower than the preponderance standard in Delaware.468 
The court procedure for provisional injunctions is informal and abbre-
viated relative to the procedure required to render definitive judgments, 
such as permanent injunctions. These characterizations are particularly true 
with respect to the fact-finding aspect of the procedure.469 In provisional in-
junction proceedings, the court confers (shinjin), orally or in writing, with 
the parties.470 The court may, to clarify the parties’ positions on disputed 
factual matters, hear statements from those who (i) administer affairs for the 
parties, such as independent contractors or professional advisors, including 
attorneys, or (ii) assist the parties with respect to the administration of such 
affairs, such as officers or employees of a company that is a party to the 
proceedings.471 The court may seek such statements at the suggestion of an 
opposing party or let the opposing party directly ask questions.472 
The parties may submit documentary evidence to the court.473 In addi-
tion, during a face-to-face conference that both parties can attend, the court 
may hear testimonies from the parties or third parties who have been desig-
nated by one of the parties and have agreed to appear.474 However, testimo-
nies are not made under oath.475 In addition, the court does not have a legal 
means to compel testimonies of third parties, and third-party testimonies 
have been taken only infrequently.476 The court may at its discretion choose 
 
pan).  
 467  See infra text accompanying note 483. 
 468  See, e.g., SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 245 (stating that under the standard a 
tentative conviction of the truth is required), ¶¶ 248–52, ¶ 253–2; Ito, supra note 402, at 331 (stating that 
“a substantial level of likelihood” of veracity is required); AKIYAMA ET AL, supra note 448, at 132 (a 
likelihood that permits a tentative conviction). As to the need (hitsuyōsei), see SEGI, PROVISIONAL 
REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 253. 
 469  In general, however, the court may not issue a provisional injunction without having a face-to-
face informal conference that the party against whom the injunction is directed can attend. Law No. 91 
of 1989, art. 23, para. 4 (Japan). However, the requirement will be waived if the passage of time neces-
sary to have such a conference or trial would frustrate the purpose of the provisional injunction. Id.  
 470  Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating by reference, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.), 
art. 87, para. 2 (Japan)) (Japan). 
 471  Id. art. 9. Cf. MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 151, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). See SEGI, PROVISIONAL 
REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶¶ 221, 228–30. 
 472  Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating by reference, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) 
art. 149, para. 3 (Japan)) (Japan). See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 231. 
 473  See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 221. 
 474  Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 7 (incorporating, among others, MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 187 (Ja-
pan)) (Japan). Cf. SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 222 (stating the existence of a con-
trary view).  
 475  See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 221. 
 476  See id. 
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to have a formal fact-finding procedure before judges.477 At such procedure, 
evidence must be taken pursuant to the formalities generally applicable to 
the proceeding.478 It is rare, at best, for a court to hold such a proceeding.479 
Moreover, the required showing must be made through evidence that 
can be examined “immediately.”480 Because of this requirement, in practice, 
document production orders are not issued in provisional injunction pro-
ceedings.481 It also means that there are no scheduled testimonies.482 
 (iii) Allocation of Burden of Proof 
In general, Japan’s standard of proof for civil cases is substantially 
higher than the preponderance standard in Delaware and requires a judge to 
form a conviction as to the existence of a fact to be proved.483 Therefore, 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and Gatekeepers in Japan 
poses a greater problem than it does in Delaware.484 
From time to time, Japanese courts have shifted burdens of proof or 
used presumptions or inferences to impose a persuasion burden on the par-
ties who otherwise do not have that burden even when there are no explicit 
statutory mandates to do so.485 For example, in connection with employee 
dismissal cases, Japanese courts have reversed the usual burden of proof to 
aid dismissed employees.486 
However, the importance of burden shifting in lawsuits against Gate-
keepers is yet to be widely recognized,487 and we have not seen flexible 
 
 477  Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 3 (Japan). 
 478  See SEGI, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, supra note 431, ¶ 223. 
 479  See, e.g., id. 
 480  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 87, para. 2 (Japan).  
 480  Id. art. 188. 
 481  See AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 134. 
 482  Id. 
 483  See ITO, supra note 402, at 331–33; Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the 
United States, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 264 (2004); HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
JAPAN, supra note 422, § 7.06[9][b] (stating that “the majority of judges appear to require a 70 to 80 
percent probability”); AKIYAMA ET AL., supra note 448, at 132 (an 80% level of conviction). 
 484  It is true that, for example, when directors are involved in specified types of related party transac-
tions without complying with statutorily prescribed ex ante safeguards, the directors’ failure to observe 
their fiduciary duties are statutorily presumed. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 
356, para. 1, nos. 2–3, art. 365, art. 423, para. 3 (Japan). However, neither MBOs nor freeze-outs neces-
sarily involve such specified types of related party transactions.  
 485  See, e.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 422 (3d ed. 2009); KOJI SHINDO, MINJISOSHOHŌ [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE LAW] 615–20 (5th ed. 2009). 
 486  See, e.g., Takeshi Araki, Flexibility in Japanese Employment Relations and the Role of the Judi-
ciary, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 249, 253–54 (Hiroshi 
Oda ed., 1994).  
 487  More recently, several commentators have advocated burden shifting in relation to shareholder 
Document1 (DO NOT  DELETE 




burden shifting or the use of presumptions in that area.488 One may specu-
late that the REX II Tokyo High Court decision,489 which involves a self-
dealing transaction (a controller freeze-out or at least an MBO), might have 
been decided differently if the burden had been shifted to the defendants.490 
 3. Strategies to Avoid Ex Post Restorative Relief to Undo a 
Shareholder Collective Decision or Transaction 
Tender offer and proxy (or its equivalent) rules in Japan create a win-
dow of time for the judiciary to render anticipatory relief. Japanese courts 
can render, among others, provisional injunctions, permanent injunctions,491 
and declaratory judgments. 492  However, Japanese courts are not equity 
courts, and their power to render injunctive relief outside statutorily author-
ized circumstances has been limited, and is, at best, of an uncertain scope. 
Further, the level of the courts’ discretion in rendering injunctions appears a 
lot less than that of the Delaware Chancery Court. They might frustrate the 
Japanese courts’ efforts to decide flexibly and to take full account of the ef-
ficiency considerations discussed in Part III.C. above in issuing injunctions. 
Specialization of judges focusing on disputes relating to control transactions 
is incomplete and weak. The courts in Japan, in dealing with preliminary 
injunction proceedings, have been remarkably speedy. However, the speed 
has been due in part to the absence of any fact-finding mechanisms that are 
meaningful in the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.493 
Thus, Japan’s judiciary has not played catch-up with the role recently thrust 
 
lawsuits against Gatekeepers. See, e.g., Hidesato Iida, MBO wo okonau torishimariyaku no gimu to dai-
sansha ni taisuru sekinin [Duties of Directors Participating in MBO and Duties to Third Parties], 1437 
JURISUTO 96 (2012) (arguing that in MBOs, directors should owe the burden of proving the fairness of 
the transactions); Ota & Yano, supra note 412, at 87, 88 n.138 (suggesting burden shifting when a com-
peting bid emerges during an MBO). 
 488  This does not mean that burden shifting has not happened. See, e.g., KANDA, COMPANY LAW, 
supra note 392, at 151 n.1 (describing a case where the court effectively shifted a burden of persuasion 
from one party to the other).  
 489  See infra note 571. 
 490  See, e.g., Iida, supra note 487, at 99–100 (arguing that burden shifting in the JPN Companies Act 
applicable to certain types of self-dealings should be applied to MBOs); SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 502–
03 (arguing that MBOs should be subject to a standard similar to the entire fairness standard in Dela-
ware and that in such situations directors should bear the burden of proving the fairness). 
 491  Japanese courts now have a means to compel compliance with injunctive remedies, both perma-
nent and provisional: the courts can impose monetary sanctions. Minji shikkōhō [Civil Execution Act], 
Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 172 (Japan), Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 
1989, art. 52, para. 2 (Japan). See HIROSHI SEGI, MINJI HOZENHŌ NYŪMON [INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CIVIL PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ACT] 240–42 (2011) [hereinafter SEGI, INTRODUCTION]. 
 492  As to the types of remedies Japanese courts may employ, see generally ITO, supra note 402, at 
158–63. 
 493  See infra Part V.B.3.b. 
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on it, and in particular, is not able to expertly render anticipatory relief in 
the context of shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers. 
 (a) Anticipatory Relief 
 (i) Permanent Injunctions 
Several provisions in the JPN Companies Act explicitly allow share-
holders to seek injunctive remedies. These provisions can be used to enjoin 
certain Gatekeeper actions taken in violation of their fiduciary obligations 
or transactions resulting from or attributable to such Gatekeeper actions. 
However, at least under the currently prevailing view, these provisions do 
not cover many situations where injunctive remedies would be available 
under the Delaware law.494 
First, any shareholder who has held shares for six months or longer 
may enjoin directors from taking an action in violation of law if such action 
might result in irreparable damages to the corporation.495 “Violation of 
law” includes a violation of the directors’ fiduciary duties.496 However, the 
power may be exercised with respect only to director actions that would 
cause damages to the “corporation,” and such damages must be “irrepara-
ble.” But for the two requirements, this right could have been potent am-
munition for shareholders to challenge defense measures. There are many 
instances where director actions taken in relation to control transactions 
would cause damages to shareholders but not to the corporation. Commen-
tators have proposed various interpretations to temper the limitation.497 The 
 
 494  The 2014 JPN Company Act Amendments added several provisions that allow shareholders to 
seek injunctive relief in relation to certain squeeze out transactions. Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law 
No. 86 of 2005, arts. 784–2, 796–2, 805–2 (Japan). However, the injunctions are available only when 
the transactions fail to comply with the technical requirements of the JPN Companies Act or articles of 
incorporation. See HIROAKI TAKAGI, YASUSHI KANOKOGI & SABURO SAKAMOTO, HŌSEISHINGIKAI 
KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAIJYŪYONKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE 
CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 32–33 (2011), 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000081570.pdf. Thus breach of fiduciary duties does not directly trigger 
the newly added injunction provisions. For the possible availability of provisional injunctions, see infra 
text accompanying note 526. 
 495  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 360, paras. 1, 3 (Japan).  
 496  See EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 495, and cases cited therein. Note that, unlike the derivative 
suit, to seek damages from directors under Article 847 of the JPN Companies Act the shareholder does 
not have to first demand that the company enforce its claim against the directors. Cf. infra text accom-
panying note 500. 
 497  See, e.g., Masao Yanaga, Ichijirushiku futōna gappeijōken to sashitome/  
songaibaishō seikyū [Extremely Unjust Merger Terms and Injunctions/Damage Suits], in KIGYŌHŌ NO 
RIRON JŌKAN [1 THEORIES ON BUSINESS LAW] 623, 627 n.3, 630–32 (Etsuro Kuronuma & Tomotaka 
Fujita eds., 2007); HŌSEISHINGIKAI KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAISANKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE THIRD 
MEETING OF THE CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 43 (2010) 
(statement of Wataru Tanaka), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000052523.pdf. 
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results of such efforts are still uncertain.498 Further, “irreparable damage” is 
a threshold higher than “severe damage.”499 
Second, shareholders may sue the company to seek an injunction 
against an issuance of shares or stock warrants if the issuance would violate 
the law or is severely unjust500 and may have unfavorable consequences for 
the shareholders.501 When target companies attempt to issue new shares or 
share warrants as a defense measure, plaintiffs commonly try to rely on this 
statutory authority to enjoin the issuances.502 Further, the provisions to en-
join the issuance of shares or share warrants can be applied to certain anal-
ogous transactions. For example, in Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund 
(Offshore), L.P. v. Bull-Dog Sauce Co.,503  the Japanese Supreme Court 
agreed that Article 247 could be applied by analogy to a distribution to 
shareholders of stock warrants constituting a poison pill.504 
Third, in the case of a short-form merger or a short-form share ex-
change,505 minority shareholders of the controlled corporation, who do not 
 
 498  The Tokyo District Court, however, recently held that the difference between the actual issue 
price of equity securities and the issue price that could have been achieved but for directors’ breach of 
their fiduciary duties constitutes damages to the company. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] 
May 10, 2010, Hei 22 (yo) no. 20040, 1343 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 21. 
 499  See Masafumi Nakahigashi, Kigyosaihen wo meguru kaishahōsei no kadai [Corporate Law De-
sign Issues Relating to Corporate Restructuring], 1437 JURISUTO 17, 20 (2011) (stating the difficulty of 
satisfying the higher threshold). Statutory auditors have similar rights except that they can seek an in-
junction against a director action that is violative of the directors’ fiduciary duties and might result in 
severe damages to the company. Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 385, para. 1, art. 386, para. 1 (Japan). 
 500  Under the prevailing view, violation of the law is a violation by the issuing company and does 
not include a breach of fiduciary duties by directors. However, if the board decides to issue shares or 
share warrants in violation of the fiduciary duties of the board members, it could constitute an unjust 
issuance.  See, e.g., Wataru Tanaka, Kakushu sashitomeseikyūken no seishitsu, yōken oyobi kōka [Na-
ture, Prerequisites and Effects of Various Injunctive Claims], in KAISHASAIBAN NI KAKARU RIRON NO 
TŌŌTATSUTEN [FRONTIERS OF THEORIES FOR CORPORATE LAWSUITS] 2, 17–18 (Hiroyuki Kansaku et 
al. eds., 2014). 
 501  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 210 (as to the issuance of shares), art. 247 (as to the issuance of stock 
warrants) (Japan). 
 502  See, e.g., Tokyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] March 23, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 429, 1899 
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 56; Tokyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] July 29, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 942, 
1909 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 87.  
 503  BESSATSU SHŌJI HŌMU HENSHU ̄BU, 311 BURUDOKKU SO ̄SU JIKEN NO HO ̄TEKI KENTO ̄: BAISHU ̄ 
BO ̄EISAKU NI KANSURU SAIBAN KEIKA TO IGI KINKYU ̄ SHUPPAN [311 LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
BULL-DOG SAUCE CASE: TRIAL COURSE ON ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES AND THE SIGNFICANCE OF 
EMERGENCY PUBLISHING] 438 (2007). Due to the discriminatory nature of the rights plan deployed in 
the case, the hostile bidder alleged a violation of the principal of the equality of shareholders. See Law 
No. 86 of 2005, art. 109, para. 1 (Japan). If there was indeed such a violation, it would have given a sep-
arate ground for the injunction. The court, however, rejected the argument. 
 504  For the analysis of the case, see Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 365, at 353–56.  
 505  Note that these are not popular methods to effect minority freeze-outs. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 394–397.  
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have a chance to vote,506 can seek to enjoin the transaction when considera-
tions payable to the shareholders are “extremely unjust” and the transaction 
could result in damages to the shareholders.507 
Furthermore, if literally interpreted, the foregoing injunction provi-
sions do not authorize an affirmative injunction.508 Therefore, for example, 
once a poison pill is adopted and warrants are actually distributed to share-
holders, under the literal interpretation the court will not be able to give an 
order to redeem the warrants.509 The lack of affirmative injunctions also 
makes it difficult for shareholders to challenge friendly acquisitions. In Ja-
pan, bidders typically launch friendly tender offers without prior agree-
ments with the targets.510 This could mean that there is no action by the tar-
get board for shareholders to stop. Under tender offer rules, targets’ boards 
are obligated to issue recommendation statements.511 Shareholders, howev-
er, may not have the opportunity to seek a negative injunction against the 
recommendation statements if they are announced simultaneously with the 
commencement of tender offers. 
In general, the Japanese courts have issued injunctions when there are 
no specific statutory authorizations in the JPN Companies Act. For exam-
ple, they have issued injunctions against certain types of interference with 
ownership rights, environmental rights, intellectual property rights, and pri-
vacy rights.512 However, there are no standard theories behind the court’s 
practices, and it is quite uncertain in what additional areas the courts will 
 
 506  Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 784, para. 1, art. 796, para. 1 (Japan). 
 507  Id. art. 784, para. 2, art. 796, para. 2. Minority shareholders also have a statutory appraisal right. 
Id. art. 785, para. 1, para. 2, no. 2, art. 786, art. 797, para. 1. para. 2, no. 2, art. 798. The holders of 
shares that are subject to the buyout right described in supra note 395 are similarly allowed to seek an 
injunction of the buyout or a statutory appraisal. 
 508  The statutory term yameru literally means “stop” or “cease.” Recently, in an antitrust context the 
Commercial Division of the Tokyo District Court stated that language of similar import does not prevent 
it from issuing an affirmative injunction. See Tōkyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 19, 2014, 
Hei 23 (wa) no. 32660, 2232 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 102 (relating to an injunction under Shitekidokusen 
oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansureu hōritsu [Dokusenkinshihō] [Antimonopoly Act], Law No. 4 
of 1947, art. 24 (Japan)). 
 509  In Delaware this is not the case. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
 510  Japan does not have antitakeover provisions similar to Section 203 of the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law. Ironically, the lack of antitakeover provisions magnifies the problem of not having af-
firmative injunctions to challenge control transactions. If Japan had such provisions, parties to friendly 
transactions would be encouraged to enter into acquisition agreements, which would give shareholders a 
chance to seek negative injunctions against the transactions.  
 511  Kinyūshōhin torihikihō [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-
10, para. 1 (Japan); Hakkōshaigainomono ni yoru kabukentō no kōkaikaitsuke no kaiji ni kansuru nai-
kakufurei [Disclosure Rules Relating to Third Party Tender Offers], Law No. 38 of 1971, art. 25, para. 
1, no. 3 (Japan).  
 512  See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 500, at 632, 638 n.19; Akira Tokutsu, Minji hozenhō idete kaishahō 
horobu? [Will the Emergence of the Provisional Remedies Act Bring about the Demise of the Companies 
Act?], 82 HŌRITSUJIHŌ 28, 30 (2011). 
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entertain requests for injunctive remedies.513 Some scholars are attempting 
to expand the scope of available permanent injunctions.514 The results of 
their attempts are uncertain. 
 (ii) Provisional Injunctions 
Under the literal language of the Provisional Remedies Act, a court 
may issue a provisional injunction if the plaintiff roughly shows a legal re-
lationship to be protected and the need for the provisional injunction515 in 
order to avoid severe damage or an imminent danger.516 Despite the broad 
language, however, the available scope of provisional injunctions—in rela-
tion to control transactions based on a claim under the JPN Companies 
Act—has been limited and uncertain. 
A traditionally prevailing view is that general provisional injunctions 
should be available to protect a right only in situations where the right is of 
a nature that entitles the holder of such right to a permanent injunction.517 
As described above,518 however, the availability of permanent injunctions 
for shareholders, in relation to control transactions, has been limited or at 
best uncertain. This could result in a very narrow availability of provisional 
injunctions in the context of control transactions. 
Recently, scholars have attempted to more broadly decouple the avail-
ability of provisional injunctions from specific provisions of the JPN Com-
panies Act authorizing permanent injunctions. 519  Despite the traditional 
view, in some cases Japanese courts have issued provisional injunctions to 
protect rights granted under the JPN Companies Act even if the Act does 
not explicitly authorize permanent injunctions to protect the rights.520 In re-
lying at least in part on such precedents, one academic has suggested that 
provisional injunctions should be available for rights that would entitle their 
owners to obtain specific performance.521 The JPN Companies Act explicit-
ly entitles shareholders to request that a court revoke a severely unjust 
 
 513  See, e.g., the authorities referenced in Yanaga, supra note 497, at 638 n.19. For an extensive 
analysis of legal theories that analyze civil law cases in Japan, see MUNENORI NEMOTO, 
SASHITOMESEIKYŪKEN NO RIRON [THEORIES FOR INJUNCTIONS] (2011). 
 514  See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 497, at 632–33; SHIRAI, supra note 139, at 515–19.  
 515  Karisashitome; the term can also be translated as “interlocutory injunction.” Delaware has two 
types of interlocutory remedies, temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See supra Part 
IV.A.2.a. Japan has ex parte and non–ex parte proceedings too. See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON, 
supra note 422, §§ 6.1–6.08. 
 516  See supra text accompanying note 466. 
 517  Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 31.  
 518  See supra Part V.B.3.a.i. 
 519  See, e.g., Yanaga, supra note 497, at 632, 638 n.19; Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 30. 
 520  See, e.g., Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 30, and authorities cited therein. 
 521  Id. at 31.  
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shareholder resolution if such a resolution passed owing to a vote by a 
shareholder especially interested with respect to the resolution.522 Under the 
recent scholarly view, to protect the revocation right the minority share-
holders should be able to provisionally enjoin a transaction, such as a mer-
ger, it is authorized to enjoin as a result of the severely unjust shareholder 
resolution.523 However, the ultimate outcome of the scholarly attempt is un-
certain.524 As stated,525 under the prevailing view, permanent injunctions 
explicitly sanctioned by the JPN Companies Act do not allow affirmative 
injunctions. This position, despite the examples of affirmative provisional 
injunctions in Article 24 of the Provisional Remedies Act,526 may further 
inhibit their use in the context of control transactions. 
 (b) Speed 
In general, Japanese courts are not known for speedy handling of cas-
es.527 Unlike Delaware, no formal expedited proceeding exists in Japan. 
Based on the author’s observation of recent high-profile provisional injunc-
tion proceedings relating to control transactions, in general Japanese courts 
have handled them with amazing speed and without causing undue delays 
in the execution of control transactions.528 This is largely due to informal 
and abbreviated procedures applicable to such proceedings 529  and the 
courts’ keen awareness of the time constraints under which the parties oper-
 
 522  See supra text accompanying note 418. 
 523  Tokutsu, supra note 512, at 31. See also Kōfu Chihō Saibansho [Kōfu Dist. Ct.] June 28, 1960, 
Shō 35 (yo) no. 61, 237 HANREJIHŌ [HANJI] 30 (Japan); EGASHIRA, supra note 360, at 366; Yanaga, 
supra note 497, at 634–35.  
 524  The JPN Provisional Remedies Act does not require a court to balance equities in determining if 
provisional remedies should be issued. As to the Delaware requirement, see supra Part IV.A.2.a.i. The 
permanent injunction provisions of the JPN Companies Act do not contain such a requirement either. 
See supra Part V.B.3.a.i. The absence of the specific authorization for the court to consider the equities 
may tempt it to choose to apply the statutory requirements strictly and discourage robust use of injunc-
tions. However, this concern may be unwarranted. For example, in rejecting a motion in which a peti-
tioner sought a provisional order that prohibits the respondent from holding a shareholders meeting, the 
Tokyo High Court referred to potential hardships to the respondent if such a motion were granted. 
Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] June 28, 2005, Hei 17 (ra) no. 1012, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 163 (Japan). 
 525  See supra Part V.B.3.a.i. 
 526  Article 24 gives several examples of the types of orders the court may give. 
 527  See, e.g., Carl. F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has It Fostered A Rule of Law 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 542–70 (2004); Takeshi Kojima, Japanese 
Civil Procedure, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 689 (1997). In recognition of the problem, Japan enacted a 
law designed to encourage speedy resolution of lawsuits. Saiban no jinsokuka ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on 
the Expediting of Trials], Law No. 107 of 2003 (Japan). MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 157 (Japan).  
 528  For an example, see infra note 535. See also Arai, supra note 436, at 226. This does not seem 
unique to the Japanese courts. 
 529  SEGI, INTRODUCTION, supra note 491, at 44–45.  
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ate.530 For example, as indicated,531 no formal fact-finding procedures exist, 
and unless a trial has been held, the court is not required to give compehen-
sive reasons for its order.532 However, the courts’ use of more robust fact-
finding measures to solve AIPs may undermine their ability to render timely 
decisions. 
Defendants in provisional remedy proceedings could have three possi-
ble appeal opportunities.533 One justifiably wonders if the involvement of 
four separate tribunals—three of which conduct factual inquiries 534 —is 
warranted. 
With respect to regular court proceedings, as one might expect, there is 
no rule prohibiting the courts and parties from moving expeditiously. Ra-
ther, Japanese courts have reserved power to press the parties to move 
speedily.535 
 (c) Expertise and Flexibility 
 (i) Courts 
The courts of first instance for civil cases are generally district courts 
located throughout Japan (fifty altogether).536 The final judgments of the 
 
 530  Monguchi/Egashira Dialogue, supra note 434, at 11–12 (Judge Monguchi’s remarks that in rare 
instances judges in the Commercial Division of the Tokyo District Court may try to get up to speed in 
anticipation of possible preliminary injunction proceedings with novel issues and the time constraints 
may become the most pressing issues that judges in the Commercial Division face when they handle 
such proceedings). 
 531  See supra Part V.B.2.b.ii. 
 532  Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 16 (Japan).  
 533  See infra text accompanying notes 540–543. One example is Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 
Ltd. v. UFJ Holdings Co. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 30, 2004, Hei 16 (kyo) no. 19, 58 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI  HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1763 (Japan), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/js_20100319120824143614.pdf. The plaintiff commenced the provi-
sional injunction proceeding on July 16, 2005 at the Tokyo District Court, which granted the injunction. 
UFJ made an interlocutory appeal to another panel in the court that affirmed on August 4 the earlier de-
termination of the court. UFJ further appealed the determination to the Tokyo High Court, which on 
August 11 rescinded the lower court’s determination. The Japanese Supreme Court affirmed the Tokyo 
High Court’s determination on August 30. 
 534  Minji hozenhō [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, arts. 23, para. 4, 29, 41, 
para. 4 (Japan). 
 535  See generally ITO, supra note 402, at 227–37. Anecdotally, delays in court proceedings are often 
attributable to the habits of judges and lawyers involved in lawsuits. See, e.g., Yamaura et al., supra note 
442, at 13–14 (speculating that lawyers do not want to have quick resolutions of matters they handle, 
since quick resolutions mean less stable income). Some habits and traditions that existed before World 
War II seem to have endured despite the efforts to change them after World War II. See, e.g., ALFRED 
OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN, 130–34 (1979). 
 536  Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 24 (Japan) (district courts have jurisdiction 
over all matters of first instance unless otherwise provided by law).  
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district courts are generally appealable to the respective high courts (num-
bering eight) covering the regions in which the districts courts reside.537 The 
high courts’ final judgments may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Ja-
pan if the judgment involves an error interpreting the Constitution of Japan, 
or otherwise violates it.538 The Japanese Supreme Court may decide to en-
tertain an appeal from the high court if the judgment conflicts with Japanese 
Supreme Court precedents or involves an important interpretive issue.539 
Decisions of the district courts granting provisional remedies may be 
appealed to panels of separate judges of the same district courts.540 The de-
cisions these separate panels and the original decisions of the district courts 
denying provisional remedies are appealable to the high courts.541 The high 
court decisions are further appealable to the Japanese Supreme Court if they 
involve errors in interpreting the Constitution of Japan or otherwise violate 
it.542 Appeals of high court decisions are also possible when the high courts 
that render the decisions allow the appeals on the basis that the judgments 
conflict with Japanese Supreme Court precedents or involve important in-
terpretive issues.543 
The Cabinet nominates the chief judge and appoints associate judges 
of the Japanese Supreme Court.544 The Japanese Supreme Court nominates 
lower court judges.545 The lower court judges are appointed for ten-year 
terms that may be renewed.546 With certain exceptions—in particular sever-
al of the current members of the Japanese Supreme Court—judges are 
mostly career judges.547 No jurors are present at Japanese civil proceedings. 
 (ii) Weak Specialization 
“[H]istorically, common law judges have been more comfortable than 
 
 537  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 281, para. 1 (Japan). 
 538  Id. art. 312, paras. 1, 3 (Japan). 
 539  Id. art. 318 (Japan). 
 540   Minji hozenhō  [Civil Provisional Remedies Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 26 (Japan). See, e.g., 
supra note 533. 
 541  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 328, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 91 of 1989, art. 41 (Japan). 
 542  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 336 (Japan); Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 7, 
para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). 
 543  MINSOHŌ (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 337 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 7, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan). 
 544  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 6, para. 2, art. 79, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 
59 of 1989, art. 39 (Japan). They will retire at age 70. Id. ¶ 5. 
 545  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 40, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 
40, para. 1 (Japan).  
 546  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80, para. 1 (Japan); Law No. 59 of 1989, art. 
40, para. 3 (Japan). 
 547  See generally HATTORI & HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN supra note 422, § 3.02.  
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their civil law counterparts in working with open-ended standards,”548 and, 
anecdotally, Japanese judges prefer not to “interpret” standards. However, 
they seem to shed such a mind-set when they are put on the spot. Thus, they 
interpret broadly phrased constitutional549  and statutory provisions,550  in-
cluding the fiduciary duty provisions in the JPN Companies Act.551 There 
are certain “judge-made” laws as well.552 Perhaps Japanese judges are more 
comfortable interpreting standards than judges in Continental Europe.553 
Thus, in policing Gatekeepers, the judiciary is required to apply amorphous 
standards, which should not necessarily be fatal. 
Due to the heavy concentration of headquarters of public Japanese 
companies in Tokyo and Osaka, however, lawsuits relating to control trans-
actions tend to be filed with the Tokyo District Court or the Osaka District 
Court. Based on their respective internal rules, these courts have Commer-
cial Divisions554 to deal with a high percentage of the disputes relating to 
control transactions. This specialization, however, is incomplete. First, not 
all cases are filed with the two district courts. Second, typically judges, in-
cluding those in the Commercial Divisions, have frequent rotations in the 
 
 548  Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 411, at 895. 
 549  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan). 
 550 See, e.g., the Japanese Civil Code: “The exercise of rights and performance of duties must be 
done with good conscience and sincerity.” MINPŌ (CIV. C.) art. 1, para. 1, no. 1 (Japan). “No abuse of 
rights is permissible” is another example. See id. art. 1, para. 1, no. 2 (Japan).  
 551  Kanda and Milhaupt point out Japanese courts’ successful applications of “duty of loyalty” pro-
visions of Article 254–3 of the Commercial Code that were statutorily introduced into company law af-
ter World War II and are now in Article 355 of the JPN Companies Act. See Kanda & Milhaupt, supra 
note 411, at 895–96. 
 552  See, e.g., Shoji Shinoda, Hanrei ni yoru hō no sōzō [Creation of Law by Judicial Precedents], in 
HANREI TO SONO YOMIKATA [JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE READ] 219 (Tsugio 
Nakano ed., 3d ed. 2009). 
 553  There are commentaries possibly justifying the conjecture. See NOBUYOSHI TOSHITANI, NIHON 
NO HŌ WO KANGAERU [REFLECTIONS ON JAPANESE LAW] 27 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting that Japanese 
Civil Code provisions are much simpler than those of France and Germany); ATSUSHI OMURA, HŌGEN, 
KAISHAKU, MINPŌGAKU [SOURCE OF LAW, INTERPRETATION, CIVIL LAW STUDY] 69 (3d ed. 2003) (stat-
ing that judgments in Japan in civil cases in many ways look more similar to those in the United States 
than to those in France). 
 554  For the Tokyo District Court, see TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, TOKYŌ CHIHŌ SAIBANSHO OYOBI 
KAN’NAI KAN’I SAIBANSHO NO HEISEI 25-NENDO NI OKERU SAIBANKAN NO HAICHI, SAIBANJIMU NO 
BUNPAI OYOBI DAIRI JYUNJO, KAITEI NO HIWARI NARABINI SHIHŌGYŌUSEIJIMU NO DAIRI JYUNJO NI 
TSUITE NO SADAME [RULES FOR THE TOKYO DISTRICT COURT AND SUMMARY COURTS WITHIN ITS 
JURISDICTION ON JUDGES’ ASSIGNMENTS, ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL TASKS AND SUBSTITUTION 
SEQUENCE, COURT IN SESSIONS, AND SEQUENCE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION SUBSTITUTION] art. 9, 
para. 4 (2015) (this document and its prior versions respectively as of April 19, 2012, June 25, 2013 and 
May 14, 2014 are on file with the author). For the Commercial Division of the Osaka District Court, see 
Ōsaka chihōsaibansho ōsakakateisaibansho [Summary Court of the Osaka District Court], NIHON NO 
SAIBANSHO [JAPANESE COURTS], http://www.courts.go.jp/osaka/saiban/minji4/dai1_1/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
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judicial system.555 Third, not all control transaction cases are assigned in-
ternally to the Commercial Divisions. Further, there is no specialization at 
the high court level.556 
 C. Other Non-US Jurisdictions 
The broad discovery and opt-out class action systems in the United 
States are uniquely American.557 Many civil law countries require a higher 
level of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard in the United 
States.558 The same is true with respect to issue preclusion.559 “European 
countries usually adopt the ‘English rule’ . . . [and] the final sum cannot be 
negotiated in advance by the plaintiff and her lawyer, because it is a cost 
 
 555  For example, of the thirteen judges and associate judges in the Commercial Division of the To-
kyo District Court on April 19, 2012, seven, twelve and all rotated out of the division by June 25, 2013, 
and April 1, 2014, respectively. For the names of the judges and associate judges in the division on April 
19, 2012, June 25, 2013, May 14, 2014 and April 15, 2015, see TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, supra note 
554, annex 1–2 (on file with the author). 
 556  See Arai, supra note 436, at 227 (recommending that the Tokyo and Osaka High Courts should 
have special commercial divisions). Recently, the need to implement measures to enhance the speciali-
zation of judges dealing with finance and commercial matters has been discussed at both the agency and 
the political levels. See, e.g., HŌSEISHINGIKAI KAISHAHŌ BUKAI DAISANKAI GIJIROKU [MINUTES OF THE 
THIRD MEETING OF THE CORPORATE LAW COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM] 11 
(2010) (statement of Futoshi Nasuno), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000052523.pdf; CORP. 
GOVERNANCE COMM., LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY ECON. RES. COMM., KŌSEINA M&A RŪRU NI 
KANSURU TEIGEN [PROPOSALS RELATING TO FAIR M&A RULES] 5 (2005), 
http://www.jimin.jp/election/results/sen_san22/seisaku/2005/pdf/seisaku-006.pdf. 
 557  With respect to discovery, see, for example, Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 215, at 1389–90. 
With respect to opt-out class actions, see, for example, id. at 69; Coffee, supra note 96, at 301 n.37 (fo-
cusing on European jurisdictions); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation 
Come to Europe?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE 37 (Jürgen G. Backhaus 
et al. eds., 2012); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN 
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic and 
the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–37 (2009). Moreover, the transplant of 
discovery and class action systems are “very hard, won’t work very well if attempted, or both.” Black, 
supra note 91, at 1594, 1601–02. See also Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the 
Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper 
No. 40/2005, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730403 (indicating “class ac-
tion and discovery rules” as “US institutions”). Moreover, in some jurisdictions the judiciaries have in-
quisitorial rather than adversarial systems. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and 
Comparative Procedure, AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 283–84 (2002). Inquisitorial jurisdictions may require an 
entirely different approach to solve AIPs (asymmetric information problems) in relation to the Stage I 
prerequisites. 
 558  See, e.g., Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 110, at 243 (“In civil-law countries, the standard 
seems strange to us: a civil claimant must in effect convince the trier of fact that the claimant’s asser-
tions are true.”).  
 559  See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Share 
Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REV. 29, 78 (1988); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for 
Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 384–85 (2003). 
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that the loser has to face.”560 Also, the loser pays aspect disincentivizes po-
tential plaintiffs. 561  It appears that the rule applied by courts “ends up 
chilling lawyers’ activism as [private attorneys general].”562 Thus, in gen-
eral, judiciaries in non-U.S. jurisdictions find meeting the Stage I prerequi-
sites difficult. 
As to the Stage II prerequisites, injunctions, including interlocutory in-
junctions, may not be available in lawsuits against fiduciaries as readily, 
broadly, and flexibly as in the United States.563 They may not have special-
ized judiciaries that focus on corporate matters and can move quickly and 
flexibly.564 Judges in European countries may be less comfortable applying 
broad standards than judges in Japan,565 let alone in the United States.566 
Thus, in general, those judiciaries will also find it difficult to satisfy the 
Stage II prerequisites. 
 D. Summary 
To date there have been few, if any, successful hostile acquisitions un-
der the current JPN Companies Act, which was enacted in 2005.567 There 
were a couple of successful legal challenges against defense measures 
adopted in the middle of the last decade.568 The defeated defense measures 
were very primitive. The judges were able to rule on the legality of the 
measures without looking beyond the four corners of the public disclosures 
made in relation to the adoption or the use of the measures.569 Those chal-
lenges were not brought by dispersed shareholders. However, advisors on 
the defense side quickly became more sophisticated and able to create a fa-
cade that, on the surface, passes muster under the Unocal standard. Soon, 
 
 560  Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 557, at 49; see also Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 276 n.30 
(stating that a contingency fee arrangement “is still formally not acceptable in several Continental Euro-
pean jurisdictions”). 
 561  Gomez & Saez, supra note 12, at 276 n.30. 
 562  Id. 
 563  For example, Fernando Gomez and Maria Isabel Saez discussed only class action damage suits to 
enforce the no-frustration rule under the EU Takeover Directive. See Gomez & Saez, supra note 12. For 
the no-frustration rule, see EU Takeover Directive, supra note 17, art. 9. See also Wendy A. Kennett, 
Enforcement of Judgments in Europe, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 321 (1997).  
 564  See, e.g., Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1, supra note 120, 
at 715 (with respect to Russia).  
 565  See supra note 553. 
 566  Judges in civil law countries are generally less experienced in interpreting standards. See, e.g., 
Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000); Coffee, supra note 129, at 28.  
 567  See TANAKA, supra note 367, at 326, 338.  
 568  For examples, see, for example, Osugi, supra note 365, at 43–49; Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, 
supra note 365, at 348–50. 
 569  See Arai, supra note 436, at 223. They should have met the standards for summary judgments in 
Delaware. See supra text accompanying notes 297, 299. 
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due primarily to the AIPs relating to lawsuits, hurdles for hostile suitors be-
came exceedingly high. Poor prospects of having a day in court or success 
in court discourage potential hostile acquisition attempts if the boards of po-
tential target companies resist acquisition attempts in violation of their fidu-
ciary duties. Other shareholders fared worse, since they also had CAPs. 
With respect to friendly acquisitions, including MBOs and freeze-outs, the 
narrow scope of available injunctive remedies further discourages share-
holders from seeking anticipatory adjudication. They tend to sit idle until 
transactions are completed and then seek a de facto appraisal proceeding. 
Damage suits have also been uncommon. 
This is illustrated by two legal proceedings relating to a two-step ac-
quisition of REX Holdings Inc. (REX) completed in 2007 by (i) an individ-
ual who is a founder, a representative director, and a de facto 29.61% owner 
(the Founder) and (ii) a private equity fund (the Fund). The initial agree-
ment between the Founder and the Fund contemplated the Founder’s post-
buyout stake of 3%–5%. However, after a postdiligence negotiation, the 
buyout price went down significantly, and the Founder’s postbuyout stake 
increased to 33.4%, a figure higher than the prebuyout stake. In relation to 
the transaction, the buyout group did not implement any notable measures 
to mitigate the Founder’s conflict of interest. Despite the obvious shortcom-
ings, no one sought to enjoin the first step tender offer or the second step 
freeze-out. Shortly after the completion of the transaction, an appraisal pro-
ceeding (the REX I proceeding) commenced, and in 2009 the Japanese Su-
preme Court confirmed a valuation by the Tokyo High Court that was sub-
stantially higher than the price offered in the two-step acquisition. 570 
Piggybacking on the successful Japanese Supreme Court appraisal determi-
nation, 114 shareholders filed damage lawsuits (the REX II proceeding) 
against the Founder and certain other former officers of the company alleg-
ing the defendants’ violated their fiduciary duties in relation to the second 
step freeze-out transaction. In the damage proceeding, the Tokyo High 
Court571 refused to grant any damage awards despite the much higher valua-
tion given in the REX I Supreme Court determination. The case was ap-
pealed to the Japanese Supreme Court, which is yet to announce its deci-
sion. The chronology of the two related proceedings—particularly the 
absence of any injunction proceeding—shows that the Japanese judiciary 
does not have effective strategies and tools to solve the TPs relating to 
shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers.572 
 
 570  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 29, 2009, Hei 20 (ku) no. 1037/ Hei 20 (kyo) no. 48, 1326 
KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINHAN] 35 (Japan). For an analysis of the REX I proceeding, see, for example, 
Wataru Tanaka, Going Private and the Role of Courts: A Comparison of Delaware and Japan, 3 U. 
TOKYO SOFT L. REV. 12, 16–18 (2011). 
 571  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Apr. 17, 2013, Hei 23 (ne) no. 2230, 2190 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 96 [hereinafter REX II Tokyo High Court decision] (appeal pending). 
 572  In Delaware a class action damage lawsuit may follow a favorable appraisal decision. See In re 
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It appears that many or most judiciaries elsewhere in the world would 
not fare any better than the Japanese judiciary in a similar situation.573 For 
example, Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giucidi took a dim view of securities 
damage suits in Continental European countries.574 However, the TPs at 
Stage I in shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers are more acute than 
those in securities actions for damages. In addition, in lawsuits against 
Gatekeepers—unlike securities actions for damage suits—there is often a 
need for anticipatory relief. Thus, the observation of Ferrarini and Giucidi 
apply more strongly to shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers. 
 VI. INTENSITY OF GATEKEEPING AND EX POST JUDICIAL 
AND EX ANTE NONJUDICIAL POLICING 
 A. United States 
The ex post judicial policing of Gatekeepers is a possible solution to 
solve dilemmas of control transaction governance.575 However, ex post ju-
dicial policing faces its own dilemmas. These dilemmas all relate to the 
TPs.576 Delaware’s judiciary has been revealed as the best-equipped in the 
United States to deal with such dilemmas. This does not mean, however, 
that the Delaware judiciary is perfect577 and can completely solve or elimi-
nate the dilemmas. The more capable it is, the more Gatekeeping power it 
should be able to give to Gatekeepers. The more confidence one has in the 
Delaware judiciary, the more power one is willing to give to boards and 
vice versa. 
There have been heated disagreements on the proper limit of Gate-
keepers’ roles. However, to a substantial extent, this debate might have 
 
Orchard Enter., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014). However, the factual circumstance is 
entirely different from that of the REX buyout transaction. The Delaware case involved a controller 
freeze-out after the controller’s failure to sell its position. See id. at 12. Therefore it appeared unlikely 
for a third-party bidder to surface to acquire the company at a price acceptable to the controller. In addi-
tion, the controller has the ability to pay damages. A preliminary injunction did not appear to lead to an 
arms-length negotiation between the controller and a purported independent committee. See supra Parts 
III.C.1.b.ii., III.C.2. Thus it seemed strategically sensible for potential plaintiffs to seek damages from 
the controller after the completion of the transaction. 
 573  The Enterprise Chamber in the Netherlands may be an exception. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The 
Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Corporate Governance Disputes in the United States and in the 
EU, Paper presented at the OECD Exploratory Meeting on Resolution of Corporate Governance Related 
Disputes 20–21 (Mar. 20, 2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/37188750.pdf. 
 574  See Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 557, at 41–56. 
 575  See supra Part II.C. 
 576  See supra Part II.D. 
 577  See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 70, 72 (2000). 
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been a proxy for a debate on the court’s capability. Disagreements as to the 
outer limit of the judiciary’s capability could create disagreements as to the 
proper limit on Gatekeepers’ roles. In recent years, despite sharp criticisms 
by several noted academics,578 Delaware’s judiciary has been reluctant to 
tighten the Gatekeeping roles of corporate boards.579 This could mean that 
the Delaware judiciary thinks more highly of its own overall capabilities 
than those critics do. It seems worthwhile to examine whether this is indeed 
the case. 
The standards that non-Delaware judiciaries can optimally apply and 
enforce are different from those the Delaware judiciary can optimally apply 
and enforce. Thus, if non-Delaware judiciaries transplant and use Delaware 
standards, there could be too many false negatives and false positives. They 
should consider cutting back corporate fiduciaries’ Gatekeeping roles to 
make the fiduciaries’ tasks less demanding. For example, non-Delaware 
states might want to limit the use of defense measures—such as poison 
pills—to those that protect against well-defined structural coercions,580 giv-
en that structural coercion is more objectively identifiable than substantive 
coercion.581 The collective interests of shareholders are also more easily 
identifiable than the interests of all the constituents. The removal of these 
from what the Gatekeepers are allowed to consider would markedly reduce 
the need for and the complexity of anticipatory adjudication.582 This in turn 
might reduce their competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis Delaware and level 
the playing field.583 Shareholders of Delaware corporations may file law-
suits with non-Delaware judiciaries. There is a risk that plaintiff sharehold-
ers would file these lawsuits hoping to see many false positive decisions.584 
If true, it seems reasonable for Delaware corporations to adopt forum selec-
tion certificates or bylaws.585 
Michal Barzuza has pointed out that to varying degrees and depending 
on the anti-takeover statutes under which they operate courts in non-
Delaware states use standards less exacting than those that Delaware uses to 
determine directors’ compliance with their fiduciary duties in connection 
with change in control transactions.586 Based on this observation, she has 
suggested federal legislation to obligate all states to use the Delaware judi-
 
 578  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 162–211; 
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 7; Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 151. 
 579  See the authorities cited in supra note 51. 
 580  For structural coercion, see the authorities cited in supra note 48.  
 581  For substantive coercion, see supra note 73. 
 582  See supra Part II.D.2.a. 
 583  See Kamar, supra note 151, at 1954 (stating that the jurisdictional competition “may not be a race 
among equals”). 
 584  See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 585  See supra note 63. 
 586  See Barzuza, supra note 52. 
Document1 (DO NOT  DELETE 




cial standards as the minimum for policing the conduct of directors in such 
transactions.587 This position, however, mistakenly assumes that “all judici-
aries are created equal” and ignores that non-Delaware judiciaries are not 
necessarily equipped to handle such fine instruments, particularly in the 
context of anticipatory adjudication. The non-Delaware judges, if they are 
unsure of how to properly use the fine instruments, may try to hide behind 
the more-deferential and less-exacting business judgment rule. Rather, Bar-
zuza should propose that the non-Delaware states consider cutting back the 
powers of Gatekeepers. 
 B. Non-US Jurisdictions 
Shareholder lawsuits against Gatekeepers are unique, and courts, even 
if they are generally competent, are not necessarily effective in handling 
such lawsuits.588 Before any jurisdiction chooses to have Gatekeepers under 
its corporation law,589 it needs to make certain that its judiciary is equipped 
to police Gatekeepers.590 In view of the potentially large gap existing judi-
ciaries must bridge to satisfy the prerequisites, one choice is to have a spe-
cialized court with strategies, tools, and attributes that enable it to satisfy 
the prerequisites. This adaptation could be the least disruptive to the overall 
judicial system.591 Over time this court will develop expertise in the field. 
The administrative cost of maintaining a judiciary that can meet the prereq-
uisites can also be made minimal.592 
With respect to directors acting as Gatekeepers, a possible interim 
measure is to give directors only a limited Gatekeeping role similar to the 
one suggested for non-Delaware jurisdictions in the United States.593 An al-
ternative can be judicial adoption of the no-frustration rule under the Take-
over Code.594 Under these approaches, “[t]he impact of management action 
 
 587  See id.  
 588  Cf. Kamar, supra note 151, at 1954–55 (“It is implausible that courts in [Germany, Britain, and 
Japan] are inherently less equipped than their American counterparts to handle corporate disputes.”). 
 589  Some EU countries have opted out of the no-frustration rule. See supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text. If the company laws of the relevant jurisdictions give the local companies devices that function 
as defense measures, those who opt out might unwittingly put their judiciaries on the spot.  
 590  For an analysis of transplants of fiduciary duties in civil law countries in Europe, see Pistor & 
Xu, supra note 410. 
 591  A small change may speed up a judicial reform that typically does not move quickly. See, e.g., 
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 
(2008). 
 592  This might be the approach the Netherlands took when it established the Enterprise Chamber. 
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 573. To resolve disputes relating to freeze-outs, Ronald Gilson and Alan 
Schwartz suggested the establishment of “an EU-level-specialized commercial court.” Gilson & 
Schwartz, supra note 160, at 179.  
 593  See supra Part VI.A (third paragraph). 
 594  See supra note 38. Gilson once suggested this approach. See Gilson, Structural Approach, supra 
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on the opportunity for shareholder decision is a relatively narrow factual 
question.”595 Due to the objective nature of the prohibitions, the normative 
force of the Stage I prerequisites should be less.596 As stated,597 depending 
on its capability and attributes, each judiciary has a substantive judicial 
standard it can use optimally. As its capabilities and attributes improve, it 
can shift to another standard that allows it to attain a higher optimal equilib-
rium point.598 Creative use of existing tools and changes to uncodified tradi-
tions—such as allowing for flexible burden shifting and lowering the level 
of the burden of proof—should also be considered. The Internet might also 
lessen CAPs at Stage I. These approaches still require the availability of 
strong and flexible anticipatory adjudication. If controllers act as Gatekeep-
ers, it is essential for the judiciary to meet the Stage I prerequisites.599 
If a no-frustration rule exists, the TPs—particularly the AIPs—may be 
fewer in lawsuits to enforce the rule, but they would still need to be re-
solved. If the judiciaries are far from being able to meet the Stage I prereq-
uisites, therefore, we have to abandon the interim approach and consider an 
approach in which neither board members nor controllers act as Gatekeep-
ers. That is the approach of the Takeover Code.600 Under this approach, the 
Stage I prerequisites become substantially irrelevant, since shareholders do 
not have to initiate and prosecute proceedings to police the control transac-
tions. This means that the tasks of the boards and the controllers are far 
more straightforward and simple, and no less importantly, the tasks do not 
force them to make numerous intricate decisions imbued with strong or out-
right conflicts of interest:601 “rules” or “regulations,” rather than “stand-
ards,” generally now regulate the conduct of the directors and controllers. 
Thus, a nonjudicial body, organ, or institution can credibly assume the po-
licing roles that would otherwise fall upon judiciaries. The nonjudicial 
body’s ex ante rule making and enforcement release the judiciary from the 
problem of implementing restorative relief.602 Thus, the Stage II prerequi-
 
note 151, at 877–79.  
 595  See Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 151, at 881–82.  
 596  It would be necessary for the jurisdiction to have mechanisms similar to the U.K. MBR to pre-
vent structural coercion. See supra text accompanying notes 389–391. Under the market standard, such 
mechanisms are unnecessary. For the market standard, see supra note 7. 
 597  See supra Part V.C. 
 598  It may be true that “the effectiveness of judicial review . . . is more important than the details of 
the legal standard that a country adopts.” Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 160, at 164–65. However, as 
indicated, different substantive rules may require different types of competence from the courts that ap-
ply the rules.  
 599  In the context of freeze-outs, anticipatory adjudication is less important. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 600  See supra Part II.A. (first paragraph). 
 601  See supra Part II.D. 
 602  At least the review of these decisions can be made “in real time.” Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, 
at 1744. 
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sites are also irrelevant.603 This regime, however, would require shareholder 
protections similar to the U.K. MBR and restrictive freeze-out rules, and 
these restrictions have anti-efficiency aspects.604 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
Upon reflection, it should become quickly obvious that shareholder 
CAPs and AIPs of companies with partially or wholly dispersed sharehold-
ers generate root issues relating to both the governance of the companies 
and the policing of their control transactions, including freeze-outs, that are 
often induced by the governance issues. The ex post policing by a judiciary 
of these control transactions calls for unique judicial attributes. The Dela-
ware judiciary has speed, expertise and flexibility. Those are features doc-
trinally called for and specially suited to ex post policing. That is why it is 
the best in the business. While less suited to engage in such ex post policing 
than the Delaware judiciary, other judiciaries in the United States in general 
have the most critical of the procedures and attributes necessary to engage 
in such policing. However, for example, class action and discovery are 
uniquely American but are crucial for effective ex post judicial policing. 
There are others features that are unusual outside of the United States.  Thus, 
at least ex post judicial policing will not work in many jurisdictions outside 
of the United States. The scopes of corporate fiduciaries’ gatekeeping roles 
in control transactions, however, have positive relationships with the severi-
ty of the twin problems relating to shareholder lawsuits against the fiduciar-
ies and the complexity and difficulty of ex post judicial policing. 
What do these suggest? To a substantial extent, the ongoing debate as 
to the scope of board veto power in relation to third party acquisitions could 
be a disagreement as to the ability of the Delaware judiciary to police board 
members: “Yes, the Delaware judiciary is very sophisticated and the best, 
but is it good enough to let directors recognize for example the threat of 
substantive coercion as a threat under Unocal?”  Non-Delaware judiciaries 
should consider applying judicial standards that give fiduciaries less gate-
keeping powers than those the Delaware judiciary gives. Multijurisdictional 
 
 603  Further, judiciaries may be less efficient than the Takeover Panel in enforcing these principals. 
See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1732 (“[T]he United Kingdom’s system has prima facie ad-
vantages in terms of procedure—it seems at once quicker, cheaper, and more certain than a system that 
relies upon litigation.”); Gomez & Saez, supra note 12. One remaining question is whether it makes 
sense, unlike the regime under the Takeover Code, to let controllers remain as Gatekeepers with respect 
to freeze-outs.  
 604  Anti-efficiency aspects of the U.K. MBR, see, for example, Davies & Hopt, Control Transac-
tions, supra note 19, §§ 8.2.5.4, 8.3.1; PACCES, supra note 13, § 7.4.2.2. The same can be said about the 
stringent freeze-out rule in the United Kingdom. For example, minority shareholders might vote down 
efficiency enhancing freeze-outs. See supra Part II.B.2. As to the allocation of lawmaking and law en-
forcement powers between judiciaries and agencies, see Pistor & Xu, supra note 410, at 13–17. 
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litigation involving Delaware companies to arbitrage differences in the rel-
evant qualities of the judiciaries are expected to produce adverse conse-
quences. 
Non-U.S. judiciaries in jurisdictions that have companies with at least 
partially-dispersed shareholders—such as certain EU countries and Japan—
should keep the gatekeeping roles of corporate fiduciaries significantly be-
low those given to fiduciaries in Delaware if they choose to employ ex post 
judicial policing. As their procedures and attributes become more consistent 
with the theoretical prerequisites for ex post judicial policing, they can 
choose to use another standard that gives a greater gatekeeping role to attain 
a higher optimal equilibrium. Depending on the procedures and attributes of 
their judiciaries, it may be better for non-U.S. jurisdictions to forgo judicial 
policing and resort to nonjudicial organs or bodies—such as those similar to 
the Takeover Panel—that promulgate rules to address the twin problems 
and engage in ex ante enforcement. 
